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ABSTRACT 
Agenda-Setting and Presidential Power in the United States 
Paul E. Rutledge 
Richard Neustadt (1960) started a revolution of sorts for future scholars examining the American 
presidency.  It was Neustadt who introduced the notion of a personal president, holding personal 
power and acting in ways that had implications beyond those powers formally granted to the 
president in the Constitution.  Starting with the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, the public has 
looked to the president to be assertive, energetic, and solve problems.  Roosevelt offered a New 
Deal with the American people, and was the first president to really reach into the homes of 
America.  Now the presidency is a public presidency, subjected to very high expectations 
without the benefit of a similar amount of power.  Presidents following Roosevelt would not only 
have the opportunity to advance a policy agenda, but in reality the advancement of a policy 
agenda would become more of an expectation.  As such, the formation of an agenda has become 
an increasingly important part of the president‟s job. 
The focus of the dissertation will be to gain a better understanding of the construction of the 
president‟s agenda, how the president‟s agenda relates to that of Congress and the media, and 
finally, whether or not the power to set the agenda has an impact on a broader mobilization of 
interests in the American political system.  The findings demonstrate that presidential attention to 
American political issue areas both responds to and shapes the political environment, and as such 
is a critical component of presidential power. 
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Richard Neustadt (1960) started a revolution of sorts for future scholars examining the 
American presidency.  It was Neustadt who introduced the notion of a personal president, 
holding personal power and acting in ways that had implications beyond those powers formally 
granted to the president in the Constitution.  Starting with the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, 
the public has looked to the president to be assertive, energetic, and solve problems.  Roosevelt 
offered a New Deal with the American people, and was the first president to really reach into the 
homes of America.  Now the presidency is a public presidency, subjected to very high 
expectations without the benefit of a similar amount of power.  Presidents following Roosevelt 
would not only have the opportunity to advance a policy agenda, but in reality the advancement 
of a policy agenda would become more of an expectation.  As such, the formation of an agenda 
has become an increasingly important part of the president‟s job. 
The focus of the dissertation will be to gain a better understanding of the construction of 
the president‟s agenda, how the president‟s agenda relates to that of Congress and the media, and 
finally, whether or not the power to set the agenda has an impact on a broader mobilization of 
interests in the American political system.  The remaining chapters of this dissertation will be 
described briefly here in order to introduce the reader to the questions that are the focus of this 
project. 
The second chapter provides a quite comprehensive review of the literature on the 
president‟s agenda.  Previous studies have been nearly unanimous in the assertion that the ability 
to influence the political agenda of other actors within the political system is a critical source of 
presidential power.  Part of the reason that agenda-setting is such an important power for the 
president is that Congress and the public have invited the president to advance his public policy 
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priorities.  The Constitution provides the opportunity for the president to offer the State of the 
Union Address, which has turned into an annual event where the president has an uninterrupted 
opportunity to advance a policy agenda.  Congress has also invited the president to introduce a 
budget, which is consistent with a broader pattern whereby Congress has given the president 
increased opportunity over time to introduce a legislative package, which Congress will then 
react to.  Finally, the public has increasingly looked to the president to be active and assertive, 
offering solutions to the problems faced by the nation.  This has specifically been the case since 
the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, for reasons described above.  The expectations placed 
upon the president have grown tremendously over the past seventy-five years.  A presidential 
agenda is not longer simply an opportunity; over time it has increasingly become a matter of 
expectation. 
Focusing on agenda-decisions in this dissertation provides an opportunity to follow the 
call of so many scholars, most notably King (1993), who argue that the presidential subfield of 
political science has been plagued by a lack of rigorous quantitative studies.  Like those scholars, 
I recognize the contribution that the so-called “N=1” studies have provided.  Without the earlier 
studies in the presidential subfield, many of which were qualitative in nature, the theory building 
required for testing quantitative models would not be possible.  The three empirical chapters, 3-5 
of this dissertation, employ quantitative techniques to gain a better understanding of the size of 
the president‟s agenda, the influence it has on the agenda of both Congress and the media as a 
bridge to the broader political environment, and the mobilization of organized interests, many of 
whom represent important constituent groups.  Before moving on, the next section provides a 
brief discussion of the three empirical chapters and the research questions they address. 
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Chapter three examines the size of the agenda advanced by the president.  Paul Light‟s 
(1999) book, The President’s Agenda, is the gold standard against which scholars studying the 
president‟s agenda must compete.  Light (1999) asserts that presidents are placed in no-win 
situations, where competing cycles influence the prospects for presidential success throughout 
his term.  First, as presidents advance through their terms, they gain a better understanding of the 
job and are therefore better able to accomplish their goals.  However, at the same time that the 
individual occupying the oval office learns how to function in the position effectively, he loses 
the support of both the public and in turn Congress, so it becomes harder at the same time to act 
upon his goals.  Light (1999) provides a list of factors that influence the prospects for 
presidential success in getting his agenda enacted.  Several other factors have been found in the 
literature as well.  Chapter 3 provides a multivariate analysis of the size of the president‟s agenda 
as a test of Light‟s formulation, comparing the factors hypothesized to influence the president‟s 
agenda for their independent effects.   
First, the liberal-conservative public mood (Stimson, 1992) can impact the president‟s 
agenda because aggregate public support levels for government expansion have been 
demonstrated to effect public policy decisions.  Because of this, the president is likely to 
calculate his chances for success and the composition of his agenda based on the liberal-
conservative public mood.  Further, whether the president faces unified or divided government 
(Mayhew, 1993) is likely to impact the president‟s agenda decisions, with larger amounts of 
change likely to be proposed during times of unified government.  The public approval of the 
president is one of the key factors, according to Light, that influences the prospects for success in 
moving his agenda forward.  Next, electoral results have an impact on the president‟s prospects 
for success, with larger margins of victory providing a short term momentum to the president‟s 
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advantage (Grossback et al, 2006).  Finally, some presidents are just more active than others, and 
should be expected to advance larger and more innovative agendas (Barber, 1992).  In summary, 
chapter three will examine each of these explanations for the size of the president‟s agenda, 
comparing the magnitude of each and determining the influences each have on the size of the 
president‟s legislative agenda. 
Chapter four, “Reassessing Who Influences Whom: the President, Congress, and the 
Media” focuses on the relationship between the agendas of the president, Congress, and the 
media from 1983-2000 across nineteen comprehensive issue areas.  Such a study improves the 
time span over which scholars have previously investigated agenda influence patterns, and the 
comprehensive nature of the list of policy areas places no assumed limits on the areas in which 
the president, or any other branch for that matter, has been able to use attention to issues as a 
source of political influence.  Overall, this investigation is far more comprehensive than previous 
examinations of the question, and provides a much broader portrait of presidential influence on 
the American political agenda, without assuming that such influence would be limited to a small 
number of political issues. 
The data for presidential attention to issues will come from Rudalevige (2002), who 
collects presidential communications with Congress that have policy import from the Public 
Papers of the President.  Each message is then topic coded using the Policy Agendas Project 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) policy topic codebook.  The number of messages offered in each 
policy area is then calculated monthly over the eighteen year period, for a total of 216 
observations in each policy area.  Congressional attention will be measured by the number days 
of hearings held by Congress on a given topic, from 1983-2000, with the data again calculated on 
6 
 
a monthly basis.  The Policy Agendas Project has coded each congressional hearing held since 
1946 into one of nineteen major topic areas similar to the presidential measures discussed above.  
Congressional hearings offer an especially relevant measure of the priority congress assigns to an 
issue because committees, where hearings occur, are essentially the venue where the action is 
(Worsham, 1997).  The amount of attention the media devote to an issue area is measured by the 
number of stories regarding that issue area that have appeared in the New York Times.  
Baumgartner and Jones have coded, as part of the Policy Agendas Project, New York Times 
stories since 1946 into their topic coding scheme already discussed.  Their book Agendas and 
Instability in American Politics (1993) demonstrates that coverage of issues in the New York 
Times is correlated with the amount of coverage seen in other measures, such as the Readers 
Guide to Periodical Literature (.88 correlation) and television news coverage at sufficient 
statistical levels to be considered a proxy for media attention as a whole. 
The method used to conduct this analysis is vector-auto regression.  Vector-auto 
regression is used as a statistical tool to determine Granger-causality between multiple time-
series, essentially evaluating whether a spike in attention in one series has a tendency to precede 
and result in a spike in the other series occurring simultaneously (Brandt and Williams, 2007).  
This is an especially appropriate tool, then, for assessing causal patterns among these three long 
time-series.  Vector-auto regression has been used in several of the previous studies similar to 
this one discussed above.  Edwards and Wood (1999) employed this technique to assess causal 
patterns among the president, congress, and the media across their five specific political issues 
over a ten year time span.  Wood and Peake (1998) have also used vector auto-regression to 
assess patterns of influence in political attention across three foreign policy events.  In this study, 
vector-auto regression is an appropriate statistical method because it will determine, within each 
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issue area, whether there is a relationship between the agendas of the president, Congress, and 
the media, and if so, which institution Granger-caused attention to an issue to increase.  The 
results will provide scholars with a broader view of the landscape of political issues 
encompassing American politics, nineteen major issue areas in all, and which institutions lead or 
follow in attending to those issues.  Viewing agenda-setting from this comprehensive, rather than 
piecemeal view, provides scholars with much greater evidence than previous studies regarding 
the extent to which the president can exert leadership through agenda-setting.  
Chapter five, “Congressional and Presidential Effects on the Demand for Lobbying”, 
extends previous work by Leech et al (2005), suggesting that government attention to issues has 
a mobilizing effect on the size of interest group populations.  Data provided by the Lobby 
Disclosure database on the size of interest group populations across fifty-six issue areas were 
coded from 1996-2004, extending by four years the study done by Leech et al (2005), which 
covered 1996-2000.  The replication indicates a stronger relationship between congressional 
attention and lobbying populations than Leech et al (ibid.) found due to the increase in data 
points.  Moreover, the number of policy statements in the State of the Union Address, as well as 
the number of executive orders issued by the president in each of the issue areas is added to the 
model based on the expectation that presidential attention should have a pronounced effect on the 
demand for lobbying because of the effect the president has on the political agenda in the 
American political system.  Using pooled-cross sectional time-series for panel correlated 
standard errors and controlling for federal spending and the lagged interest group population of 
the issue area, the results demonstrate that presidential attention indeed has a significant effect on 
the demand for lobbying independent of that of Congress.  These results demonstrate that the 
president‟s power to set the agenda can indeed lead to mobilization, and provides further 
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evidence that the explosion of interest group populations since the middle of the twentieth 
century can be significantly attributed to the government‟s involvement in an expanded number 
of issue areas, regulating an increasing number of economic sectors.   
Finally, chapter six discusses some of the broad impacts of the findings from each of the 
empirical chapters and calls for future research.  Specifically, the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation demonstrate that the president‟s influence over the policy agenda is unparalleled, 
supporting the findings of several previous scholars (Edwards, 1989; Bond and Fleisher, 1990; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Light, 1999; Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  The 
president is strategic in advancing a policy agenda, with attention especially given to the 
composition of Congress, the margin of electoral victory and the resulting momentum from the 
victory, and to a lesser extent his public standing.  Presidents influence the agenda of Congress 
and the media on far more issues than previous studies have suggested, and he leads the agenda 
of others to a much greater extent than he follows.  Finally, the president‟s agenda has an 
important influence on the mobilization of organized interests, but the effect is to pull lobbying 
attention away from Congress and presumably toward the executive branch, contrary to 
expectations. 
Scholars reading this dissertation come away with several important areas in need of 
future study encompassing two broad areas of study.  First, scholars have been all over the map 
in how they measure presidential policy priorities.  To some extent, this dissertation admittedly 
follows that pattern.  Scholars need to come up with a better understanding of which measure 
more accurately reflects presidential priorities, or whether some measures are more appropriate 
for some research questions over others.  Secondly, there has been an insufficient amount of 
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scholarly attention devoted to the relationship between the executive branch and interest groups.  
Much of the research on interest group influence and lobbying efforts in general has been 
focused on influencing or working with Congress, but chapter five demonstrates to the surprise 
of no one that interest groups are attentive to the policy priorities of the president.  There are 
likely important public policy actions that are missed with so little attention devoted to lobbying 
the executive.
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Richard Neustadt, in his now-famous dictum, defined presidential power as the power to 
persuade.  As George C. Edwards (2000) illustrates, Neustadt‟s vision departed from the normal 
conceptions of power which focused on the formal institutional powers.  Early presidency 
scholars such as Clinton Rossiter (1956) and Edward Corwin (1957) writing in Neustadt‟s time 
conceived of presidential power as being formally defined in the Constitution.  Neustadt‟s 
departure spurred a great deal of scholarship which focused on the occupant of the oval office, 
rather than the legal or institutional powers of the office itself.  This marked somewhat of a 
revolution, if you will, in presidential studies because rigid institutional conceptions of power 
left no room for strategy on the part of individuals, an assertion with which Neustadt was 
intellectually uncomfortable. 
Presidential power is the power to persuade essentially because presidential action is 
frequently dependent upon other actors within government.  The president has to persuade 
members of Congress, whether members of the president‟s party or the opposition, to come to 
some compromise in order to advance his legislative agenda.  Similarly, Presidents must 
persuade leaders of bureaucratic agencies to implement public policies in ways that are 
consistent with the goals of the administration.  Fundamentally, however, the precursor to the 
power to persuade is the power to set the agenda.  As Edwards and Barrett (2000) note, one of 
the most important powers of the president is the power to set the congressional agenda.  It is 
only after the president has secured agenda space for his initiatives that policy bargaining can 
take place.  To secure a full understanding of presidential power, one must first seek a better 
understanding of the president‟s ability to set the agendas of other actors within the political 
system. 
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This chapter will proceed as follows.  First, I will review the literature on agenda-setting 
as a form of political power, the literature which forms the fundamental power structure critical 
to this dissertation.  Next, I will review the relevant literature for each of the three empirical 
chapters that are part of this work, and discuss how those studies demonstrate the importance of 
the contributions this volume will make to the bodies of literature in question. 
Agenda-Setting and Political Power 
Agenda-setting is separate from other aspects of the policy process in several important 
ways.  The separation of agenda-setting from the pack can be found even in the earliest, classics 
on agenda-setting.  Schattschneider (1960) characterizes the power players at the agenda-setting 
stage as those who are able to control the scope of conflict.  Interested parties in American 
politics attempt to control the scope of conflict surrounding a policy area.  Those who wish to 
upset the balance, or change the status quo surrounding a policy debate, have an incentive to 
expand the scope of conflict.  This brings other players into the political system and a variety of 
different perspectives.  Issue monopolies can be created in Congress, for example, because 
members are able to self-select to some extent their committee membership positions, and 
thereby introduce bias into the committee.  These political subsystems are upset by the expansion 
of conflict, which is fatal to issue monopolies (Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert, 1993).   
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) discuss the agenda-setting stage at which a second face of 
power in American politics emerges.  Power is typically studied in the literature, at least prior to 
the work of Bachrach and Baratz, as the influence over decision-making, specifically those 
decisions that are visible such as congressional roll call votes, or agency implementation 
decisions, for example.  Bachrach and Baratz argue that this conception of power is but one, and 
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probably the weaker, of two faces of power.  An important facet of power that was at best 
understudied but more likely ignored before Bachrach and Baratz was the concept of defining the 
issues and alternatives available for debate.  That is, power was typically studied as the choice 
between two alternatives, but prior studies did not attend to how alternatives were chosen, and 
who had the power to choose them. 
The heart of the American political power lies not in voting or cooperation, but in the 
definition of the issues.  Conflict expansion is achieved through changing the nature of the 
debate (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), potentially even redefining issues as appropriate for 
government action which were not previously considered to be.  It can be argued, therefore, that 
the winners and losers in politics often depend on who can control the nature of the debate.   
Riker (1986) cites examples of several cases where political actors who determined the 
nature of the debate achieved a position of power in their political situation.  Abraham Lincoln, 
for example, was cited by Riker as being a master in the art of political manipulation.  This talent 
went a long way in getting Lincoln elected over Stephen Douglas.  Before Lincoln and Douglas 
were opponents in the presidential election of 1860, they faced off in a race for the U.S. Senate 
seat from Illinois in 1858.  Both men were leaders in the northern wing of their respective 
parties, and both had their eyes on presidential nominations in 1860.  During one of a series of 
debates in the Senate race, Lincoln asked Douglas “Can the people of a United States territory, in 
any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its 
limits prior to the formation of a state constitution?” (Riker, 1986)  This question was a trap for 
Douglas, set masterfully by Lincoln.  Douglas had to answer yes or no.  By answering yes, 
Douglas would certainly please the northern state electorate he faced in the Illinois senate race, 
14 
 
but he would surely alienate the southern wing of his party.  By answering no, Douglas would 
lose his senate race, but not hurt himself in the 1860 presidential election.  Douglas chose to 
answer yes, won his senate election over Lincoln, but then lost the presidency when the southern 
wing of the party walked out as a result of his nomination (Riker, 1986).   
The definition of alternatives does not always lend itself to such visible and entertaining 
stories as Lincoln‟s, but the power held in controlling the political agenda remains.  Changing 
definitions of issues necessarily expands the scope of conflict.  Issue creation is a quite complex 
political process (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994).  In order for conflict to be expanded, Felstiner, 
Abel, and Sarat (1980-81) argue that there are three separate steps: naming, blaming, and 
claiming (Cobb and Ross, 1997).  That is, problems have to be given a name that is appropriate 
for a government response, and solutions have to be available that have advocates claiming those 
solutions will work.  A fine example of this process in motion is the debate over automobile 
safety in the 1960s.  As Cobb and Ross note, the response of the automobile industry was to 
blame unsafe drivers for the increased number of deaths as a result of automobile collisions.  The 
industry‟s solution to the public problem was to bring about changes in the behavior of 
individuals.  The issue as originally defined, blaming drivers, produced little government 
activity.  However, the power of issue definition became clear when Ralph Nader produced a 
study demonstrating that the Chevrolet Corvair was structured in an unsafe way, changing the 
name of the public problem from safe drivers to automobile safety (Nader, 1965; Cobb and Ross, 
1997).   
Solutions to the original problem, too many people are being killed in automobile 
collisions, became a target of much more legislative activity once the automobile industry 
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instead of individual drivers became the focal point.  In fact, this definition of the issue expanded 
the scope of conflict to an extent that the original people who brought about the new definition of 
the problem lost control of the debate.  Walker (1977) follows the advocates of safety 
movements and their effort to get their potential solutions onto the agenda.  After safety issues 
reached the agenda, policy entrepreneurs were able to use the successes first achieved as positive 
feedback for a whole slew of continued safety regulation, some of which the original advocates 
of the safety movement could never have imagined or intended. 
Once a few successes are attained for a given policy position, positive feedback can arise 
that will drive the solution or similar proposals into other arenas (Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1993).  It is the potential effects of issue definition and policy feedback that are 
missing from Downs (1972), where he argues that public policy proposals go through an issue 
attention cycle.  The issue attention cycle posits that problems will go through stages of 
discovery, temporary support for change, and eventual realization of the costs of legislation 
followed by a fading of attention to the issue.  Positive feedback mechanisms can lead to non-
incremental policy change, sometimes resulting in the opening of what Kingdon refers to as 
policy windows and keep solutions on the agenda for a much longer period of time than the 
Downsian model allows.  A policy window, for Kingdon, opens when three streams intersect.  
These streams, which are contained in a garbage can model he adapted from Cohen, March, and 
Olsen (1972), are the political stream, the problem stream, and the solution stream.  The political 
stream contains elected officials who have electoral, and to a lesser extent (Mayhew, 1974) 
public policy goals.  The problem stream contains problems that exist in society that are 
candidates for government action in order to render a solution.  The solutions stream contains a 
series of solutions being advocated by interest groups, citizens, and other interested parties who 
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are trying to find a problem with which to attach their preferred solution.  Advocates are 
persistent with their solutions and continue trying to push their alternative.  Eventually, the 
streams intersect, and the solution is met with a problem.  This is when the political stream 
determines whether policy will pass or not.  In studying the issues of health care and 
transportation, Kingdon found support for the garbage can model of agenda-setting.  In defense 
of Downs, positive feedback is the exception rather than the rule, and just as many interested 
parties to a policy area are working to contain the scope of conflict as are trying to expand it, and 
in some policy areas there may be more groups trying to contain conflict (Baumgartner and 
Leech, 2001).  This clearly was not the case with the environmental movement, however, and 
Downs was simply wrong. 
Kingdon‟s (1995) case study choices are quite effective because of the variation between 
the health care and transportation policy communities.  First, it should be noted that by choosing 
two different policy communities, Kingdon can account for idiosyncratic effects that are 
particular to a policy community.  The health care and transportation communities are effective 
case studies because of their many differences.  Most notably, Kingdon discovered that the 
health care community was much more salient to the public because of its nearly universal effect.  
The same cannot be said for transportation.  Transportation issues rise and fall on the agenda, 
and unless there is some crisis or disaster that forces the public to pay attention, the issues go 
largely unnoticed in the public sphere.  Another important distinction between the policy areas 
that is discovered by Kingdon is the nature of the debate among elites.  In transportation, there is 
rarely an agreement among the actors involved as to the defining issues or terms of debate in the 
community.  Health care actors, on the other hand, were much more cohesive in their use of 
similar terms used to make reference to debates in the policy area.  Kingdon‟s choice of case 
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studies, in short, was quite effective in that a) he chose two entire policy areas rather than 
focusing on specific policy debates or only focusing on one area, and b) the two policy areas 
chosen as cases represented some important distinctions that Kingdon was able to account for as 
part of the agenda and alternative processes. 
Kingdon‟s findings have been criticized for the part “randomness” plays in the process of 
issues rising and falling on agendas and in the specification of alternatives (Mucciaroni, 1992).  
However, as Kingdon notes, despite the part randomness plays in the process, there is also a 
great deal of structure to the processes.  For example, policies do not randomly survive or die in 
the “primeval soup”; there is structure to who is invited to participate in policy areas, and there is 
also structure in whether or not an issue is “ready” for action when a critical policy window of 
opportunity opens.  Randomness plays a role, but the discovery of structure in the process of 
agenda-setting and alternative specification in Kingdon‟s work are simply too important to 
ignore. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) also take a case study approach to the question of how 
issues rise on the agenda in American politics.  The model is an adaptation of Eldridge and Niles 
(1972) theory of punctuated equilibrium as an alternative to phyletic graduation.  They build 
upon theories of incremental changes, including Wildavsky‟s (1979) look at the budget.  The 
authors find that incremental change is actually the norm in American politics.  However, 
incrementalism is punctuated by periods of explosive, non-incremental changes in attention, 
which typically lead to non-incremental policy changes.  Baumgartner and Jones build upon 
Kingdon‟s work by developing a model that explains different policy areas, and also is more 
generalizable than Kingdon‟s garbage can model.  They find that punctuations occur when issues 
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are redefined by political entrepreneurs and successes in the political arena provide positive 
feedback, which in turn keeps the momentum going towards non-incremental, sweeping policy 
change. 
The problem that the agenda-setting literature faced with Kingdon (1984; 1995) and 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), widely considered the classics in the sub-discipline, is that there 
was still a lack of a generalized theory of how issues come to the agenda, and how that in turn 
brings about policy change.  Kingdon and Baumgartner and Jones both provided the groundwork 
for rich theories and empirical testing, but the policy process still lacked a comprehensive theory.    
In an update of Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Jones and Baumgartner (2005) test 
the theory of punctuated equilibrium in hopes of making the theory more generalizable.  In 
essence, the study looks at a variety of measures of institutional agendas and policy outcomes, 
and measures the year-by-year change in each. 
Jones and Baumgartner found support for punctuated equilibrium throughout the 
American political universe.  Institutional friction, which is usually attributed to gridlock, 
actually is associated with larger, more explosive change.  In studying congressional attention, 
media attention, presidential attention, and budget allocations, and several other measures, Jones 
and Baumgartner found that annual change in American politics follows a leptokurtic 
distribution.  A leptokurtic distribution is named according to its kurtosis, or the tendency for the 
distribution to resemble the normal distribution except with higher peaks, lower shoulders, and 
fatter tails.  In agenda-setting terminology, this indicates that all of these measures of political 
attention are frequently incremental (this is indicated by the higher peaks), seldom middle of the 
road change (shoulders of the distribution), and greater explosive change than is associated with 
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a normal distribution, which is what incremental theorists have assumed.  In fact, budget 
allocation change on an annual basis follows a power law distribution, which indicates that as 
changes occur in the budget, they start at incremental levels but grow at a very rapid pace, 
perhaps as high as 1,000%.  The evidence in support of the punctuated equilibrium theory of the 
policy process is the closest, to date, to providing a comprehensive theory of public policy.  Such 
a theory, though, meshes agenda-setting with other stages of the policy process because it is so 
comprehensive.  
Scholars who focus on the agenda-setting stage of the public policy process have gone far 
in dispelling long-held notions of stalemate, gridlock, and incrementalism being the dominant 
models of change in American politics.  The work of Kingdon (1984) and Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993) demonstrate with clarity that broad, sweeping change is possible in American 
politics, certainly to a greater extent than previous scholars had implied.  Further, non-
incremental change, or punctuations, come about with much greater regularity than previous 
studies have demonstrated.  What actually turns out to be most unusual is moderate change; the 
political landscape is formed and reformed almost exclusively by a combination of incremental 
and explosive change.   
Because broad, sweeping change can occur in American politics with little warning, as 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993; 2005) demonstrate, the power to set the political agenda becomes 
even more critical to understanding power in American politics.  In this dissertation, the role of 
the President in shaping the political agenda is brought under scrutiny.  The next section 
discusses the presidential agenda-setting literature, and the central place that agenda-setting plays 
in contemporary conceptions of presidential power.  Finally, after discussing previous studies of 
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presidential power and the ability of the president to influence the political agenda of other 
institutions, I will preview the three empirical chapters of the dissertation and discuss some of 
the more important findings. 
Presidential Power and Agenda-Setting 
Power has been a major focus of study particularly among scholars who study the 
American presidency.  No other office commands so much attention in terms of political power.  
This is particularly the case because of the stature of the office in the United States.  The Office 
of the President has become the focal point of politics and policy in the American political 
system (Neustadt, 1991).  Lowi (1985) and Light (1999) refer to the office as “the no-win 
presidency” due to the mounting expectations that citizens place upon the president to solve 
public policy problems.  Lowi argues that the power invested in the president and the 
accompanying expectations have little prospect of being fulfilled.  Despite the expectations gap, 
however, it is clear that the president does have some power.  Scholars of the presidency have 
expended a great deal of effort defining the powers of the office, a subject which merits some 
attention here.  
Neustadt‟s aforementioned conception of presidential power as the power to persuade 
involved two component parts.  The President‟s personal power is a reflection of both his 
professional reputation and public prestige.  Neustadt argues that a president with high standing 
among the public may not be decisively able to exercise power, but it certainly does not hurt his 
chances.  The same can be said for the second component of presidential power, his professional 
reputation, which can make persuasion “easier, harder, or impossible” (Neustadt, 1991; 54).  A 
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president‟s reputation basically boils down to a dominant tone among Washington insiders that 
encapsulates what their expectations are of the individual.   
Personal power involves the ability of one individual to influence someone else to 
abandon their own positions in part or in full and act according to the individual‟s interests 
(Ragsdale, 2000).  To exercise personal political power, then, is to be able to get strategic 
politicians to act according to your will, which may or may not be different from their own.  This 
is no small feat.  To exercise personal power requires a great deal of bargaining with many 
people.  Neustadt also recognizes the importance of bargaining for presidential power, as he 
states “the power to persuade is the power to bargain.” (Neustadt, 1991; 32)  The essence of the 
presidential task to persuade, then, is to convince strategic politicians that what he is asking them 
to do is in their best interest, not just his (Neustadt, 1991).  The president holds a position in 
American politics that requires him to bargain with key members of Congress, administrative 
agencies, leaders of foreign governments, interest groups, and the public.  The position of the 
president as bargainer has important implications for his leadership potential. 
Charles Cameron (2000) suggests that working together in the political arena can take 
one or both of two forms.  First, cooperation can involve a coordination game, in which players 
select focal points that they can rally around in such a way as to coordinate the actions of the 
players.  Cameron notes that one possible example of a coordination game would be a majority 
party setting a legislative agenda in Congress.  Coordination is required because players must 
have a short list of focal points, “a few priorities, if they are to accomplish much” (Cameron, 
2000; 48).  Another possibility, however, is that players in politics can play a bargaining game in 
which players struggle with one another to divide a pie.  In such a situation politicians decide 
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how to allocate the benefits of a policy or political outcome.  A prime example of this type of 
game would be dividing pork among members of Congress, where in order for legislation to 
pass, a sufficient number of legislators must feel they are getting their fair share of the benefits. 
In terms of the presidency, Cameron (2000) argues that the President‟s position in such 
political games have changed significantly since the time of Neustadt‟s writing (1960) because 
of the increased likelihood that presidents will face divided government.  Cameron notes that in 
1960, the likelihood of a president facing divided government was .50, whereas in the time that 
has passed since then presidents have an 80% chance of facing divided government.  The 
increased probability of facing divided government has changed presidential strategies in their 
efforts to exercise personal power because they are required in such situations of divided 
government to engage more in bargaining than in cooperation games.  Perhaps most 
interestingly, the presidents who are ranked among the greatest by historians (Schlesinger, 1997) 
have for the most part served under unified government.  Serving under divided government and 
being forced to engage in bargaining, rather than cooperative games, may have signaled an end 
to presidential greatness in producing major legislative movements in American politics 
(Cameron, 2000). 
Presidents, with their institutional as well as personal power bases, are ideally situated for 
such bargaining situations.  While making the advantageous position of the president clear, 
Neustadt (1991) warns that the advantageous position in bargaining relationships held by the 
president falls far short of guaranteeing success.  It is important to recognize, as Neustadt‟s text 
so frequently reminds us, that a bargaining relationship is a two-way street.  Neustadt‟s view of 
bargaining for American presidents certainly is more optimistic about the state of the presidency, 
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even if success is not a guarantee, than Cameron‟s argument that the presence of bargaining in 
lieu of cooperation may have actually signaled a death knell for presidential greatness. 
Cameron (2000) is only one of a long list of scholars eulogizing presidential greatness 
among the modern presidents.  Ted Lowi (1985), in his book The Personal President, argues that 
the presidency has become a plebiscitary institution, vested with great power but placed in a no-
win situation.  Lowi argues that the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, the earliest of personal 
presidents, elevated the presidency to become the face of a new, big government to the public.  
Roosevelt, as Lowi recognizes, embodied this conception of the presidency because he was an 
exceptional individual.  However, what was good for the nation also may have damned the 
institution because future presidents have built in barriers that will prevent them from coming 
close to bridging the expectations gap.  The public turns to the president at every crossroads, and 
the president has little chance of successfully acting upon these expectations.  Perhaps the most 
important contribution of Neustadt‟s (1990) conception of presidential power is his argument 
that presidents themselves cannot exercise control over either of its component parts, frequently 
placing presidents in situations where they are expected to exert leadership but are handcuffed. 
Scholars of the presidency, despite these advances in identifying the power of the 
president, have been met with disappointment when applying these concepts to statistical 
research.  A vast amount of literature has noted the problems associated with presidential 
research.  Many of the concepts identified as part of the presidential power schema are hard to 
measure and operationalize; this is especially the case with professional reputation, for example 
(Edwards, 1980).  Public prestige as part of the presidential power picture is easier to measure 
using Gallup‟s support scores, but the results of these support scores in quantitative models of 
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presidential influence, particularly in Congress, have been disappointing.  Bond and Fleisher 
(1990) and Edwards (1989) find that public support for the president has an impact in Congress 
only at the margins.  Other factors such as ideological and partisan congruence with Congress 
appear to carry much more weight in determining a president‟s legislative success (Bond and 
Fleisher, 1990).   
The importance of public prestige has been a subject of widespread debate, drawing 
attention to many of the problems that scholars who have taken quantitative approaches to 
presidential power encounter.  In his earlier work, Edwards (1980) argued that public support, 
when controlling for the partisan tendency to support same-party presidents, does not contribute 
a great deal to the portrait of presidential power.  Rivers and Rose (1985) are critical of 
Edwards‟s findings, however, because he uses only correlation coefficients, which are suggestive 
but cannot effectively determine causality.  Rivers and Rose find that public prestige as a source 
of presidential influence has to be more carefully specified to account for rising and falling poll 
numbers throughout a president‟s term, and the recognition that presidents are strategic 
politicians.  Presidents who have higher public prestige, according to the findings of Rivers and 
Rose, will have greater success in Congress, but as a result of this success they will increase the 
size of their legislative programs simultaneously as their approval wanes during the normal 
course of their term.  These tendencies muddy the water of public prestige as a source of 
presidential power, and illustrate a desperate need for scholars to move beyond standard bivariate 
correlation or simple regression models that would mask these circumstances. 
Neustadt‟s second component of presidential power, professional reputation, creates 
greater conceptual problems on its face than the public prestige component.  While public 
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opinion polls rating the president are readily available, we do not have similar surveys of the 
perceptions of the president from Washington insiders.  Several scholars have attempted to 
operationalize professional reputation, with varying degrees of success.  Some have argued that 
professional reputation and public prestige are not easily separated, contrary to Neustadt‟s (1990) 
distinguishing between the two.  This is based on an assumption that elite opinions on the 
president are to some extent formed by their popularity among the mass public (Kernell, 1986), a 
notion wrapped entirely in the electoral incentive (Mayhew, 1974), or that elite perceptions can 
actually trickle down in the opposite direction to influence the perceptions of the president 
among the mass public (Lockerbie and Borrelli, 1989).  Further confounding is the fact that 
congressional evaluations of the president are a significant component of a president‟s 
professional reputation, making statistical relationships all the more difficult to correctly specify 
since influence in Congress is the primary venue for a president to exercise power.  Advances 
have been made in studying the president‟s professional reputation by relying on media coverage 
of the president (Lockerbie and Borrelli, 1989), so the state of presidential power research has 
produced some breakthroughs and the picture is not entirely bad.  Focusing on a president‟s 
power to persuade members of Congress to vote for his programs, however, has left us with a 
somewhat confusing and frequently contradictory understanding of the president‟s influence in 
the legislature. 
Some of the most promising work on presidential power, especially the power to 
influence Congress, comes not in securing votes, but rather in gaining access to the agenda.  
Focusing on the power of the president to set the political agenda provides scholars with an 
opportunity to step back from the confounding relationships, while still examining an important 
facet of political power.  As I noted at the outset, the ability to set the agenda is fundamentally a 
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precursor to other conceptions of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Riker, 1986).  However, 
presidency scholars have recently turned a much greater proportion of their attention away from 
agenda-setting as a form of the president‟s power and focused more on his ability to influence 
votes in Congress.  To do so is to miss the fundamental aspect of power, the ability to define 
alternatives and influence the terms of debate.  
The ability to set the political agenda is an important component of presidential power.  
Bond and Fleisher (1990) argue that in a Congress that is far from guaranteed to vote a 
president‟s way, setting the agenda ends up being one of the president‟s greatest sources of 
influence.  Edwards (1989) identifies the president‟s ability to set the political agenda as one of 
his greatest strategic powers.  Several scholars who have been critical of the president becoming 
the focus of the public‟s aspirations for policy change have still recognized the president‟s ability 
to manage the agenda as an important force in American politics (Jones, 1994).   Influencing the 
agenda of Congress is not an especially onerous challenge for presidents.  Congress needs an 
agenda from outside with high status to react against, and there is no better program to fit this 
criterion than that of the president (Neustadt, 1991).  In fact, the president has been invited by 
congress to take the lead on the budget, the economy, national security, the environment, and 
other areas of public policy (Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  In terms of the bargaining that 
presidents are forced to undertake in order to survive in the political system, then, simply 
achieving a spot on the agenda is one area where the costs of the bargaining game are likely to be 
comparatively low.  
Presidents have been able to use the important strategic power of agenda-setting to their 
advantage.  Kingdon (1984), in his study of the transportation and health subsystems, found that 
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no other actor rivaled the ability of the president to bring attention to issues.  Similarly, 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that no other actor can so clearly focus attention or change 
the motivations of other political actors as well as the president. 
Members of Congress also have an incentive to invite the president to initiate legislation, 
so introducing a policy agenda to Congress should not be an onerous task for presidents.  
Members of Congress, in response to their electoral incentive (Mayhew, 1974), have an incentive 
to invite presidential initiatives because the president‟s agenda reflects a high status set of 
initiatives from outside to react for or against.  No actor is in a better position for members of 
Congress to serve this need than the president (Neustadt, 1991). 
Political realities have revealed that Congress acts on this incentive.  Congress has invited 
the president to take greater roles in initiating legislation and policy priorities in the areas of the 
economy, foreign policy, the environment, and others (Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  Perhaps in 
no area is this clearer than in inviting the president to submit a budget for congressional approval 
on an annual basis. 
Paul Light‟s (1999) classic work on the president‟s agenda focuses on the president‟s 
domestic policy choices made by presidents from Kennedy to Clinton.  Light‟s work brings to 
the surface many fundamentally important aspects of a president‟s agenda.  The president‟s 
agenda, according to Light, includes defining which of the litany of political issues are 
appropriate for government activity, proposing solutions to those problems, and prioritizing 
among the problems and solutions.  
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Many of the sources of presidential power discussed above have an influence on the 
president‟s agenda itself.  Light (1999) argues that the size and composition of the president‟s 
agenda cannot be divorced from his power base.  For Light this includes internal sources, such as 
time, information, expertise, and energy, as well as external sources such as party support in 
Congress, public approval, and electoral margin (1999; 15).  Taken together, these internal and 
external resources combine to produce presidential capital, a factor that in turn determines both 
the size and detail of the president‟s program.  Presidential capital compels presidents to strike 
while the iron is hot, but according to Light‟s argument the hot iron is rarely to be found.  Capital 
decreases throughout a president‟s term, which compels the president to act on his most 
important agenda items early.  However, acting on major programs requires a legislative skill 
that new presidents take time to learn, which compels restraint.  These countervailing pressures 
provide further evidence of the notion that the president has little hope of overcoming the 
expectations gap discussed above (Lowi, 1985). 
Fett (1994) argues that the president can augment his support in Congress through 
strategically prioritizing among the political issues being addressed.  Studying the Carter and 
Reagan administrations, Fett found that the priority assigned to an issue in the president‟s 
legislative agenda can have an effect on the voting decisions of members of Congress, although 
Reagan was more successful in his ability to move members of Congress who were not already 
predisposed to vote with him anyway, an area where Carter struggled mightily.  Fett‟s findings 
suggest that careful attention should be paid to the process of agenda-building if we are to get a 
more thorough understanding of presidential power, especially as it relates to Congress.   
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The size of the president‟s agenda has important implications for his success in Congress.  
Presidents are limited by an “attention bottleneck” (Jones, 1995), which only allows the 
president to vigorously lobby Congress on a few issues at a time.  Edwards and Wood (1999) 
note that the president must exercise great care in both the size and composition of his agenda 
because of the limited amount of political capital presidents can devote to any one issue if they 
hope to get anything accomplished.  Previous work has evidenced that presidents with more 
compact legislative agendas tend to have greater success in Congress than those presidents who 
attempt simply to do too much (Fett, 1994).   
Presidential policy agendas, like those of other institutions, are subject to periods of 
stability punctuated by rapid change and shifting among policy priorities.  Jones and 
Baumgartner (2005) demonstrate that the distribution of presidential attention to public policy 
areas display significant kurtosis, which suggests that the distribution of attention is 
characterized dominantly by incremental and large change, with little moderate change 
(characterized by the “shoulders” of a normal distribution).  Further, changes in presidential 
attention in the post-war period are much more likely to be increases in attention to new issue 
areas, rather than withdrawal from issues that previously had been attended to by the president.  
These findings suggest that, consistent with public expectations, the president has expanded his 
legislative priorities to address a wider range of policy areas.  However, the analysis falls short of 
explaining the timing of such increases or innovations in presidential attention. 
While many scholars have agreed on the president‟s ability to set the political agenda and 
its stature as an important strategic resource for the president, far too many of the studies of 
presidential abilities to influence the agenda have been devoid of empirical testing, opting more 
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for “proof of existence” being sufficient.  If we are to understand presidential power 
comprehensively, however, several steps are necessary.  First, scholars have to be willing to 
focus on the more subtle second face of power, but second and more importantly, move further 
to understand where presidents are able to exercise power over political agendas and what the 
implications are of this power.  Presidency scholars widely recognize the importance of agenda-
setting as a source of presidential power, but to this point it is unclear what determines the extent 
to which this power can be exercised, and more importantly, what are the implications for the 
broader political system.  Further, scholars have mostly assumed that the relationship between 
the agendas of the president, Congress, and the media are one-directional, although there are 
exceptions.  This is an assumption that certainly requires testing across a broad range of political 
issues. 
The influence of issue attention does not simply flow from the president to Congress.  It 
is important to note that scholars have acknowledged that presidents can strategically alter their 
legislative agendas in such a way as to improve their chances in Congress.  Such a calculation 
would be based on those measures that the president thinks Congress would be most willing to 
act upon, and through his advocacy of those measures most likely to meet success, the president 
improves his standing (Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Edwards, 1989).  The recognition that the 
interaction between the branches is not likely to be one in which the preferences of either side is 
likely to be perfectly understood is of critical importance to studies of agenda-setting in both 
branches (Fett, 1992).  That the president would alter his agenda to increase his likelihood of 
success is quite consistent with Neustadt‟s (1990) notion that presidents should make decisions 
strategically to guard their personal power, portraying presidents as risk-averse actors seeking 
legislative success in Congress above all else (Covington and Kinney, 1991). 
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Another possibility is that presidents respond more to other strategic considerations when 
it comes to their agenda, such as the proper timing of advocating an issue before Congress.  Fett 
(1992) finds little evidence studying the Carter and Reagan administration of either president 
altering their legislative agenda in ways that would increase their chances of success, or ducking 
contentious issues that would most certainly be unlikely to have a successful outcome.  President 
Carter, Fett (1994) argues, had too broad of a legislative agenda which greatly dampened his 
potential for success in Congress.  President Reagan‟s agenda, according to Fett‟s (1992; 1994) 
data, was much more focused which could have had some effect on his legislative success. 
Congress is certainly capable of setting its own agenda (Taylor, 1998).  The 
congressional agenda has a similar capacity to influence the amount of attention the president 
will devote to a policy issue, and despite the president‟s ideally suited position to set the agenda, 
the direction of the relationship is equally likely to be in the other direction, a situation in which 
the president is a responder, not an initiator, of policy attention.  Paul Light (1999) notes that the 
president may borrow issues from the congressional agenda.  Fleming, Wood, and Bohte (1997) 
argue that presidents have shown a tendency to respond to the work of policy entrepreneurs in 
Congress, whether the response is in cooperation or conflict.   
The president also invests a lot of energy in attempting to influence the agenda of the 
media (Edwards and Wayne, 1999; Kumar, 2007).  The president can use the media strategically 
in a number of ways.  First, it is to the president‟s advantage in keeping with his personal power 
to control to the best of his ability how he is portrayed in the media.  Keeping the media 
informed of presidential activities and priorities is advantageous because what the media reports 
is what the public hears about the president‟s activities.  Given the importance of public prestige 
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in the presidential power schema, the media plays a very important role in the success or failure 
of presidential administrations.   
Light (1999) suggests that the president can use the media as a bridge to the broader 
political environment.  This power is especially pronounced because of the nature of the mass 
public.  Page and Shapiro (1992) note that the salience that the mass public affords to a political 
issue is dependent upon the amount and duration of the coverage that issue receives from the 
media.   
Despite rich anecdotal evidence, and strong theoretical reasons to expect the president to 
expend effort influencing the agenda of the media, we know very little about the extent to which 
the president is successful in influencing the agenda of the media (Flemming, Wood, and Bohte, 
1999).  Moreover, the direction of causality between the agendas of the president and the media 
is certainly in question.  Gilberg et al (1980) find that to the extent there is a relationship between 
the agendas of the president and the mass media, the State of the Union message appears to be 
responsive to the media coverage afforded to an issue.  Wood and Peake (1998) find that even in 
the area of foreign policy, where the president should be expected to have the greatest leadership 
potential, the media coverage of foreign policy events play a greater role in shaping the 
president‟s agenda than vice versa.  Wanta et al (1989) found that the causal relationship 
between the agendas of the president and the mass media were reciprocal, with each branch 
responding to coverage in the other. 
If we accept Light‟s (1991) notion that the media provide a bridge between the president 
and the broader political environment, then some thought must be devoted to how the president 
and the public relate directly.  As Kernell (1997) notes, the president goes to the public to rally 
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support for his initiatives and place pressure on Congress.  However, his success in using the 
bully pulpit to do so is in question (Edwards, 1989).  When the president reaches the public, 
however, is the agenda he presents able to influence the agenda of the mass public anyway?  
Some research suggests that elite opinions can affect the agendas of the mass public, flowing 
from the top down (Zaller, 1992), while others have asserted that the linkage flows from the 
mass public up to elites and policymakers, more of a bottom up approach (Page and Shapiro, 
1983).  Hill and Hinton-Anderson (1995) are probably correct when they find that the pattern of 
influence between the agendas of the president and the mass public flows in both directions, and 
causality is reciprocal.   
Jeffrey Cohen (1995) studies the linkage between the policy agendas of the mass public 
and the president, testing only for causality flowing from the presidential level.  He finds that 
presidential attention to foreign policy, civil rights, and economic policy in the State of the 
Union Address affects the salience assigned to those issues by the mass public, as measured by 
Gallup‟s most important problem series.  There is reason to question Cohen‟s analysis, however, 
because he only tests for causality flowing from the president to the mass media.  Jacobs and 
Shapiro (1994), for example, demonstrate that the policy agendas of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
and John Kennedy were both highly responsive to the agendas of the mass public.  
Brandice Canes-Wrone (2006) conducts a test from the perspective of formal theory on 
who leads whom between the president and the media.  In general, she finds that the president 
can increase his legislative success by “going public” (Kernell, 1997), but that public leadership 
is usually not realistic.  The reality of the situation is that the post-World War II presidency is 
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ideally suited, due to proliferation the ownership of televisions, to call upon the public when 
public sentiment lines up with a president‟s legislative priorities.   
 Presidential attention to issues is often dictated by events, sometimes against the will of 
the president.  A fine example of events playing a dominate role in the composition of the 
president‟s agenda is the presidency of Lyndon Johnson.  President Johnson had an extensive 
domestic agenda, wanting to advance his great society program to improve the living situations 
for citizens.  However, Johnson was able to devote little of his energies towards these ends in the 
second half of his term because the latter half of his presidency became dominated by dealing 
with the Vietnam War (Bornet, 1984). 
Birkland (1997) studies the effect of focusing events on public policy.  A focusing event, 
by Birkland‟s definition, is “a rare, harmful, and sudden event that becomes known to the mass 
public and policy elites virtually simultaneously” (Birkland, 1997; 3).  Focusing events force the 
hand of political elites to respond to an issue, no matter what their personal priorities may be.  
When an event happens, what makes it “focusing” in Birkland‟s definition is the assignment of a 
causal story, linking the event to some public policy problem that warrants a governmental 
response (Stone, 1989), and the attachment of a powerful symbol that will keep the issue fresh 
and salient in the public eye long enough to sustain policy change (Kingdon, 1984; Rochefort 
and Cobb, 1994).  Frequently, the way in which the media frame an event determines the causal 
story and symbol that the public attaches to it (Stone, 1989; Druckman, 2001).  Media coverage 
of events, then, can create a demand for action, which leaves the president little room for 
discretion in how his administration will respond (Baker, 1995). 
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The effect of events can be especially pronounced on presidential agendas.  The public, 
especially since World War II, has grown accustomed to placing its hope for response to crisis in 
the hands of the president because the president has become the face of American government 
(Lowi, 1985).  Frequently, this ties the hands of the president whose responsibility can be 
primarily that of a nation-keeper, as is evident in response to the civil rights movement (Riley, 
1999).  This is another example of how events can impact a president‟s agenda.  Lyndon 
Johnson, whose domestic agenda was crippled to some extent by the Vietnam War, also 
benefitted by being the president in office when the civil rights movement finally came to a boil, 
demanding a response from government in order to keep the nation together (Riley, 1999). 
Kim Quaile Hill (1998) tests for the relationship between public salience and policy 
events on the president‟s agenda, with causality examined in both directions.  His research 
reexamines Cohen‟s (1995) investigation of the areas of foreign, economic, and civil rights 
policy.  Again the president‟s agenda is measured by the number of sentences devoted to each 
policy area in the State of the Union Address, and public salience is measured by Gallup‟s most 
important problem series.  Hill also codes event data, such as civil rights protests, unemployment 
and inflation rates, and war and military interventions across the three policy areas.  He finds a 
reciprocal pattern of influence between the agendas of the president and the mass public on the 
issues of foreign and economic policy, and the president having unidirectional influence on the 
mass public‟s salience assigned to civil rights.  Interestingly, Hill demonstrates that political 
events only affect the policy agenda of the mass public, not the president.  Theoretically, the 
presidential response to events is conditioned first by the public‟s response then, in the areas 
where the president‟s agenda is responsive to public salience.  
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 Hill‟s analysis demonstrates two important facts for scholars looking at the influence the 
president can exert through agenda-setting.  First, it is important not to assume that causality is 
one-directional, but instead to test first for which direction causality flows.  Secondly, the 
relationship between the political agendas of the president, Congress, the media, and the mass 
public for that matter are issue dependent; the relationship one finds is dependent upon the issues 
one selects for study.  These issues are but a few of the problems found in explorations of the 
presidential impact on the political agenda.  Previous studies of presidential agenda-setting have 
been plagued by the use of limited case studies.  The executive office of the president has grown 
substantially, especially since the Second World War (Burke, 2000).  The increased capacity that 
a growing office has afforded a president could provide presidents with the opportunity to 
become actively engaged in issues on which presidential involvement was previously low.  The 
sheer size of the executive branch, coinciding with the increasingly broader range of issues 
which are considered on the federal level, should prompt scholars to look at an increasingly 
diverse range of issues for presidential leadership, and responsiveness for that matter.  To date, 
scholars have not followed this call. 
The lack of effective quantitative measures has long been a problem for scholars of the 
American presidency.  This is also true of agenda-setting research.  The problem lies in the fact 
that most previous studies (e.g. Light, 1991) of the topic have focused only on the State of the 
Union Address.  But this presents many statistical problems, most notably the small number of 
observations.  The State of the Union address is delivered by the president to Congress every 
January, leaving presidency scholars with one observation of the president‟s agenda per year.  To 
gain the necessary statistical leverage with so few observations can be a daunting task.  Gary 
King (1993) has offered a solution to these typical problems of data availability for presidential 
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scholars, calling on the scholars to focus on smaller units of analysis, such as decisions, which 
are made all year round and can expand the N.   
Scholars of the presidency have also made the implicit assumption that the agendas are 
presidential, that is personal, rather than institutional.  While Neustadt‟s (1990) work has been 
groundbreaking, it seems that presidential scholars have had a tendency to ignore the institution.  
We see that in the assumptions that a president can only be involved in a few issues at a time.  
While this may be true, it certainly should be tested in light of the size of the president‟s staff 
(Burke, 2000).  Terry Moe (1993) advocates a return of presidential scholars to the study of the 
executive institution.  He argues that because the size of the executive branch has increased to 
such a great extent in recent years, Neustadt‟s work became outdated as it was being written.  
From Moe‟s view, it is no longer realistic to view the president as an individual only, because a 
focus on one actor, even in a leadership role, risks scholars missing a far broader picture. 
While in this study, I follow the call made by Moe (1993) to return to a consideration of 
the presidency as institution, I do not support the argument that personal power studies have been 
outdated all along.  However, when we consider the president‟s ability to set and manage an 
agenda, and exert power through that agenda, it is important to recognize that the attention 
bottleneck (Jones, 1994) may not be as small as scholars originally thought.  The expanding size 
of the executive branch deems it a possibility that the president can be involved in a far broader 
number of issue areas, perhaps issue areas where presidential involvement has not been 
historically the norm. 
Such a proposed study would not be the first effort of its kind.  Several studies of the 
agenda-setting process have included the role of institutions in setting agendas of other 
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institutions as well as that of the public.  Such a focus is consistent with the top-down model of 
agenda-setting (Cobb and Elder, 1972).  Several authors have investigated the role that the 
president plays in not only setting but also responding to other institutional agendas, a series of 
studies that will be briefly discussed in the remainder of this section.  Then, a new study of 
presidential influence and responsiveness on issue attention will be proposed.  It is from this 
proposal that chapter three of the dissertation flows. 
Kim Quaile Hill (1998) tests for leadership in policy priorities between the president and 
the mass public in the areas of foreign policy, economics, and civil rights.  He finds that there is 
a reciprocal pattern of influence between the president and the media in foreign and economic 
policy, and that the president leads the public‟s attention to civil rights policy.  His results 
demonstrate that “future research cannot assume a recursive influence process where…the 
president influences the public but not vice versa.  We must test for both possibilities, and we 
must search for explanations for why different patterns of influence exist for different policy 
areas.” (Hill, 1998; 1333) 
Edwards and Wood (1999) have looked at the “who influences whom” question in 
American politics at the agenda-setting stage, primarily from a top-down approach to agenda-
setting where institutional agendas affect the amount of attention devoted to an issue throughout 
the political system.  At the same time Edwards and Wood discuss the possibility that the media 
could potentially have a causal influence in recognition of the possibilities of a bottom-up 
approach (Cobb and Elder, 1972).  The analysis of causal patterns among the institutional 
agendas were performed across five areas, including crime, health care, education, U.S.-Soviet 
relations, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The results indicated that presidential leadership in 
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agenda-setting is inconsistent.  Contrary to expectations, the president‟s leadership ability in 
foreign policy was absent; rather the president responded to media coverage of these two issues.   
This is consistent with the work of Wood and Peake (1998), who demonstrate that despite 
the constitutional mandate for the president to take a leadership role in foreign affairs, the 
president is largely responsive to media coverage of foreign policy events.  Theirs was the first 
analysis of agenda-setting in foreign policy matters, a field mostly dominated previously by 
studies of the domestic agenda.  Wood and Peake argue that agenda-setting scholars have been 
hesitant to get involved in foreign policy agendas because they do not fit with most 
contemporary agenda-setting theories, which require subsystems, interest group politics, and 
venue shopping.  However, they argue that foreign policy agendas are certainly prone to other 
agenda-setting components, most notably issue definitions, problem perceptions, and 
institutional attention.  Wanta et al (1989) also found some evidence that the president is 
responsive to the media on foreign policy issues, but can also exert leadership on the media‟s 
coverage of them. 
The president‟s record of leadership in domestic policy issues was mixed as well, 
showing leadership on health care, simply reacting to crime coverage, and having reciprocal 
relationships with the media when it comes to education issues (Edwards and Wood, 1999).  
Perhaps the most intriguing of Edwards and Wood‟s set of results, however, comes in their 
portrayal of Congress as an inert branch, neither effecting nor being affected by the agendas of 
the president or the media.  This result is interesting on the congressional level because the 
electoral incentive that is so dominant in the minds of individual members of Congress is so 
tightly associated with the president (Jacobson, 1996) and the media (Fenno, 1974).  Members of 
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Congress seek to align themselves with a popular president who is on top of the ticket during 
elections, and distance themselves from presidents who are unpopular among their constituents.  
This would lead one to expect a reaction, regardless of whether it is a positive or negative 
reaction, to increase the amount of attention an issue receives in Congress as a result of increased 
presidential attention. 
Similar to Congress, the media invite the president to have influence over their agenda.  
The presidency has become one of the stars of media coverage, especially political coverage.  No 
matter what the president is doing, from the mundane to exciting, the media covers the daily 
activities of the president.  However, there are no guarantees that the media coverage afforded to 
a president will be shaped by the president.  In a study of press coverage of the president‟s 
legislative appeals, Andrew Barrett (2007) found that less than forty percent of the appeals are 
reported by the media.  Among legislative appeals, Barrett reports that only those to which the 
president devotes a substantial portion of his attention receive media coverage.   
Presidential strategy then becomes a critical part of presidential leadership.  As Canes-
Wrone (2006) shows, when the president goes public with a popular proposal, it places added 
pressure on members of Congress to enact the proposal, thereby increasing the legislative 
success of the president.  However, the president has to be strategic in selecting the issues on 
which he wants to use the public as a tool to garner legislative success because Canes-Wrone‟s 
results also demonstrate that presidents who go public with unpopular legislative appeals actually 
lower their prospects for legislative success.  Essentially, the agenda that the president advocates 
is just one of a line of decisions that the president must make in such a way as to intensely guard 
his personal power prospects (Neustadt, 1991).  Presidents must exercise caution, then, in 
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determining which legislative proposals to advocate most to the media, because fewer than half 
of his legislative appeals will garner the attention of the media, and those few that do could hurt 
the power prospects of the president if they are unpopular.   
Brace and Hinckley (1992) study the presidential use of polling and the subsequent 
appeal to the media for public, and indirectly, congressional support.  Their work is consistent 
with Canes-Wrone (2006) in that the president has a tendency to avoid the media during times of 
economic peril, which is directly tied to the president‟s public standing (Mackuen, Erikson, and 
Stimson 2002), or only use the media in such a way as to convey the difficulty of choices that he 
has had to make.  On the other hand, the president has a tendency to embrace the media during 
good economic times, when the chances for success are highest, in order to expand the scope of 
his supporting coalition and pressure Congress to attend to an issue high on both his and the 
public agenda.  Brace and Hinckley also show that the president‟s attention to foreign policy 
issues is higher in times where the economy is bad, in an attempt to misdirect some of the 
criticism brought about because of the bad domestic conditions.  The perception of the 
president‟s management of foreign policy is not the only basis on which his public standing is 
formed, but it certainly is an important component of it (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995).   
Many of the studies discussed above regarding the president‟s ability to set the agenda, or 
patterns of influence across institutions, have several strengths and weaknesses in common.  
Much of the early agenda-setting research focused only on the domestic agenda (Cobb and Elder, 
1972; Kingdon, 1984; Light, 1991; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  Several of the studies 
discussed here have begun the process of viewing agenda-setting as an important component of 
foreign policy studies as well (Wanta et al, 1989; Wood and Peake, 1998; Edwards and Wood, 
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1999).  Agenda-setting research, especially the president‟s position in the agenda-setting process, 
is especially strengthened by the inclusion of foreign policy in the study of institutional agendas.  
Qualitative works of agenda-setting have offered scholars several advantages.  Paul 
Light‟s (1991) work on the president‟s agenda provides scholars in the field with a great deal of 
information regarding how the president prioritizes the political issues to which he would like to 
see government attention devoted.  John Kingdon‟s (1984) work introduced the notion of policy 
entrepreneurs, including those who are part of political institutions, working to define a problem 
in such a way that will fit with their pet solution in the garbage can model, bringing about their 
preferred policy change.  Finally, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have provided scholars with 
information regarding the rate of change of political attention, showing that some issues garner 
positive feedback within the political system, a process which can lead to explosive, non-
incremental change.  Their later work demonstrates that punctuated equilibrium is a theory that 
applies across institutions in American politics, making their theory much more broadly 
applicable (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). 
However, many of these same studies also have common weaknesses.  The study of 
agenda-setting has been moving in an increasingly quantitative direction over time.  This is 
because many of the qualitative studies fail to provide scholars with causal theories of agenda-
setting.  For example, Kingdon (1984) and Baumgartner and Jones (1993) provide interview and 
anecdotal evidence that no other actors match the power of the president to set the political 
agenda.  While interview data are certainly empirical in nature, the exhaustive nature of the 
coverage of only a few issue areas has limited the ability to make generalizations about agenda-
setting power to more than a few issue areas.   
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Quantitative studies of influence on the political agenda among institutions have also 
suffered from the use of short time periods and small samples of issues.  Edwards and Wood 
(1999) study three domestic issues, and two foreign policy issues, and their study is focused only 
on the period 1984-1994, encompassing three presidential terms spanning three presidencies 
(two of those presidencies had terms not covered in this time span).  Wood and Peake (1998) 
analyzed three foreign policy events during their time.  
The preceding discussion has illustrated that many important strides have been made 
toward a better understanding of the role of the president on the political agenda.  Although 
scholars have gained a better understanding, there remains much work to be done.  Several 
important theoretical holes exist in the literature, which will be discussed below. 
First, studies of the president‟s ability to set the political agenda have been rather limited 
in scope.  Light‟s (1999) groundbreaking study of presidential agendas, while contributing a 
great deal to scholarly knowledge of the president‟s role in setting the American political agenda, 
focuses primarily on the president‟s choice among political issues or the setting of the 
presidential agenda only.  While gaining an understanding of which issues the president views as 
a priority is an important step to gaining an understanding of presidential power, little is offered 
in terms of advancing scholarly knowledge on how the presidential agenda is translated into an 
avenue of political influence. 
Further, although Light (1999) offers an understanding of what issues are presidential 
priorities, there is significant room for improvement in scholarly understanding of why some 
issues garner greater levels of presidential attention, whereas others go largely ignored.  
Similarly, Light offers a portrait of the timing of presidential agendas throughout the term, but 
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we know very little about whether presidents act strategically in their agenda choices through the 
course of their terms.  An important contribution to the scholarly discussion of presidential 
agenda-setting would determine which factors those issues that the president is frequently 
involved in have in common.  Further, scholars would gain much from understanding 
presidential innovation, entering into policy debates not typically part of the president‟s agenda, 
and what factors influence the president‟s timing in doing so. 
An improved study of agenda-setting as a source of presidential power would accomplish 
three fundamental goals.  First, the agenda of the president across both time and space has to be 
better understood.  To what degree is the agenda of the president stable over time?  Are there 
certain issues that can be deemed “presidential”, whereas others that are completely or nearly 
ignored by the president?  If so, why?  Are presidents strategic in their timing of issue 
involvement?  When do presidents depart from predecessors‟ conventional levels of attention 
devoted to political issues, and why? 
Patterns of influence among the president, Congress, and the media would better be 
studied for longer time spans, and spanning a much broader range of issues.  If scholars focus on 
simply a few issues, there are several problems.  First, presidential leadership is likely to be 
higher in some areas rather than others.  So scholars could potentially focus only on those issues 
where presidential leadership is greatest or least, depending on what one is attempting to argue.  
Secondly, the president and the national government as a whole has become involved in an 
increasingly diverse number of regulatory areas of public policy in the post- World War II era 
than ever before.  Limiting studies of influence through attention to only a few sample issues 
ignores this fact.  Finally, focusing on event-related agenda-setting or short time spans is likely 
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to augment the power of the media in these relationships because the nature of the media is to 
respond to events with increased coverage in an almost immediate fashion, something that is 
notably more difficult for political institutions to achieve with such rapidity.   
Setting the agenda of Congress or the media, or potentially being influenced by their 
agendas, is not the only way in which the president‟s agenda can be an important factor in 
American politics.  Several scholars have demonstrated that the level of attention that the 
government devotes to political issues can result in an increased demand for lobbying in the 
associated policy communities, both at the state (Lowery and Gray, 1996) and national (Leech et 
al, 2005) levels.  If the president indeed has a major impact on the level of attention devoted to a 
political issue at the national level, we should expect a response from interest group communities 
when the level of presidential attention to an issue changes.  Does presidential attention to issues 
enhance the demand for lobbying in an issue area?  How does the impact of presidential attention  
on the demand for lobbying compare to that of Congress (Leech et al, 2005) or state legislatures 
(Lowery and Gray, 1996)?  In the next section, the literature that connects interest group 
mobilization and the problems of collective activity to agenda-setting is discussed in order to 
illustrate how presidential attention to political issue areas is a theoretical hole yet to be filled by 
earlier work.  As part of this dissertation, the effect of presidential attention on lobby demand in 
comparison to other forms of national political attention will be investigated. 
Agenda Setting and Interest Group Mobilization  
The growth of the federal government in the United States since World War II has been 
staggering, as the federal government has become involved in a much more diverse group of 
policy areas than at any time previously in the history of the nation.  This vast expansion of 
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government at the federal level has been studied extensively.  As such, one of the main culprits 
political scientists have placed blame upon for the vast expansion has been the increased 
mobilization of organized interests.  Tichenour and Harris (2002/2003) have linked the drastic 
rise of social movements during the progressive era to the growth of the federal government, 
while other scholars have pointed to rent-seeking interest groups driving the increases in 
government regulation and spending by creating an increased demand for services (Buchanon 
and Tullock, 1962).  Although interest group mobilization has fostered a response of new 
government programs which has undoubtedly led to an increase in the sheer size of government, 
the reverse is also true.  The growth of government over time has also had a role in the explosion 
of interest group populations registered to lobby at the federal level.   
The creation of lobby demand by governmental institutions provides an incentive to 
overcome the problem of collective action.  Rent-seeking groups are able to secure patronage 
from the federal government (Walker, 1983), and the growth of government in policy areas of 
interest to a group provides a purposive benefit (Salisbury, 1969) for mobilization.  Groups will 
respond to increased government attention in a policy area in order to secure new benefits made 
available by that attention, or mobilize to defend their interests.  The relationship between groups 
and government may well be reciprocal.  A potential pattern could be that a few interest groups 
will mobilize in order to gain government attention, but then it is the government attention itself 
once secured that will lead to an increased demand for lobbying activity (Leech et al, 2005).  
Chapter four of my dissertation will seek to uncover the relationship between institutional 
attention and the growth of lobbying populations.  In this section, I will review the literature that 
has been focused on the demand side of lobbying, and proceed to propose an extension of these 
studies which adds the presidency, previously omitted from these studies, to the equation.   
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Interest group mobilization has long posed an interesting dilemma for political scientists.  
Early works describing interest group mobilizations were dominated by pluralists, such as 
Truman (1951), who argued that interest groups actually had the potential to increase 
representation in a democratic society because latent groups had the potential to be mobilized for 
any interest if necessary.  While the pluralist school of thought painted an encouraging portrait of 
the expanding interest group landscape in the United States, numerous scholars lined up to attack 
the prospect of a somewhat utopian pluralist perspective.   
One of the most damaging blows to pluralism came from the discipline of economics.  
Mancur Olson (1965), in his book The Logic of Collective Action, employed rational calculus to 
determine that collective action was in fact an illogical activity: the costs of any individual 
participating in collective action are almost certain to outweigh the benefits.  Collective action 
for Olson would not occur, then, absent selective benefits provided to those who participate in 
collective action that cannot be achieved absent one‟s participation.  Despite these formidable 
barriers built against collective action, however, Olson‟s work questioned why individuals are 
increasingly participating in such irrational behavior, as interest group populations explode. 
Schattschneider (1960) was one of the earliest scholars to debunk pluralist thought, 
arguing that their assumptions about latent groups in theory do not come to bare on reality.  
Schattschneider‟s now famous dictum “the problem with the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with a distinctively upper class accent”, was an especially witty method for 
delivering an important message: some interest groups, especially those representing the 
wealthiest among society, had a much easier time overcoming the illogic of collective action 
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than others.  Citizen representation was harmed, not helped, by interest group mobilization 
according to Schattschneider. 
It is not hard to imagine higher incentives existing for the wealthy to mobilize for 
collective action; after all it is their interests most likely to be threatened by government activity.  
But the incentive system for interest group mobilization is not so simple.  Olson‟s formulation 
focused primarily on selective incentives, ignoring other possible incentives that could produce 
an interest group mobilization.  Political scientists Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson (1961) argue 
that purposive and solidary benefits can also produce mobilization for collective activity.  
Purposive incentives are those incentives that encourage people to join a cause they believe in, in 
order to secure some public policy desire or public good not materialistic in nature.  Solidary 
benefits are afforded to those who just desire to be a part of something, and join just for the 
personal benefit of joining based on the belief that man is a social animal who wants to work 
together with others. 
Salisbury (1969) proposes an exchange theory of interest groups based on the contractual 
exchange between entrepreneurs and new members.  The entrepreneur can provide any of a 
number of benefits, material, solidary, or expressive, to encourage new members to join and 
sustain their membership.  As long as entrepreneurs are able to provide benefits sufficient 
enough to encourage people to join and overcome the initial problem of collective action, 
Salisbury argues that individuals are less likely to need continued or at least equal benefit for 
their continued participation.  Hence, entrepreneurs do face some startup costs in overcoming the 
barriers to collective action, but once the threshold is broken and individuals are participating, it 
is much less costly to ensure their continued membership. 
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Jack Walker‟s (1983, 1991) research which surveys an extensive list of membership 
interest groups provides evidence in support of Salisbury‟s (1969) thesis.  Walker finds similarly 
that the startup costs of a membership group are the most formidable barrier to collective action.  
His data demonstrate that eighty-nine percent of citizen groups surveyed had major contributions 
from patrons in their initial startup phase.  Such major contributions, according to Walker‟s data, 
could come from government grants, foundations, corporations, or wealthy individuals.  Only 
thirty-four percent of profit sector groups needed major donations from patrons to overcome 
startup costs, however.  This indicates again some support of Schattschneider‟s argument: it is 
much easier for profit sector groups to overcome the problems associated with collective action.   
Perhaps the most interesting pattern to come out of Walker‟s surveys performed in 1980 
and 1985 is the explosive increase in citizen groups.  Citizen groups, assisted in large part by 
patronage, have begun to level the playing field with profit sector groups, a development which 
has implications not only in the interest group field but also in public administration, where the 
increased presence of citizen watchdog groups has weakened the ability of wealthier profit sector 
groups to capture implementing agencies (Wilson, 1989).  For the purposes of this dissertation, 
Walker‟s data are the first to point to the role that government itself can play in the formation 
and mobilization of interest groups. 
The increase in citizen groups as a result of patronage has opened the door to new 
possible explanations for interest group mobilizations, a development which several scholars 
have welcomed with open arms.  Lowery and Gray (1996) borrow theoretically from population 
ecology to explain the growth and diversity of interest group populations in the American states.  
Their analyses are based on a large sample of interest group populations across 50 states.  The 
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model is represented by energy, stability, and area, or ESA.  Basically, the ESA model predicts 
that the size of the government in any given state is a major predictor of both the growth and 
diversity of interest group populations.  These results provide empirical support for some of the 
theoretical arguments discussed above, namely, that government has a role in patronage (Walker, 
1991), that a quite diverse set of incentives can be employed by entrepreneurs to encourage 
mobilization (Clark and Wilson, 1961; Salisbury, 1969), and finally that much of the growth in 
lobbying groups overtime is accounted for by a rise in citizen groups. 
Boehmke (2005) echoes the findings of Lowery and Gray (1998) in studying the role of 
direct legislation.  Boehmke notes that states in which direct legislation is encouraged or 
increases, the lobbying populations tend to respond with a growth in the number of interest 
groups participating in the process. 
The ability of government to foster lobby demand has not only been explored on the state 
level.  Baumgartner and Leech (2001) explore the interest group registrations required by the 
Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995 across 137 issue areas.  They find that the interest group 
populations across their issue areas are quite skewed, with a few areas having a great majority of 
groups while others only have a few groups operating at any one time.  These results confirm the 
concerns of earlier scholars because business interests are still able to exercise their dominance 
in those policy areas where only a few groups have been mobilized.  Citizen groups tend to be 
concentrated in the issue areas where many groups are located, while the more powerful 
economic interests are able to find an issue niche where they can carve out an isolated spot for 
continued domination over their policy of interest. 
51 
 
The studies discussed thus far have still had a predominant focus on the size of 
government, indicating an overwhelming exploration of tangible benefits.  Leech and her 
colleagues (2005) move beyond tangible benefits, exploring the specific activities that 
government can use to foster interest group mobilization.  They test specifically for the effects of 
increased governmental attention, as measured by the number of Congressional hearings, across 
fifty-six policy areas.  They find that increased attention to a policy area, even absent increased 
legislative output, leads to a responsive increase in the number of lobbyists registered to 
participate in that issue area.  Interest groups respond to the potential of new legislation or new 
benefits available at the agenda-stage.  The mobilization of organized interests at both the state 
and national levels, then, is a result not only of the social and economic “supply” factors, but also 
of demand factors such as increased government attention.  Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery 
(2009, forthcoming) find evidence that policy attention on the federal level also has an impact on 
the state level, increasing the number of organized interests lobbying in a given policy area at the 
state level.   
Despite the gains made by studies showing the impact of government on fostering 
demand for lobbying, a significant part of the political attention picture has yet to be examined.  
Leech et al (2005) and Baumgartner et al (forthcoming) focus only on Congressional attention 
and federal spending as a signal to interest groups of increased government attention to their 
policy area of interest.  What is troubling about these studies is the omission of the attention 
devoted to an issue by the President.  As I discussed extensively above, previous scholars of 
agenda-setting have noted the importance of the president in setting the governmental agenda 
(Kingdon, 1984; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, Light, 1999; Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  If the 
president has such a significant role in setting the public policy agenda of the nation, and 
52 
 
political attention has a significant impact on the population of interest group communities, we 
should expect to see some relationship between presidential attention to public policy issues and 
the number of registered lobbyists operating in that policy community.  It is this inquiry that is 
the focus of Chapter four of this volume.   
Plan of the Dissertation 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I examine the president‟s agenda decision, with 
specific attention focused on how timing and political capital effect the size of the president‟s 
agenda.  The purpose of the chapter is to reexamine the construction of the president‟s agenda, 
testing the explanations offered as part of Paul Light‟s (1999) political capital construct for their 
independent influence on the size of the president‟s legislative agenda.  The findings demonstrate 
that unified government, margin of electoral victory, and public approval all influence the total 
size of the president‟s agenda.  When it comes to proposing new issues, however, unified 
government is the only factor Light (1999) discussed that has a significant influence.  More of 
the variation in the number of new programs offered is explained by differences between 
presidents than the other component parts of the political capital formulation put forth by Light. 
Chapter four examines the relationship between the agendas of the president, Congress, 
and the media.  Specifically, I examine spikes in the attention to each of the three actors across 
nineteen major issue areas in American politics, using vector autoregression to determine 
Granger causality among the institutions.  In doing so, chapter three provides the patterns of 
influence through agenda-setting that exist across the universe of American political issues, and 
leads to the conclusion that patterns of influence are highly issue dependent.  Most importantly, 
however, the results demonstrate that the president does indeed have a significant amount of 
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influence over the political agendas of Congress and the media.  The president exerts the most 
leadership over the political attention devoted to issues out of the three agenda-series, and 
Congress has the agenda series that is most responsive to the agendas of the president and the 
media. 
Chapter five examines the impact that political institutions have on the demand for 
lobbying.  Previous scholars have posited that institutions can foster lobby demand simply by 
attending to issues on the agenda (Lowery and Gray, 1996; Leech et al, 2005).  However, none 
of the previous studies has included the president as potentially fostering demand by attending to 
issues, despite the litany of scholarship that discusses the key role of the president setting the 
political agenda.  Chapter four compares the ability of the president, Congress, and federal 
spending to influence lobbying communities, adding the president to the lobby demand picture. 
Finally, in chapter six I discuss the main findings and conclusions of the dissertation.  
While significant findings arise from this volume, perhaps the most significant contribution this 
work adds to the literature is by pointing out several avenues for continued research that would 
add valuable contributions to the study of the presidency and agenda-setting. 
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Introduction 
 Richard Neustadt‟s (1991) now famous dictum that presidential power is the power to 
persuade has become second nature not only to scholars of the presidency, but to others.  
Presidents are placed into positions constitutionally where their ability to exert influence in the 
political arena is dependent upon the ability of the individual occupying the oval office to 
bargain with others.  This is especially true of presidential relations with Congress, which the 
president is forced to work with in order to bring about desired policy change.  Although arm-
twisting and negotiations over votes constitute an important part of presidential power, the power 
to persuade also involves persuading members of Congress to attend to the policy agenda of the 
president.  Certainly, persuading members of Congress to merely devote attention to issues is a 
much simpler task than bringing Congress around to enact the desired policy changes of the 
president (Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  The ability to influence the political agenda is an 
important component of presidential power, perhaps even the most important avenue through 
which presidents can pursue influence (Bond and Fleisher, 1990).  Presidents recognize this and 
use their persuasive power at the agenda-setting stage quite well.  As previous scholars have 
noted, no other actor rivals the ability of the president to raise the levels of attention devoted to 
an issue throughout the political system (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995).  But 
how does the president construct an agenda for presentation to Congress?  What factors influence 
the construction of the president‟s agenda?  These are the questions that will be the focus of this 
paper. 
 Paul Light (1999) has provided a great deal of insight into how presidents make agenda 
choices, and how the concept of political capital influences the agenda that the president puts 
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forth.  Presidential capital is a concept which includes several measurable component parts, 
however.  Which of these component parts exert influence over the size of the president‟s 
agenda?  Which factors advanced in the previous studies of the president‟s agenda significantly 
influence the nature of the programs the president puts forth: is the agenda filled with new 
programs or just the tweaking of existing programs?  Finally, how does the president respond to 
the changing political realities in the composition of his agenda?   These questions will be 
investigated using multivariate pooled cross sectional time-series analysis. 
 Briefly, the findings provide confirming evidence for Light‟s model of presidential 
capital.  Even after being disaggregated into its component parts, it is clear that Light‟s interview 
data captured the appropriate variables that are part of the broader political capital concept.  
However, it is clear that certain components of political capital have a much larger influence 
over the size of the president‟s agenda.  Specifically, the margin of the electoral victory of the 
president has a very large influence on the size of the president‟s agenda, an influence that is a 
far more powerful than public approval.  Finally, the most important factor influencing the size 
of the president‟s agenda as well as the number of new programs advanced by the president is 
the composition of Congress.  None of the component parts of the political capital concept 
advanced by Paul Light rival the influence that unified government has on the size of the 
president‟s agenda or the amount of innovation offered in the agenda. 
Presidential Power and the President’s Agenda 
Richard Neustadt (1991) redefined presidential power as personal, rather than 
institutional power. Neustadt‟s conception of Presidential power as the power to persuade 
involved two component parts.  First, the President‟s personal power is a reflection of his public 
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prestige.  Neustadt argues that a president with high standing among the public may not be 
decisively able to exercise power, but it certainly does not hurt his chances.  The same can be 
said for the second component of presidential power, his professional reputation, which can 
make persuasion “easier, harder, or impossible” (Neustadt, 1990; 54).  A president‟s reputation 
basically boils down to a dominant tone among Washington insiders that encapsulates what their 
expectations are from the individual.   
 Personal power involves the ability of one individual to influence someone else to 
abandon their own positions in part or in full and act according to the individual‟s interests 
(Ragsdale, 2000).  To exercise personal political power, then, is to be able to get strategic 
politicians to act according to your will, which may or may not be different from their own.  This 
is no small feat.  To exercise personal power requires a great deal of bargaining with a great deal 
of people.  Neustadt also recognizes the importance of bargaining for Presidential power, as he 
states “the power to persuade is the power to bargain.” (Neustadt, 1990; 32)  The essence of the 
Presidential task to persuade, then, is to convince strategic politicians that what he is asking them 
to do is in their best interest, not just his (Neustadt, 1990).  The President holds a position in 
American politics that requires them to bargain with key members of Congress, administrative 
agencies, leaders of foreign governments, interest groups, and the public.  The position of the 
President as bargainer has important implications for his leadership potential. 
A great majority of work on the President‟s influence in Congress has been focused on 
presidential popularity as a source of influence.  While such studies add to the literature, one 
critical weakness of popularity, which is measured on the aggregate, is that such a measure does 
not include any information that is specific to individual Congressional votes (Fett, 1994).  While 
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presidents who have greater popularity can have an effect on Congress, that influence has been 
shown to be limited to the margins (Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Edwards, 1989).  The omission of 
information that is specific to individual Congressional votes greatly mutes the effects of many 
vote-specific measures a president can take to augment his influence in Congress. 
Some of the most promising work on presidential power comes not in obtaining vote 
support, but rather in obtaining attention to the president‟s program in the first place.  Focusing 
on the power of the president to set the political agenda provides scholars with an opportunity to 
step back from the confounding relationships, while still examining an important facet of 
political power.  As I noted in the outset, the ability to set the agenda is fundamentally a 
precursor to other conceptions of power (Schattschneider, 1960; Riker, 1986).  However, 
presidency scholars have recently turned a much greater proportion of their attention away from 
agenda-setting as a form of the president‟s power and focused more on his ability to influence 
votes in Congress.   
The ability to set the political agenda is an important component of presidential power.  
Persuading Congress to vote with the president has proven quite difficult, which makes the 
power to influence the Congressional agenda critical to the president (Edwards, 1989; Bond and 
Fleisher, 1990).  Members of Congress also have an incentive to invite the president to initiate 
legislation, so introducing a policy agenda to Congress should not be an onerous task for 
presidents.  The public has also placed a great deal of hope in the presidency to solve public 
policy problems, leading scholars to conclude that no single actor can better influence the policy 
agendas of others than the president (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995). 
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Paul Light‟s (1999) classic work on the president‟s agenda focuses on the president‟s 
domestic policy choices made by presidents from Kennedy to Clinton.  Light‟s work brings to 
the surface many fundamentally important aspects of a president‟s agenda.  He argues that the 
president‟s agenda includes the defining of issues that are appropriate for government activity, 
proposing solutions to those problems, and finally prioritizing among the many problems 
government could address those issues that are most important to the president‟s program.   
Many of the sources of presidential power discussed above have an influence on the 
president‟s agenda itself.  Light (1999) argues that the size and composition of the president‟s 
agenda cannot be divorced from his power base.  For Light this includes internal sources, such as 
time, information, expertise, and energy, as well as external sources such as party support in 
Congress, public approval, and electoral margin (1999; 15).  Taken together, these internal and 
external resources combine to produce presidential capital, a factor that in turn determines both 
the size and detail of the president‟s program.  Presidential capital compels presidents to strike 
while the iron is hot, but according to Light‟s argument the hot iron is rarely to be found.  Capital 
decreases throughout a president‟s term, which compels the president to act on his most 
important agenda items early.  However, acting on major programs requires a legislative skill 
that new presidents take time to learn, which compels restraint.   
The size of the president‟s agenda has important implications for his success in Congress, 
however.  Presidents are limited by an “attention bottleneck” (Jones, 1994), which only allows 
the president to vigorously lobby Congress on a few issues at a time.  Edwards and Wood (1999) 
note that the president must exercise great care in both the size and composition of his agenda 
because of the limited amount of political capital presidents can devote to any one issue if they 
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hope to get anything accomplished.  Previous work has evidenced that presidents with legislative 
agendas that are more compact tend to have greater success in Congress than those presidents 
who attempt simply to do too much (Fett, 1994).   
To summarize, the literature suggests that the president‟s ability to influence the political 
agenda, especially that of Congress, is one of the most important sources of presidential 
influence.  Presidents have been quite successful at influencing the amount of attention devoted 
to issues in the political arena.  The president‟s agenda has important implications for his power 
prospects, and the size, composition, and timing of the agenda have important implications for 
presidential success in producing policy changes.  Focusing on the construction of the agenda, 
Paul Light (1999) advances both internal and external variables that combine to form a level of 
presidential capital, which then influences the president‟s agenda decisions.  The purpose of this 
paper is to disaggregate the concept of political capital, comparing the influence that its 
component parts have on the president‟s agenda.  Specifically, this paper examines the influence 
of several indicators of political capital on two different characteristics of the president‟s agenda: 
the size of the agenda and the number of new policies advanced by the president in his agenda.  
The next section provides a discussion of the variables used in the models and discusses the data 
before moving onto a multivariate comparison of several factors influencing the president‟s 
agenda decisions. 
Measuring the Size of the President’s Agenda as a Dependent Variable 
 Paul Light (1999) asserts that several factors influence the construction of the president‟s 
agenda.  These influences come from both internal and external sources.  In this paper, the focus 
will be entirely on the external sources that Light asserts will influence the president‟s agenda.  
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This section will provide a discussion of the external sources that influence the president‟s 
agenda and construct a quantitative model to discover the extent of their independent influence 
on the president‟s agenda. 
 This paper seeks to explain the size of the president‟s agenda.  As such, the dependent 
variable for this study is the size of the president‟s legislative agenda.  There are many ways in 
which previous scholars have measured the president‟s policy priorities.  Several scholars have 
relied upon the policy content of the State of the Union Address as the best indicator of the 
president‟s policy priorities (Cohen, 1995).  The policy content of the State of the Union Address 
has been argued to be equivalent to the president‟s shopping list (Light, 1999).  However, others 
have argued that studying the State of the Union is an exercise in futility because the address 
only represents but one of many opportunities for the president to go public (Campbell and Hall 
Jameson, 1990; Kernell, 1997), and that the president‟s legislative priorities are better 
represented by other measures (Rudalevige, 2002).  The dependent variable in this paper has a 
central focus on the president‟s legislative priorities.  Although undoubtedly the president goes 
public to gain support for many of his legislative proposals (Kernell, 1997), the legislation on 
which the president actually takes formal action represents a much clearer picture of presidential 
priorities because the president is taking political action to bring about policy changes desired 
(Rudalevige, 2002).   
 The dependent variables in the analyses below are constructed based on the bills 
introduced to Congress by request.  Oleszek (2007) notes that bills designated as being 
introduced by request in the Congressional Record are introduced at the request of the president 
or his administration.  The Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson, 2004) topic codes 
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thousands of bills introduced to Congress from 1973-2000, also providing information about the 
sponsor of the legislation including those introduced by request.  Each of the bills introduced by 
the president is then coded based on whether or not the bill introduced is proposing a new 
program.  Data for these purposes comes from the Policy Agendas Project, which provides a list 
of the Congressional hearings held on new administration proposals.  Essentially, the hearings 
serve as a proxy for new administration proposals.  Because multiple hearings can be held on any 
given proposal, especially a new one, I have limited the count of hearings held on any individual 
proposal to one so as not to be double counted.  These data are described in more detail below. 
 In the first set of models presented in the analysis section, the size of the president‟s 
legislative agenda is approximated by the number of bills introduced by the president quarterly 
from 1977-2000, covering four presidencies and six presidential terms.  Figure 3-1 displays the 
number of bills introduced by each president throughout their terms, with each term consisting of 
sixteen total quarters.  Figure 3-1 demonstrates that the number of bills introduced at the request 
of the president varies significantly both throughout each individual president‟s term, as well as 
across presidencies.  President Carter clearly has the largest number of bill introductions, 
followed by President Reagan who introduced far less than Carter throughout both of his terms, 
but more than Presidents Bush or Clinton.  Figure 3-1 also suggests that the president‟s 
legislative agenda does not follow a linear progression as capital declines throughout the term.   
For example, the size of President Carter‟s legislative agenda increases drastically 
following the midterm elections in 1978.  In fact, the first quarter of 1979 following the midterm 
1978 elections represents the high point in the series, with a whopping 180 bill introductions by  
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Figure 3-1: Bills Introduced by Request per Term Quarter1977-2000 
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request.  The size of President Reagan‟s legislative agenda also increases following the midterm 
elections in each of his terms in office
1
.  The number of bills introduced by request during the 
Carter administration is significantly greater across the board.  At least 120 bills were introduced 
by request during four different quarters during the Carter years, a number only reached by 
Ronald Reagan in the second quarter of 1981 and the first quarter of 1987 and never even 
approached by Presidents Bush or Clinton.  
A second set of models examines the number of new proposals offered by the president 
quarterly during the same time period.  As Light (1999) notes, the introduction of a new program 
has a higher cost in terms of political capital, and presidents take their capital resources into 
account when deciding whether to advance new programs or simply tweak old ones.  New 
proposals require much more energy and focus as well, so the number of new proposals is almost 
certainly limited to a greater extent than general bill introductions.  This reflects the attention 
bottleneck (Jones, 1994); the executive or any other institution can only devote attention to a 
limited number of issues at a time.  New proposals should be expected to require a great deal 
more attention.  It is important when modeling the size of the president‟s agenda, then, not only 
to model the actual number of proposals but also the extent to which the president is being 
innovative. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The data for the Reagan administration, especially in his second term, are significantly different from Light‟s 
(1999) data.  Light has zeroes across the board for Reagan‟s second term as far as introducing legislation to 
Congress.  But even Light himself admits that the data from the OMB regarding legislative priorities became less 
reliable over time.  I expect that the information from the Congressional Record is more reliable based on Light‟s 
own admission, coupled with the unlikelihood that a president will not introduce legislation to Congress for any 
significant portion of his term, let alone the whole. 
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Figure 3-2: New Agency/Legislative Proposals by Term Quarter 
1977-2000 
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Data on new proposals are obtained from the Policy Agendas Project.  As part of the 
coding process for Congressional hearings, the project codes every hearing with a dummy 
variable, coded 1 for an administration proposal and 0 otherwise; the same goes for whether or 
not the proposal is new.  Using these two columns in the hearings dataset I was able to construct 
a list of 104 new proposals, whether involving new programs or the creation of new agencies, 
from 1977-2000.  One can question whether this measure captures all of the new programs 
advanced by the president, because there is no guarantee that Congress will hold a hearing on 
every new proposal offered by the president.  However, it is very unlikely that a bill introduction 
made at the request of the administration is not going to get a hearing in Congress, let alone a 
proposal for a new program.  In a study of how successful the president is in obtaining agenda 
space, measured by Congressional hearings, for his legislative initiatives, Edwards and Barrett 
(2000) found that the president rarely did not get at least a hearing on his legislative proposals. In 
fact, as Edwards and Barrett (2000) demonstrate, “from 1935-1996 the president obtained 
agenda-status for 97.6% of his legislative initiatives” (Edwards and Barrett, 2000; 120)!  
Because the president has such a successful track record in garnering Congressional attention, an 
indicator based on hearings should be accepted as a valid proxy.  Figure 3-2 above displays a 
time-series graph of new administration proposals for each administration, presented quarterly.  
Again it is clear from figure 3-2 that new proposals vary extensively across administrations and 
throughout the individual terms of each individual president.  The data presented in figure 3-2 
seem substantively accurate given what scholars know about the individual presidencies.  
President Clinton starts off with very little innovation because of a poor transition (Jones, 1998; 
Light, 1999), recovering to actually offer more innovations during one quarter in his second year 
than any other president in any quarters during the time span of this study.  Similarly, there is a 
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noticeable difference between the first and second term of both Presidents Reagan and Clinton, 
with a far greater number of new proposals coming during the first term and very few in the 
second. 
Explanations for Agenda-Size: Independent Variables and Measurement 
 There are many different reasons why a president‟s agenda will expand in size, or shrink 
for that matter, at any given time throughout the presidential term.    Paul Light (1999) provides a 
great theoretical starting point for constructing a multivariate model to explain agenda size.  
Light suggests several considerations mentioned by his interview respondents that are taken into 
account when the president is packaging his program.  In this section, I will describe the 
independent variables described by Light that are then used to model the size of the president‟s 
agenda.  Each of these measures becomes part of Light‟s (1999) political capital concept, which 
will be disaggregated and tested separately in this paper to compare the influence of its 
component parts. 
 The first component of political capital is presidential approval.  Light (1999) notes that 
presidential is relatively high at the beginning of the term, but then decreases throughout the 
remainder of the term.  The importance of public approval has been a point of debate in the 
literature.  However, the majority of evidence suggests that higher public approval can help a 
president in his power to persuade Congress at the margins (Edwards, 1990), but low approval 
ratings are quite harmful (Light, 1999).  It is also important to note that the pattern of public 
approval of the president is not quite the linear cycle that Light (1999) suggests.  As Edwards 
and Gallup (1990) note, there are several instances in the public approval series where presidents 
experience a bounce in public approval.  This especially true during rallying events, where the 
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public‟s approval of the president increases substantially (Edwards and Swenson, 1997).  Even 
during normal times, however, the pattern ebbs and flows to a much greater extent than Light 
(1999) suggests.  Absent rallying events, during normal circumstances, public approval should 
be expected to decrease throughout the president‟s term. 
 Another factor that could affect the agenda of the president is the public mood.  James 
Stimson (1991) created a macro-level measure of the public support for government regulation 
based on a series of public opinion surveys asking respondents whether or not they supported 
regulation in various policy sectors.  The policy mood, then, is a general measure of the political 
winds, portraying the level of public support or lack thereof for expanded government regulatory 
activity, with higher scores representing a more liberal (regulatory) mood among the citizenry on 
a scale of 0-100.  One potential problem that arises when using the mood variable, especially for 
our purposes, is that the public policy mood is consistently above fifty, suggesting that 
conservatives, usually represented by the Republican party, never have a majority of citizen 
support against expanded regulation, much less for deregulation.  Similarly, because the mood is 
a general measure of the political wind among citizens, it may not be the wind itself but rather 
the direction and magnitude in which it is blowing.  This variable is modeled for each 
observation as the change in policy mood from the previous to the present year.  Because 
increases in public mood would generally only be beneficial to Democratic presidents, mood is 
modeled as changes in the liberal direction positively for Democrats, negatively for Republicans, 
and vice versa.  When the mood swings in favor of a president from either party, it is expected 
the size of the president‟s agenda will increase.  
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 Presidents should be expected to also construct their agendas with their prospects for 
success in the front of their minds.  As Neustadt (1991) suggests, presidents must make decisions 
carefully so as not to damage themselves politically.  A president who proposes a large agenda to 
Congress but fails miserably will certainly hurt his future power prospects.  Because of this, a 
dummy variable is included coded 1 for a year in which the president is facing unified 
government; and 0 otherwise.  Presidents are likely to introduce more bills to a Congress which 
has more fellow partisans based on an increased expectation for success, just as presidents are 
more likely to veto and block legislation when government is divided (Edwards, Barrett, and 
Peake, 1997).  It is expected that presidents will have larger policy agendas when facing a 
Congress that is composed by a majority of his fellow partisans.   
 Light (1999) also suggests that the size of the president‟s electoral victory will have an 
effect on the construction of a legislative agenda.  Presidents are expected to increase the size of 
their policy agendas when they are coming off of decisive victories.  Again, such a decision is 
based on the increased prospects for success.  Larger electoral victories increase the amount of 
capital the president has available (Light, 1999), and constitute part of the acceptance of a 
mandate perception (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson, 2006).  For this reason, the margin of the 
president‟s popular vote victory is included in the model as an explanatory variable.  I expect 
that larger margins of victory will lead to a larger presidential agenda.  However, I do not expect 
that the momentum from a decisive victory will exert influence for long.  As Grossback, 
Peterson, and Stimson (2006) suggest, even the largest electoral victories only produce altered 
behavior for a period of about 180 days, or two quarters.  For this reason, I model the margin of 
electoral victory only in the first two quarters of a president‟s term, and the variable is coded as 
zero for all other terms.  I assume that the margin of electoral victory will have no impact beyond 
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the second quarter of any presidential term.  It is also possible that presidents will respond to the 
success of their party in the midterm elections.  Presidents typically lose some of their fellow 
partisans in Congress during midterm elections.  In this case, I expect that the magnitude of the 
loss will depress the size of the president‟s agenda. 
 Finally, there are several other potential factors influencing the size of the president‟s 
agenda that are important to control.  First, I include a dummy variable for each president, coded 
one for Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, with Carter serving as the omitted baseline.  This variable is 
included to control for the differences between presidents themselves, such as the tendency for 
President Carter to have a larger agenda than any of the other presidents examined in this paper.  
I expect that each president will have a significantly smaller agenda than that of President Carter, 
represented by significant negative coefficients for each of the presidential dummies.  I also 
include a dummy variable for each year following an election.  The first is coded 1 for the first 
year in office, and zero otherwise, based on the expectation that presidents will offer their largest 
agenda in the year immediately following their election (Light, 1999).  A second dummy 
variable is coded 1 for the year following the midterm elections, and zero otherwise, based on the 
possibility that presidents increase the size of their legislative agenda to begin the new 
Congressional session. 
Methods  
One of Light‟s (1999) most important contributions to the presidential literature is his 
emphasis on time.  Light argues that the president has a limited amount of time at the beginning 
of his first term where his public approval and the momentum from his electoral victory will be 
highest.  Throughout the rest of the term, there is a cycle of decreasing influence as the memory 
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of the electoral victory fades and the newness of a president wears off on the public.  Generally, 
public approval of the president declines throughout the term.  By the time the president is fully 
prepared to take the lead, the opportunity for leadership is frequently passed.  It is because of 
these cycles that the dependent variables will be modeled using pooled-cross sectional time 
series analysis.  The cross section for this study is each individual presidential term, with the 
time component being the sixteen quarters (4 years) that encompass a presidential term.   
 Fitting a model over a long period of “discontinuous” administrations will present issues 
that may be problematic.   When testing for serial correlation, the correlation between the end of 
one administration and the start of the next will be problematic or at least suspect, especially to 
the degree that the source of the serial correlation is inherent in internal administration issues, 
rather than external factors exogenous to the presidential tenure.  While a large number of 
dummies and interaction terms could be included to try to handle this, the large number of 
parameters relative to the number of cases will be problematic, and multicollinearity will be a 
problem. 
Alternatively the panel design provides a flexible alternative.  It will remove the last 
year/first year autocorrelation for the estimate of the residuals.  In addition, the use of panel 
corrected standard errors should have the same effect as correcting for heteroskedasticity with 
weighted least squares.  In fact it ensures that the correction is by administration rather than more 
artificial statistically determined segments.    The important part of a panel design is that the 
cases, in this paper presidential terms, are treated independently with respect to error structure at 
the boundary time points.   
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Analysis 
 Table 3-1 below presents the results of the pooled cross sectional time series model for 
the total number of bills introduced by the president throughout the sixteen quarters of his term, 
with each term treated separately.  For the most part the model conforms to the expectations 
described above.  Public approval is positive and significantly influences the number of bills 
introduced by request.  For each two point increase in presidential approval, there is expected to 
be an increase of about one bill introduced by the request of the administration.  Second, as 
expected, President Carter has a larger agenda than the other presidents analyzed in this paper.  
An average of about twenty-nine fewer bills per quarter are introduced at the request of the Bush 
administration, and nearly forty-three fewer bills per quarter were introduced at the request of the 
Clinton administration.  The dummy variable for President Reagan has a negative coefficient, as 
expected, but fails to achieve statistical significance.  While Reagan requested fewer bill 
introductions per quarter than President Carter, the difference is not statistically different from 
zero when all other factors are held constant. 
 While this finding seems somewhat surprising, a great part of the explanation may be 
found in looking at the effect of unified government.  President Carter faced a unified Congress 
throughout his presidency, whereas President Reagan never faced unified government.  A 
president facing unified government is expected to request nearly twenty-seven more bill 
introductions than those facing divided government per quarter, a result that is significant at the 
.01 level.  When the effect of unified government is taken into account, the results suggest that 
President Carter‟s agenda was not significantly larger than that of Ronald Reagan.   
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Table 3-1: Presidential Capital and Bills Introduced by Request, 1977-2000 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Public Approval 0.52* 0.31 
Change in Policy Mood -0.93 1.71 
Unified Government 26.63*** 9.10 
Margin of Victory 3.69*** 1.23 
Midterm Loss 0.92*** 0.29 
Reagan -5.44 11.09 
Bush -29.04* 15.12 
Clinton -42.97*** 14.72 
Term Year 1 -6.12 11.88 
Term Year 3 9.45 10.71 
Intercept 15.60 22.40 
R Square 0.47  
 
 Election results also have an impact on the size of the president‟s legislative agenda.  For 
each two point increase in a president‟s margin of victory, the results suggest that over seven 
more bills will be introduced on average in the first two quarters of the term, holding other things 
equal.  These results support the findings of Light (1999) and Grossback et al (2006).  However, 
the midterm election variable does not significantly decrease the size of the president‟s 
legislative agenda, contrary to expectations.  Instead, the results suggest that for each additional 
seat in Congress lost at the midterm, there is an increase of one bill introduced at the request of 
the administration.  This could perhaps be a result of the president tending to introduce more 
bills at the beginning of a Congressional session, regardless of the composition of Congress.  
Also, it could reflect the president “not backing down” from a Congress expected present a 
greater cooperative challenge.  A president may be more active following midterm losses as a 
way to demonstrate that he is not going to let a less partisan friendly Congress stop him from 
pursuing his legislative goals.  The public policy mood does not significantly influence the size 
of the president‟s legislative agenda.  The coefficient for the change in public policy mood is 
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wrongly signed and does not achieve statistical significance.  Finally, the dummy variables for 
term year one and term year three do not significantly influence the size of the president‟s 
agenda after accounting for the other explanations.  The model explains 47 percent of the 
variation in the size of the president‟s legislative agenda.  The results provide statistical evidence 
in support of Light‟s (1999) model explaining the size of the president‟s agenda.  
Table 3-2 below provides the results with new programs as the dependent variable, rather 
than the simple count of bills introduced by request.  Again a list of new programs constructed 
using the coding scheme discussed above is included in the appendix.  In general, the model does 
not perform as well in explaining the introduction of new proposals, with an R-square of only 
.27.  Also, several of the independent variables do not conform to expectations.  Public approval 
does not significantly affect the number of new proposals made by a president.  The coefficient 
is signed in the appropriate direction but does not come close to achieving statistical 
significance.  Public mood again does not significantly influence the president‟s agenda.  
Contrary to expectations and the results presented in table 3-1, the margin of victory also does 
not significantly influence the number of new programs proposed by the president, and the 
results of the midterm elections do not either.  Similar to the results presented in table 3-1, 
presidents are no more likely to introduce new proposals in the first year of a Congressional 
session, whether following their electoral victory or the midterm elections.   
There are two consistencies that carry over from the results presented in table 3-1.  First, 
there are significant differences between presidents.  Holding all other things equal, President 
Bush introduced the most new programs per quarter, introducing on average two additional new 
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Table 3-2: Presidential Capital and the Proposal of New Programs by the President, 1977-
2000 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Public Approval 0.02 0.02 
Change in Policy Mood -0.05 0.07 
Unified Government 2.66*** 0.80 
Margin of Victory -0.01 0.04 
Midterm Loss 0.03 0.02 
Reagan 1.73* 0.88 
Bush 2.00** 0.94 
Clinton 0.95 0.86 
Term Year 1 0.23 0.42 
Term Year 3 0.46 0.37 
Intercept -2.18* 1.23 
R Square 0.27  
  
programs per quarter than President Carter, the omitted category.  The results also indicate that 
President Reagan introduced more new programs, nearly two per quarter, than President Carter 
with other variables held constant.  There is not a significant difference between the tendencies 
of Presidents Clinton and Carter to propose new programs when other factors are held constant. 
 The other consistency is in the affect of unified government.  When presidents face 
unified as opposed to divided government, the results suggest that there will be just over 2.5 new 
programs proposed per quarter.  Unified government has the strongest impact of any variable on 
both the size of the president‟s legislative agenda, and the extent to which the agenda is 
innovative.   
Conclusion 
 Paul Light (1999) set the standard for scholars who examine the president‟s agenda.  The 
president‟s ability to influence the political agenda is an absolutely critical component of his 
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power, one of the few areas where presidents actually have an unrivaled ability to exercise the 
power of persuasion (Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  As Neustadt (1991) suggests, presidents must 
make each of their decisions with their power prospects in mind.  This is especially true when it 
comes to the agenda decision.  This paper has developed a multivariate model of the president‟s 
legislative agenda, disaggregating the concept of political capital into its component parts in 
order to test which of the factors put forth by Light (1999) exert the most influence over the size 
of the president‟s legislative agenda. 
 The findings suggest that the most important factor influencing the size of the president‟s 
legislative agenda is the composition of Congress.  When a president is benefitted by the 
existence of unified government, the size of the legislative agenda he puts forth is significantly 
larger.  It is with power prospects foremost in mind, as Neustadt (1991) would suggest, that 
presidents would make such a decision.  Presidents have a much greater likelihood of succeeding 
in Congress when the legislature is dominated by his political party.  Success breeds success, so 
presidents prefer to strike early and often while the iron is hot. 
 The size of the president‟s agenda is also significantly influenced by the margin of 
electoral victory for the first six months of a presidential term.  It is the margin of victory that is 
second only to unified government in its effect on the president‟s agenda.  Electoral results do 
not always matter however, as midterm losses do not work to depress the size of the president‟s 
agenda.  Rather, the opposite occurs.  The more seats the president‟s party loses in Congress, the 
greater the size of the legislative agenda put forth.  This is likely to be the case for two reasons.  
First, part of the explanation behind this rather peculiar finding is that presidents tend to advance 
a large agenda at the beginning of a Congressional session.  This possibility was controlled for in 
77 
 
the model, but the two variables are correlated so some of the variation of one may have been 
picked up by the other.  Secondly, presidents also may advance a slightly larger agenda after 
midterm losses because of his desire to show the new Congress that he still will work with them, 
and also will not be intimidated by the extent of the midterm losses for his party. 
 Public approval also has an impact on the size of the president‟s agenda, but consistent 
with the findings of others public approval does not seem to help a president much (Edwards, 
1990).  Only after picking up two points in approval will the president request one more bill 
introduced to Congress on average, a small substantive effect especially when compared to the 
importance of unified government or the margin of electoral victory.   
 Finally, one of the most consistent findings presented in this paper is that the size of the 
president‟s agenda varies across administrations.  The legislative agendas of Presidents Bush and 
Clinton were significantly smaller than that of Presidents Carter, who had the largest, and 
Reagan.  President Carter is widely known to have advanced an agenda that was quite large, 
perhaps too large.  The data presented in this paper bring that into question.  The models suggest 
that holding other things equal, both Presidents Reagan and Bush were more innovative as 
presidents offering new legislative programs.  Further, President Carter‟s overall agenda is not 
statistically larger than that of President Reagan when the full model of the dependent variable is 
presented.  Rather, the model suggests that Carter had a larger legislative agenda because of the 
political situation in which he served, namely unified government.  The greatest difference 
between Carter and Reagan when it comes to agenda size is not found in their presidential styles 
or personalities, but rather in their political realities.   
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 Unified government emerges as the most important factor explaining both the size and 
the new proposals offered in the president‟s agenda.  At the same time, unified government 
offers the greatest likelihood of presidential success.  While divided government has come to be 
the norm in American politics (Jones, 1994) and significant legislation is still passed, these 
findings suggest that periods of unified government are still likely to lead to much larger political 
agendas, many more new programs offered, and as a result, an opportunity for important policy 
change. 
 Presidents do indeed strike when the iron is hot, which should come as no surprise to 
scholars of the strategic institution.  However, the evidence presented above suggests that 
perhaps scholars have looked too much into the effects of public approval at the expense of other 
factors when analyzing the president‟s agenda.
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Introduction 
 Scholars of American politics have rigorously investigated the links between 
governmental institutions and public opinion.  These studies have included predominantly 
conceptualizations of representation, linking public opinion to policy outcomes (Stimson, 
Mackuen, and Erickson, 1995; Erickson, Wright, McIver, 1993).  Other scholars have focused on 
the similarity of policy priorities placed on issues by the public and governmental institutions.  
The public prioritizes issues according to those issues which are deemed most important, issues 
that reach the systemic agenda (Cobb and Elder, 1972).  Not all issues on the systemic agenda 
are attended to by the government.  However, individuals within government often can use the 
public as a weapon in order to gain attention for their issues; those in government who find 
themselves and their policy priorities on the outside of a stable policy subsystem can expand the 
scope of conflict (Schattschneider, 1960), often leading to shifts in attention that disrupt policy 
subsystems and result in broadened participation in a policy debate (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993).  Not all issues can be attended to at the same time, however.  Despite the size of 
governmental institutions which allow for increased opportunity to multi-task, policy making 
bodies still face “attention bottlenecks”; increased attention to one issue necessarily will result in 
decreased attention to some other issue.  This perspective of agenda-setting focuses on “shifts in 
collective attention in policy-making bodies from one constellation of policy issues to another” 
(Jones, 1994), because attention is finite and increases in attention to something necessitate 
decreases to some other policy area.  The question remains, however, which institutions take the 
lead in the shifting of collective attention?   
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Scant attention has been given to the “Who influences whom?” question.  Previous 
studies have provided some mixed evidence, revealing that the role of the President, Congress, 
and the media as leaders or followers in the shifting of attention are issue-dependent (Edwards 
and Wood, 1999).  Similar findings were reached regarding the attention shifts among the 
President, Congress, and the Supreme Court (Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1999).  Each of these 
studies suffers from limited ability to generalize, however, due to a focus on a limited number of 
issues.  The purpose of this chapter is to reinvigorate the search for leaders and followers in the 
shifting of political attention, focusing on the interactions of attention among the President, 
Congress, and the media.  Using the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), 
attention shifts among these three venues can be traced across nineteen major policy areas, 
providing much more generalizable results than a focus only on a few specific policies.  Using 
these data will provide several improvements over previous studies.   
First, previous studies of leadership patterns have covered much shorter time periods.  In 
this chapter, the relationships will be tested over the period 1983-2000.  Second, previous studies 
have been limited to less than five cases, several of which were specific issues rather than 
broader, more comprehensive issue areas with sustained viability on the political agenda.  This 
chapter will provide a more comprehensive view of American political attention, nineteen issue 
areas, that cover a broader scope of issue areas rather than a limited number of specific issues.  
Doing so will provide an enhanced ability to generalize from the findings, especially considering 
that the Policy Agendas Project data include the full range of government activity over the 
eighteen years examined in this study.   
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Finally, the shift to longer time periods in this study provides an important advantage 
over previous studies.  Previous studies, since they have been based on limited time samples, 
have been forced to use weekly measures of government activity in order to have a sufficient 
number of observations to use Vector Auto-regressive methods.  In this study, time periods will 
be aggregated to one month, picking up sufficient variation in governmental attention to avoid 
overstating the stability of attention, while still having a sufficient number of observations over 
time to have the necessary leverage to produce efficient estimates using vector-autoregressive 
techniques.  Edwards and Wood (1999), for example, use vector autoregression to examine 
causal patterns in attention shifts among the President, Congress, and the media over a ten year 
period from 1984-1994.  While this study was an important addition to the literature introducing 
an appropriate technique to gain a better understanding of agenda influence, the study 
encompasses only a small subset of the specific issues the president is involved in for a very 
small time period.  In contrast, this study will expand from ten to eighteen years, examine 
nineteen comprehensive issue areas on which the president has been active from 1983-2000, and 
provide a more realistic time interval of one month instead of one week.   
 The paper will proceed in the following way.  First, the relationship between institutional 
attention and that of the media will be discussed, a literature which illustrates the importance of a 
study that encompasses a much longer time period as well as a more comprehensive examination 
of more than a few political issues.  Next, I will describe the indicators of governmental attention 
to issues that will be used in this paper, and the methods that will be used to model the patterns 
of influence existing between them.  Finally, the results will be presented for the VAR models, 
investigating who leads whom among the President, Congress, and the media, extending the 
previous work of Edwards and Wood (1999) across nineteen issue areas from 1983-2000.   An 
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extensive discussion will be included for several of the key issue areas in which findings warrant 
further discussion due to their implications for future research.  After presenting the results, the 
discussion section will review the most important findings and their implications, and make 
suggestions for continued research in this area.   
Briefly, the results of this paper indicate that patterns of influence are quite inconsistent 
across issue areas, and broad generalizations cannot be drawn from a sample of only a few 
issues.  The findings of this paper are preliminary to some extent, suggesting a need for a much 
larger research undertaking, adding a more precise measure for presidential attention that can 
better be used in time-series models, while still providing a much more generalizable, long range 
view of the patterns of influence that exist among these actors and their attention to political 
issue areas. 
Presidential Agenda Setting and Influence in Congress 
 The President has long been considered to have the most significant role in setting the 
policymaking agenda.  Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 241) argue that “no other single actor can 
focus attention as clearly, or change the motivations of such a great number of other actors, as 
the president”.  Similarly, Kingdon (1995, 23) finds in his interviews with policymakers in the 
health and transportation subsystems that “no other single actor in the political system has quite 
the capability of the president to set agendas.”  Indeed, the president‟s role in setting the agenda 
may be his greatest source of influence (Bond and Fleischer, 1990) and the most important of his 
strategic powers (Edwards, 1989).  Although several scholars of the presidency are skeptical of a 
presidency-centered view of policymaking, even those skeptics have recognized the importance 
of the president in setting the agenda (Moe and Teel, 1970; Edwards, 1989; Jones, 1994).   
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 Richard Neustadt (1991), in his now famous dictum, argues that presidential power is the 
power to persuade.  Presidents have to master persuasion in order to succeed in office because 
their ability to act on their goals are always contingent on the compliance of other political 
actors.  The power to persuade always involves the power to bargain (Neustadt, 1991; Cameron, 
2000).  The essence of Presidential persuasion is to convince strategic politicians that what he is 
asking them to do is in their best interest, not just his (Neustadt, 1991).   
 One of the key components of presidential success in the policy process, then, is the 
ability to set the agenda not only of his administration, but of others.  Influencing the agenda of 
Congress is not an onerous task for presidents.  Congress needs an agenda from outside with 
high status to react against, and there is no better program to fit these criteria than that of the 
President (Neustadt, 1991).  In fact, the president has been invited by Congress to take the lead 
on the budget, the economy, national security, the environment, and other areas of public policy 
(Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  The president needs only to convince members of Congress that 
his agenda items are worthy of attention and consideration.  The burdens of leadership are higher 
on the floor, for example, when the president must try to defend the political and substantive 
merits of the policy (ibid).   
While most scholars agree on the importance of the president‟s role in agenda-setting, the 
literature has been largely devoid of empirical studies that test the influence.  Most of the 
evidence presented in the literature regarding presidential influence through agenda-setting has 
been anecdotal rather than rigorous tests that provide information as to the strength and 
consistency of presidential influence.  Light (1991) provides rich information about the 
president‟s ability to set his own agenda, while not really attending to the role of the president in 
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influencing the agendas of others.  This ignores the importance that the president places on 
obtaining especially agenda-space in Congress, which is necessary for building momentum and 
attaining Congressional support (Edwards and Barrett, 2000).      
Scholars have noted several constraints on the ability of the president to set the agenda of 
Congress, however.  One limitation is the “attention bottleneck” (Jones, 1994) referred to above.  
Presidents are only able to attend and lobby vigorously on a few bills at a time, and there are 
limitations on the capital that presidents can devote to issues (Edwards and Wood, 1999).  
Scholars have posited a no-win presidency (Lowi, 1986; Light, 1999), then, in which the 
constraints placed on the president by conflicting demands limit the ability to attend to more than 
a few policy areas at a time.  Further, Congress has the ability to set its own agenda (Taylor, 
1998).  The Congressional agenda can also influence the presidential agenda.  Presidents may 
borrow issues that Congress is tending to for their agenda (Light, 1991).  Presidents respond to 
entrepreneurs at work within Congress (Flemming, Wood, and Bohte, 1999), acting either as 
cooperators (Kingdon, 1995) or competitors (Jones, 1975).   
This view of presidential attention is overly pessimistic.  The Executive Office of the 
Presidency has grown substantially alongside the increased expectations of the presidency, at 
least in part offsetting the attention allocation problem noted by several authors above.  Figure 4-
1 displays the Executive Direction and Management Budget from 1947-2005, in millions of 
inflation-adjusted real dollars.  The figure clearly demonstrates substantial increases in the 
resources available for the president over time.  These resources correspond with an explosion of 
individuals working in the Executive Office of the President (Burke, 2000), many of whom can 
be delegated by the president to attend to issues. 
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 Previous scholars may have overestimated the institutional constraints placed upon the 
president by treating the presidency as a unitary branch, or by using measures of the president‟s 
policy priorities that are only indicative of presidential priorities in the most salient areas.  
Studies of presidential agenda-setting have frequently relied on the State of the Union Address or 
other public speeches to measure issue attention (e.g. Cohen, 1995; Hill, 1998; Edwards and 
Wood, 1999; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte, 1999; Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  The State of the 
Union and other public speeches certainly capture some of the President‟s most important policy 
priorities, and capture the important Presidential strategy of going public to gain public support 
for his programs (Kernell, 1993).    
Presidents also are active in areas which are not usually as salient to the public.  In order 
to draw attention to these issues, the President can make use of the bully pulpit, attempting to  
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manipulate the public agenda sufficiently to call Congress to action, as Kernell (1993) or 
Edwards (2003) suggest.  As Baumgartner and Jones (1993) demonstrate, many issue areas in 
American politics are quite insulated from public attention.  However, there are few reasons to 
believe that the President will not have policy priorities in these areas, and devote increased 
attention to them.  Figure 4-2 above demonstrates that although the president is active in some 
areas more than others, from 1983-2000 the president was at least active in each of the nineteen 
major policy areas encompassed by the policy agendas project.  While the president certainly 
devotes higher levels of attention to some issues over others, as figure 4-2 clearly demonstrates, 
it is important for scholars who are trying to understand the role of the president in setting the 
political agenda or influencing public policies not to ignore those areas where presidential 
involvement may be less frequent but still have important implications for policy areas.  In sum, 
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there is no justifiable reason to limit presidential influence to a limited number of policy areas 
where the president is most active.  In doing so, scholars may miss many important policy 
changes that presidential initiatives bring about in less salient policy areas.  None of the policy 
areas has been the subject of less than forty-five policy mentions (Rudalavige, 2002) by the 
president from 1983-2000.  There is little reason to expect that presidential attention in these 
areas will not have an effect in the policy area.  In fact, the opposite may be true.  When 
presidents get involved in policy areas where presidential involvement is not the norm, 
presidential activity might actually produce a more substantial response because the activity is 
unusual rather than expected. 
The President and the Media 
The President invests a lot of effort in attempting to shape the attention of the media.  The 
president can use the media strategically, providing briefings and press conferences with the 
President himself or other officials high within the administration.  Keeping the media informed 
can be to the advantage of the President, because doing so influences the nature and content of 
what the media reports about presidential activity.  Not doing so can be dangerous, as the media 
may misinterpret presidential priorities, portraying presidential attention where it is not intended.   
This gives Presidents an added incentive to spend intense energies in coordinating the 
administration messages to the media, using the media as a bridge to the political environment 
(Light, 1991).  This is especially true of the mass public, whose familiarity with political issues 
is closely correlated with the amount and duration of attention devoted to those issues by the 
mass media (Page and Shapiro, 1992).  As Flemming, Wood, and Bohte (1999) note, despite rich 
descriptions of the efforts of the President to influence the media‟s agenda, very little is known 
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about the President‟s success in doing so, and results are mixed.  Gilberg et al (1980), using the 
State of the Union message as a measure of presidential attention, concluded that the media 
actually set the agenda of the President.  Wood and Peake (1998) find that even in foreign policy, 
where the President has a constitutional mandate to take a leadership role, the media leads the 
President.  Baker (1995) echoes the assertion of Wood and Peake with evidence that media 
coverage creates a demand for action, making it more difficult for Presidents to exercise 
discretion in their attention to world affairs.  Wanta et al (1989) found evidence that the 
president‟s relationship with the media is reciprocal, with each branch sometimes exerting 
influence over the other.   
 Edwards and Wood (1999) have attempted to answer the “Who Influences Whom?” 
question with respect to the President, Congress, and the media.  Primarily they focus on the 
ability of the President to direct the attention of others.  The focus of the article is on five issues, 
three domestic and two foreign policy areas.  These include crime, health care, education, U.S.-
Soviet relations, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Using Vector Auto-Regression, the authors find 
mixed results.  Surprisingly, the President does not have an influence on the media or Congress 
in terms of their attention to foreign policy issues.  The President, rather, was highly reactive to 
the media on these two foreign policy matters.  In domestic policy, the authors show that the 
President is reactive on crime, entrepreneurial on health care, and has a reciprocal causal 
relationship with the media on attention to education.  Congress has a highly inert issue agenda, 
with outside influences only occurring on the issue of education.  Congress does not Granger 
cause attention by the President or the media on any of the issues studied.  The picture the 
findings paint of Congress is that of an institution that acts largely in isolation.  The evidence 
presented by Edwards and Wood (1999), then, is mixed, and calls into question the litany of 
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literature portraying the President as the supreme force in the setting of policy agendas, and the 
responsiveness of Congress to any outside influences.   
Reassessing the Agenda Relationships of the President, Congress, and the Media 
 This study will follow Wood and his colleagues in the use of vector auto-regressive 
techniques to assess causal relationships that exist in agenda series of the President, Congress, 
and the media over time.  Vector auto-regression is a technique that can be used to evaluate the 
direction of causality between two or more time-series (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989; 
Brandt and Williams, 2007).  Using VAR, “is an extension of the Granger (1969) approach to 
causal inference…each dependent variable is regressed on lagged values of itself as well as 
lagged values of the other dependent variables in the system.” (Edwards and Wood, 1999; 334) 
VAR is particularly useful in the investigation of causal patterns between two series where 
theories are ambiguous in terms of what causal direction to expect.  Regression coefficients 
cannot be interpreted, but the method provides scholars with an interpretable sign and 
significance between two series.  As a result, displaying coefficients would be tedious and bog 
the reader down in needless detail.  However, because there is little theoretical justification for 
positing causal directions, VAR is an appropriate method of investigation to determine directions 
of causality and statistical magnitude of relationships in attention to issues between the President, 
Congress, and the media. 
   As Edwards and Wood (1999) note, there is little reason to impose any set of parameter 
restrictions in either direction of the relationships that exist among these actors.  Structural 
equations would be inappropriate when we have little theoretical reason to impose restrictions on 
the direction of causality.  Because of this, vector autoregression is an appropriate technique 
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because, rather than being either devoid of theory or placing inappropriate parameter restrictions 
that would be necessary for more standard statistical techniques, VAR will simply provide 
evidence across each issue area about which, if any, parameter restrictions would be appropriate 
among the agendas of these political actors (Edwards and Wood, 1999). 
 Measures of attention  devoted to issues by government have been quite variegated in the 
literature.  In this study, I will rely on the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) 
for each of the series of interest.  The Policy Agendas Project includes measures of attention for 
the President, Congress, and the media since World War II.  Using these data is advantageous 
because it encompasses the entire scope of governmental activity, which is broken down into 
nineteen major topic codes that are comparable across institutions and the media.  Issue areas 
that are more or less salient, or more or less typically an issue that a given branch attends to can 
all be included in the analyses of these data.  As figure 4-2 demonstrates, the inclusion of each of 
these issue areas is critical to understanding the influence the president exerts over the political 
agendas of Congress and the media, or vice versa, because the president has been active in each 
of the policy areas over the time period of this study.  If the president devotes some attention to 
each issue area, limiting the study to only five specific issues risks missing many of the patterns 
of agenda influence that exist among the three series. 
Edwards and Wood (1999), for example, used weekly measures of attention to issues.  
Using such a small time period for each observation is likely to overestimate the stability of 
attention to issues in each institution, and may have resulted directly in one of their most 
troubling findings: that Congress as an institution acts primarily in isolation from the political 
priorities of the President or the media.  The finding that Congress has an agenda which is devoid 
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of influences from outside leads to a great deal of skepticism because it runs counter to scholars 
who have found that the President‟s policy priorities have a significant influence upon the 
agenda of Congress (Kingdon, 1984; Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Edwards and Barrett, 2000), and 
also does not comport well with the electoral incentive so vital to every member of Congress 
(Mayhew, 1974) because of the affect of the media on the public‟s issue attention (Iyengar and 
Kinder, 1987).  Similarly, using short time periods can drastically increase the number of zeroes 
present in the series, whereas monthly data will have far less zeroes for any time period, 
institution, or issue area.  The presence of a large number of zeroes in any of the series will 
present numerous methodological problems with using vector autoregressive techniques, making 
reliable causal patterns more difficult to discern (Brandt and Williams, 2007).  In order to 
increase the variation in the dependent variables, I employ monthly time periods in this study.  
Monthly time periods seem to provide the best balance between the lack of variation in weekly 
data and the missed responses that would be characteristic of using longer time periods, such as 
would be the case if annual data were to be employed in a similar study. 
The analyses will proceed as follows.  First, I will discuss the indicators of political 
attention that will be used to measure the agendas of the President, Congress, and the media.  
Then, the patterns of leadership will be investigated across each of the nineteen Policy Agendas 
Project major topic codes between the President, Congress, and the media from 1983-2000, and 
the results will be discussed.  In this section, some attention will be devoted to some of the most 
important findings across the issue areas, comparing these results with those reported in previous 
studies of those issue areas.  Finally, the discussion section will revisit some of the most 
important findings of this paper, how these findings fit into the literature on presidential agenda 
setting, and suggest an important research agenda that arises from these findings. 
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Indicators of Attention 
Presidential attention will be measured as the monthly number of policy messages issued 
by the president across nineteen issue areas from 1983-2000.  Rudalevige (2002) compiled a list 
of policy messages from the Public Papers of the Presidents, and it is from this list that the data 
for presidential attention from 1983-2000 are obtained.  Each policy message collected by 
Rudalevige (2002) from the Public Papers is topic-coded using the codebook provided in the 
Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  The Public Papers are regarded as 
providing a comprehensive portrait of presidential attention because it includes public speeches, 
messages to Congress, and many other documents (Edwards and Wood, 1999).  Using data from 
the Public Papers is more advantageous, then, in providing a comprehensive collection of 
presidential activities, which when coded for policy content, provide the most comprehensive 
distribution of presidential priorities. 
Congressional attention will be measured as the number of days of hearings held in each 
topic area per month from 1983-2000
2
.  While one could use a simple count of hearings, as many 
others have (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), the number of days of hearings held more 
approximately appropriates the efforts of Edwards and Wood (1999), who used this measure of 
Congressional attention.  Because this paper is intended to extend the Edwards and Wood piece 
both theoretically and in time, it is important to use similar measures.  All three of the variables, 
including the media measure discussed below, come from the same source for this paper. 
                                                          
2
 While one could argue that House and Senate hearings could be modeled separately in this investigation, 
Congressional hearings are modeled together for two reasons.  First, it is important for this paper to approximate as 
closely as possible the methods used by Edwards and Wood.  Secondly, and more importantly, House and Senate 
hearings have a correlation of .87, which does not signify enough difference to necessitate their being modeled 
separately. 
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Finally, attention to issue areas by the media will be measured by the number of stories 
devoted to each issue area by the New York Times, aggregated monthly from 1983-2000.  
Flemming, Bohte, and Wood (1997) rely on monthly counts of stories found in The Readers 
Guide to Periodical Literature across a sample of issues.  The authors are critical of the use of 
specific prominent newspapers such as the New York Times because the Reader’s Guide surveys 
a wider assortment of specialized publications with a far greater combined readership than any 
one selected publication.  Although their assertion is certainly correct, using the New York Times 
as a measure of media attention to issues is an effective proxy.  Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
report that there is a high correlation (.88) between New York Times stories and those in The 
Reader’s Guide, and also find a high correlation between NYT coverage and coverage of issues 
in television news.  For these reasons, the NYT counts should be expected to perform quite 
similarly to any other indicator of media attention.  According to Flemming, Bohte, and Wood 
(1997), media coverage of issues can serve as a surrogate indicator of what issues are being 
considered on the systemic agenda (Kingdon, 1995) at any point in time.  The degree of 
importance that the public accords to issues does vary in part with the amount of media coverage 
devoted to the issue (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte, 1997).  Because of 
this, we should expect both the President and members of Congress to devote considerable 
attention to the policy content of the media‟s coverage of politics, as well as attempting to shape 
that coverage to comport more with their policy priorities. 
Figures 4-3 and 4-4 are a series of figures that graphically provide a picture of the 
relationships between the president, Congress, and the media.  The first set of graphs provides a 
visual sample of domestic policy relationships.  The following provides a sample to provide 
scholars with some idea of what the time varying relationships look like.  Figure 4-3 provides  
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Figure 4-3: Political Attention to Domestic Policy Issues 
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time-series line graphs of political attention for four domestic policy issue areas: 
macroeconomics, civil rights, health care, and environmental policy.  Figure 4-4 displays the 
time-series relationships among the president, Congress, and the media in three foreign policy 
areas.   
97 
 
The series of graphs demonstrate visually the difficulty that arises in structuring 
equations because the series track together very closely.  These graphs provide supporting 
evidence relating to the necessity of VAR techniques to determine the causal patterns that exist 
among the three series for each policy area.  The graphs also demonstrate the importance of 
looking at issue areas separately because clearly each issue area has differing levels of attention 
for each of the three actors.  For example, presidential attention is much more consistent and has 
higher peaks in the area of macroeconomics.  At the same time, however, presidential attention 
does have high peaks in each of the other areas, and clearly ebbs and flows with the attention of 
other institutions.  The same can be said for foreign policy areas displayed in figure 4-4.  The 
president is most active in the area of international affairs, and much less so in the areas of 
defense and foreign trade.  Similarly, the visual evidence suggests that presidential attention 
seems to precede spikes in attention by Congress and the media in the area of international 
affairs, whereas in defense the president does not appear to exert leadership.  Graphically it is 
difficult to discern which actor leads and which follows, but what can be discerned from these 
visual glimpses is that attention among the three actors does seem to be related for each of these 
issue areas.  While causal patterns may seem apparent in some areas more than others, it is 
important to test for their presence before accepting the visual evidence. 
Finally, I also add an exogenous control variable to account for differences in the causal 
patterns that exist between the three series during unified vs. divided government.  From 1983-
2000, only President Clinton in 1993-1994 presided over unified government.  Although one 
should be careful about making generalizations based on this finding to longer time periods, 
these two years of unified government are not statistically different from the other years in the 
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Figure 4-4: Political Attention to Foreign Policy Issues 
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series, providing evidence that at least in 1993 and 1994, unified government did not alter the 
causal patterns observed between the president, Congress, and the media across the nineteen 
issue areas examined in this paper. 
Results 
 In this section, the results of the VAR Granger models are displayed across nineteen 
major issue areas from the Policy Agendas Project.  Using vector autoregression presents some 
unique considerations for researchers, despite its utility for answering this research question.  
Using VAR is appropriate to test for causality between multiple time-series; however, the 
inability to include a cross section makes it necessary for researchers to run the models 
separately for each issue area.   
 The results of the VAR Granger causality tests are reported in table one below.  First, a 
general discussion of what is in the table is appropriate.  The first column specifies which issue 
area in which the relationship reported occurs.  Using VAR does not permit for cross-sectional 
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analysis, so models have to be run and reported separately for each issue area.  Column two 
provides the causal relationships and their direction observed among the president, Congress, and 
the media.  Many of the issue areas have multiple causal patterns, all of which are reported in the 
table.  Column three provides the P-value of the observed relationship.  Only the P-value is 
reported because VAR does not provide coefficients that are interpretable, instead it is a method 
intended only to determine causality among three series among which there is ambiguity over the 
theoretically causal direction (Granger, 1969; Freeman Williams and Lin, 1989; Edwards and 
Wood, 1999; Brandt and Williams, 2007).   
Column four provides the number of significant lags between the series in each issue 
area.  One of the critical benefits of VAR is that it controls for lagged values of each dependent 
variable in the series.  As a part of the results, then, the number of significant lags that influence 
time t is provided by VAR.  The results are reported here because, whereas Edwards and Wood  
(1999) made the broad assumption to control for a four week time lag in their previous work, this 
paper demonstrates that the amount of stickiness observed in the multiple time-series is 
dependent upon the issue area.  What this indicates is, basically, that shocks to the system will 
have a longer affect in some issue areas as opposed to others.  For example, the stickiest series 
resides in the area of international affairs and foreign aid, where shocks to the system have 
significant effects on attention for up to eight months.  In the areas of health care, social welfare, 
foreign trade, and several other shocks to the system significantly influence the levels of political 
attention for only one month.  The appropriate lag structure is a methodological issue that was 
not given sufficient  
 
101 
 
 
Table 4-1: Patterns of Agenda Influence: The President, Congress, and the Media in 
Nineteen Issue Areas 
Issue Area Causal Relationship P:Value Significant month lag 
Macroeonomics Media  Congress*** .01 1 
 President  Congress* .08  
Civil Rights 
 
Congress  President*** .01 1,2 
Health Care Media  President* .08 1 
 Media  Congress***   
Agriculture 
 
None  1,2 
Labor and 
Immigration 
Media  President* 
Congress  President* 
.08 
.09 
1 
    
Education Media  Congress*** .00 1,2 
 Congress  Media* .08  
 President  Media** .04  
Environment Media  Congress*** .01 1,2,3,4 
 President  Congress* .06  
Energy Media  Congress*** .00 1,2 
 President  Media*** .01  
 President  Congress*** .01  
Transportation President  Congress** .02 1,2 
 President  Media* .07  
Law, Crime, and 
Family 
Media  Congress* .06 1,2,3 
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Social Welfare 
 
None 
  
1 
 
Housing and 
Community 
Development 
 
None 
  
1 
 
Banking, Finance, 
and Domestic 
Commerce 
 
Media  President*** 
President  Media** 
Media  Congress** 
President  Congress*** 
 
 
.01 
.04 
.05 
.01 
 
1 
Defense Media  President*** .00 1,2,3,4,5 
 Media  Congress*** .00  
 President  Congress*** .00  
 Congress  President*** .00  
Space, Science, 
Technology, and 
Communications 
Media  President** 
Media  Congress*** 
President  Congress** 
Congress  President*** 
.05 
.00 
.02 
.01 
1,2 
Foreign Trade President  Congress*** .01 1 
 President  Media** .05  
International Affairs 
and Foreign Aid 
President  Congress** 
Congress  President*** 
President  Media** 
Congress  Media*** 
.03 
.00 
.02 
.00 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
Government Op. President  Media*** .00 1,2,3 
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Public Lands and 
Water Management 
 
President  Media* 
Media  President* 
Media  Congress*** 
 
.07 
.10 
.01 
 
1,2 
    
Note: P: Values are reported to indicate the percentage likelihood that the observed relationships 
between each series occur by chance.  Lagged structures reported in column four indicate the 
number of significant lags, or the length of time which a shock to the system remains in the 
system before decaying out.  *=.10, **=.05, ***=.01 
 
attention by Edwards and Wood
3
.  This issue will be discussed further in the conclusion of this 
paper.  
Table 4-2 demonstrates that not only the lag structure differs across issue areas, but also a 
variety of causal patterns are observed.  First, in the areas of agriculture, social welfare, and 
housing and community development there are no significant relationships between the 
president, Congress and the media.  This indicates that shifts in attention to these issues do not 
follow a consistent pattern where one or the other series exerts leadership.  This finding may 
indicate that shifts in attention are distributed randomly and that such shifts do not necessarily 
produce a response from other actors, or it could indicate that events such as agricultural 
emergencies, rising poverty, or increases in the number of homeless individuals produces a 
virtually simultaneous reaction from each of the three actors. 
                                                          
3
 While this may seem like a tedious point, it does matter.  When one assumes a broad reaching significant lag 
structure without specifying which lags actually matter, the results will be different because VAR is controlling for 
lags that do not matter.   
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 There is strong evidence of presidential leadership in setting the agenda of Congress and 
the media.  Presidential leadership is most evident in the areas of energy, transportation, foreign 
trade, and government operations.  The amount of attention the president devotes to the issues of 
energy, transportation, and foreign trade each significantly influence the attention levels of both 
Congress and the media.  The president‟s attention to government operations significantly 
influences the level of attention the media devotes to government operations, but does not 
influence Congressional attention to government operations.  The president can be seen as the 
prominent actor setting the agenda in four of nineteen policy areas, just over twenty percent. 
How does this compare to other actors?  Next the remainder of the findings will be discussed. 
The president‟s role as agenda-setter will be reevaluated in the conclusion.  
Congressional leadership over the president and the media in attending to issues is 
limited to the areas of civil rights and labor and immigration.  When it comes to civil rights and 
labor and immigration, the level of attention Congress is devoting to the issue as measured by the 
number of days of hearings held on the topic significantly influences the amount of attention the 
president will devote to the issues.  The results demonstrate that Congress is much more of a 
responsive institution than it is a leader in setting the agenda.  That said, it certainly is not the 
institution acting in isolation as Edwards and Wood demonstrate.  Congress is responsive to the 
president‟s attention levels in the areas of energy, energy, transportation, and international affairs 
and foreign aid.  Congress is responsive to both the president and the media in the four areas of 
macroeconomics, environment, banking, finance, and domestic commerce, and defense.   
 One of the most important findings that is consistent throughout the table is the extent to 
which media attention influences the attention levels of the political institutions.  The amount of 
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attention the media is devoting to an issue significantly influences both the president and 
Congress in the four areas of health care, space, science, technology, and communications, 
defense, and land use and water management.  The media‟s attention leads that of Congress only 
in the areas of macroeconomics and law, crime, and family issues, and that of the president only 
in labor and immigration.  In seven of the nineteen issue areas, then, the political institutions 
significantly respond to the systemic agenda as reflected by the amount of media coverage 
devoted to the issue. 
 Many of the issues also have reciprocal patterns of influence between actors.  In these 
areas, issues hit the agendas of the president, Congress, and the media virtually simultaneously, 
and there is no consistent causal pattern between the series.  Rather, when the issue reaches the 
agendas of multiple actors the attention levels continue to move together.  The attention levels of 
the president and Congress respond to each other, moving together in the areas of defense, space, 
science, technology, and communications, and international affairs and foreign aid.  The 
president and the media have a reciprocal pattern of influence in the area of banking, finance, 
and domestic commerce.  The media and Congress have a reciprocal pattern of influence in the 
areas of education and international affairs and foreign aid.   
 Finally, table 4-1 demonstrates that institutions do have an effect on the systemic agenda 
as represented by the media.  The media is responsive to each of the political branches but does 
not significantly influence the attention levels of policymakers in the area of international affairs 
and foreign aid.  The media is responsive to the president only, but does not significantly 
influence the attention levels of the president in the areas education, energy, transportation, 
foreign trade, and government operations.   
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Table 4-2: Patterns of Agenda Influence Scorecard 
 
Relationship Issues Number of Issues 
President  Congress Macroeconomics 
Environment 
Energy 
Transportation 
Banking, Finance, and 
Domestic Commerce 
Foreign Trade 
6 
Congress  President Civil Rights 
Labor and Immigration 
2 
Reciprocal (President and 
Congress) 
Defense 
Space, Science, Technology, 
and Communications 
International Affairs and 
Foreign Aid 
3 
President  Media Education 
Environment 
Transportation 
Foreign Trade 
International Affairs and 
Foreign Aid 
Government Operations 
6 
Media  President Health Care 
Labor and Immigration 
Defense 
Space, Science, Technology, 
4 
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and Communications 
 
Reciprocal (President and 
Media) 
Banking, Finance, and 
Domestic Commerce 
Public Lands and Water 
Management 
2 
Congress  Media International Affairs and 
Foreign Aid 
1 
Media  Congress Macroeconomics 
Health Care 
Environment 
Energy 
Law, Crime, and Family 
Banking, Finance, and 
Domestic Commerce 
Defense 
Space, Science, Technology, 
and Communications 
Public Lands and Water 
Management 
9 
Reciprocal (Congress and 
Media) 
Education 1 
 
So what do all of these findings mean?  Because there are nineteen issue areas and 
assorted causal patterns exist in each area, a matter which is only further complicated by 
reciprocal influence, sorting through these results is difficult.  To make this task easier, table 4-2 
below provides an agenda influence scorecard for the president, Congress, and the media.  As the 
table demonstrates, the president has much greater influence over the agenda of Congress than 
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vice versa, by a count of 6 issues to 2.  The issues in which there are reciprocal patterns of 
influence are considered a wash.  Congress also is influenced by the media much more 
frequently than it exerts influence, by a resounding count of 9 to 1.  Interestingly, while the 
president is responsive to the systemic agenda of the media on four areas, the president is able to 
shape the level of media attention on six issues.  Table 4-2 makes clear, then, that of the three 
actors the president seems to exert the most influence on the political agendas of the others. 
The systemic agenda has considerable influence over the political agendas of the elected 
institutions as well.  Finally, the scorecard makes even clearer than the findings in table 4-1 that 
Congress is much more of a follower when it comes to agenda-setting than it is a leader.  
However, the strongest finding presented from these tables is that Edwards and Wood‟s (1999) 
findings that Congress largely sets its agenda in isolation of the president and the media could 
not be more wrong.  Conversely, the agenda of Congress is quite susceptible to outside influence. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have set out to extend the work of Edwards and Wood (1999), who 
tested for causal patterns in political attention between the president, Congress, and the media 
across five political issues from 1984-1994.  While their work was certainly groundbreaking in 
providing scholars an effective method for answering this important question, there were several 
questions that remained.  This chapter represents a first effort to investigate these queries. 
 The work of Edwards and Wood left open several questions that required further 
investigation.  First, their article only examined causal patterns in five specific issue areas which 
were salient during the period 1984-1994.  Scholars were left with little reason to make 
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generalizations beyond these salient issues because the authors did not examine less salient 
issues, which this chapter demonstrates were also the subject of political attention during the 
period under study.  There is no reason to believe that patterns of influence are only going to 
exist on the most salient issues, and this chapter demonstrates that causal patterns exist in nearly 
every issue area; including those which are not especially salient on the political agenda.   
 Further, the Edwards and Wood study only encapsulated the admininstration of George 
H.W. Bush in its entirety, with the addition of the second term of the Reagan presidency and the 
first two years of the Clinton administration.  This seems a strange time selection, and is 
certainly a difficult one to justify.  It is entirely possible that different presidents are 
entrepreneurial or responsive on different issues, so it is problematic to take a piecemeal 
approach.  A critical extension of Edwards and Wood and this chapter would be to continue 
coding data from the Public Papers of the Presidents to exend this research project further in 
time, beginning to understand not only longer term patterns of influence that exist between the 
three actors but also whether or not the patterns that are discovered are presidency specific or 
generalizable to all presidents.  Although this question could not be taken up in this chapter, a 
step in the right direction is offered by adding the remainder of the Clinton administration to the 
picture. 
 Finally, several of the findings offered by Edwards and Wood were somewhat dubious 
theoretically.  Primarily, the idea that Congress acts as an institution in isolation from outside 
pressure on their agenda does not sit well with the rest of the literature.  This paper debunks the 
myth of an isolated Congress.  Congress is quite responsive to the agenda of the president on a 
number of issues, and even more responsive to those issues that the media devotes the most 
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attention to, reflecting their heightened status on the systemic agenda.  Congress does not exert a 
great deal of agenda influence, but the evidence presented in this chapter most certainly suggests 
that it is responsive.  In fact, among the three actors, it is by far the most responsive.   
One possible explanation for Edwards and Wood‟s findings regarding Congress could be 
the limited number of issues included in their study.  But the evidence presented in this paper 
makes it far more likely that those findings which I have argued are dubious are more a result of 
setting an improper time component for impulse responses.  Edwards and Wood examine the 
relationships between the president, Congress, and the media in one week intervals over their ten 
year period.  While the actors certainly can respond to each other in as short as a week, it is much 
more likely that responses will take longer than one week simply because of the attention 
bottleneck (Jones, 1994); serial processing is limited to only a few issues at any one time (Jones, 
2003).  While the constraints that serial processing place on institutions can be overcome by a 
large presidential staff, and decentralization of Congress plus increases amounts of staffers in the 
legislative branch, one week still seems too quick to expect a response on any but the most 
salient issues.  Further, one of the statistical problems that can present itself when using VAR 
Granger is the presence of a large number of zeroes in the series under examination.  It is much 
less likely to see zeroes in monthly time intervals, such as were used in this chapter, than there 
are in weekly intervals.  Employing weekly time intervals, in short, presents dangers statistically 
in the use of VAR Granger, but also on a more substantive basis is likely to overestimate the 
stability of political attention to issues. 
While this paper is a first effort to address some of these problems and move closer to 
more concrete evidence regarding the relationship between the president, Congress, and the 
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media, there certainly is much more work to be done.  The best approach to this question would 
be to employ the methods used in both this chapter and the Edwards and Wood articles, using 
monthly time intervals, across a diverse set of issue areas, and over a long period of time.  One of 
the most important avenues for future research that arises from this chapter is the potential that 
resides in collecting more data on presidential priorities over a longer time period.  In doing so, 
scholars will have a greater amount of evidence in support of those patterns that do exist between 
the president, Congress, and the media, but also gain a greater understanding of whether the 
patterns that do exist are specific to each president or generalizable to all presidents.  It seems 
likely that the influence a president can exert in an issue area depends upon the extent to which it 
is a priority of his administration, but this question is only answerable with a much larger amount 
of data. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Reexamining the role of Agenda Setting in Creating a Demand for Lobbying* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Note: A version of this chapter has been submitted to Political Research Quarterly for review.  The author wishes 
to thank Frank Baumgartner, Heather Larsen-Price, and Beth Leech for their contributions, recognizing that neither 
version of this paper would be nearly what it is without their insights. 
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Introduction 
The growth of the federal government during the twentieth century, entering into a 
burgeoning area of policy areas and economic sectors over time has been staggering.  At the 
same time that the government has grown, the size of interest group populations lobbying the 
federal government has also undergone on an explosive period of growth.  Tichenour and Harris 
(2002/2003) associate progressive era explosions in social movements with federal government 
growth, while other scholars have argued that interest groups engaged in rent-seeking drive the 
increased government spending as well as regulation increasing demand for services (Buchanon 
and Tullock, 1962).  While interest group mobilization has fostered a response of new 
government programs and a larger government in general, the reverse is also true.  The growth of 
government over time has also had a role in the explosion of interest group populations 
registered to lobby at the federal level.   
 Several recent studies have demonstrated that the increase of government activity in a 
policy sector also has an influence on the size of lobbying communities, based on the premise 
that increased activity on the part of government institutions will foster a demand for lobbying 
(Lowery et al, 2004; Gray et al, 2005; Leech et al, 2005).  The relationship between the growth 
of government and the growth of interest group communities, then, should be seen as reciprocal, 
with the size of each growing in response to one another.  Such findings are consistent with the 
work of Jack Walker (1983, 1991), who argued that the government can compel groups to 
organize to secure patronage from the government.  This paper will continue the work of these 
scholars in arguing that government patronage plays a significant role in the expansion of interest 
group communities, the reverse of which is also true. 
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 The creation of lobby demand by governmental institutions is theoretically satisfying 
because it provides an incentive for collective action.  Rent-seeking groups are able to secure 
patronage from the federal government (Walker, 1983), and the growth of government in policy 
areas of interest to a group provides a purposive benefit (Salisbury, 1984) for mobilization.  
Groups will respond to increased government attention in a policy area in order to secure new 
benefits made available by that attention, or mobilize to defend their interests.  A potential 
pattern could be that a few interest groups will mobilize in order to gain government attention, 
but then it is the government attention itself once secured that will lead to an increased demand 
for lobbying activity (Leech et al, 2005). 
 This chapter will explore the relationship between institutional attention to public policy 
issues and the demand for lobbying in those policy communities.  Specifically, this chapter will 
update the work of Leech and her colleagues (2005), who found that Congressional attention to 
political issues had a significant effect on the size of the corresponding lobbying communities.  
The first portion of this paper will be devoted to replicating their work, which covered the time 
period 1996-2000 across fifty-six issues, and then extending their models to 2004 to show how 
the relationship has been strengthened with an increased number of data points and provide 
further confirmation of the findings.  The addition of increased data points, from four to fourteen 
six-month time periods, demonstrates that an even stronger relationship exists between 
Congressional attention to issues and lobbying registrations in the corresponding issue area than 
was posited in the original work. 
 Theoretically, however, the most important contribution this chapter will make to the 
literature is the addition of a measure of presidential attention to each issue area.  Leech et al 
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(2005) only consider Congressional attention as a potential source on the federal level where 
agenda setting can foster a demand for lobbying.  However, previous studies have shown 
consistently that it is the president, not Congress, who has the biggest affect in setting the 
political agenda, a critical component part of the president‟s power (Kingdon, 1984; Bond and 
Fleisher, 1990; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  In fact, the president has been invited by 
Congress to take the lead on the budget, the economy, national security, the environment, and 
other areas of public policy (Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  If the president has power over the 
political agenda, it should follow that interest groups will respond at least as much, and probably 
more, to presidential attention to issues than any other actor.  Adding presidential attention to the 
list of potential factors influencing the demand for lobbying activity will result in a better 
specified model and an improved substantive understanding of the growth of interest group 
populations. 
 This chapter follows the work of Leech et al (2005) in linking data from the federal lobby 
disclosure database to indicators of Congressional and presidential activities in the corresponding 
policy areas from the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  The Lobby 
Disclosure Act of 1995 requires that lobbyists who spend greater than $10,000 to report their 
activities in each of seventy-four policy areas.  Of the seventy-four areas, fifty-six can be linked 
to the data from the Policy Agendas Project, covering about eighty-five percent of the total lobby 
registration reports.  Since the publication of the Leech et al (2005) article, new indicators of 
presidential attention have been made available through the Policy Agendas Project, which are 
coded using the identical system of Congressional hearings.  These new data provide the 
opportunity in this paper to explore more fully the affect on lobbying populations that policy 
attention at the federal level has, as well as explore the inter-branch dynamics in fostering lobby 
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demand.  Further detail about the indicators of government attention, as well as the lobby 
populations are discussed below. 
 Briefly, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that the president does have a strong 
mobilizing effect on interest groups when measured alone.  However, in full models including 
Congressional attention and other control variables, several important findings emerge.  First, the 
effect of the president‟s attention on lobby mobilization is issue-specific, with the largest effect 
coming in policy domains where the president is frequently involved.  In policy-areas where the 
president is active, presidential attention actually depresses Congressional lobbying, contrary to 
expectations.  Presidential attention has a much weaker effect in domains where Congress is 
dominant or powers are more equally shared between the branches.  Lobbying populations are 
consistently lower in those areas where the president is a frequent actor, especially during time 
periods in which presidential activity is increased.  These findings are likely a result of the 
Lobby Disclosure data being a measure of Congressional lobbying.  A likely explanation is that 
presidential attention in presidential domains draws lobbyists away from Congress, leading them 
to focus more of their lobbying efforts on the executive branch.  This possibility demonstrates a 
need for better measures of lobbying in the executive branch, and perhaps modification to the 
Lobby Disclosure Act that would require lobbyists to report their activities to a broader number 
of executive branch officials.  This will be discussed further below. 
Congressional Attention and the Demand for Lobbying 
 Interest group scholars have wrestled for decades with Mancur Olson‟s (1965) bombshell 
from the field of economics, demonstrating that the collective action calculus renders non-
participation on the part of citizens to be rational.  Despite the irrational nature of collective 
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action, America has been a leader among nations in its tendency to be joiners dating as far back 
as the first half of the nineteenth century (de Tocqueville, 1838).  The tendency to engage in 
collective action among American citizens was certainly not something that was lost on Olson; 
however, he demonstrated that simple rational calculus of costs and benefits could not suffice in 
explaining participation in collective action.  Rather, there had to be other non-material 
incentives which led individuals to overcome the costs associated with collective activity. 
 Scholars writing at nearly the same time as Olson were beginning to take on the 
challenge of explaining collective action, and the literature has vastly expanded since the time of 
Olson‟s writing.  Clark and Wilson (1961), for example, argue that purposive and solidary 
benefits can also produce mobilization for collective activity.  Purposive incentives are those 
incentives that encourage people to join a cause they believe in, in order to secure some public 
policy desire or public good not materialistic in nature.  Solidary benefits are afforded to those 
who just desire to be a part of something, and join just for the personal benefit of joining based 
on the belief that man is a social animal who wants to be a part of something with other people. 
 Salisbury (1969) proposes an exchange theory of interest groups based on the contractual 
exchange between entrepreneurs and new members.  The key to collective action according to 
Salisbury is the ability of entrepreneurs to provide incentives for individuals to participate, 
including material or tangible benefits, solidary benefits similar to those discussed by Clark and 
Wilson, or expressive benefits in which the individual is part of a group because the group is 
expressing an argument which the individual wants to be heard.  Interestingly, Salisbury argues 
that the main hurdle for interest group entrepreneurs is getting individuals to join, not to maintain 
their membership.  The important contribution entrepreneurs make to overcoming the problem of 
118 
 
collective action is providing incentives to join and individuals require fewer incentives to 
continue their membership once they have already joined.   
 Walker (1983), in his survey of an extensive list of membership interest groups, finds that 
startup costs are the most significant barrier to collective action, supporting the argument made 
earlier by Salisbury.  His data demonstrate that eighty-nine percent of citizen groups and thirty-
four percent of profit-sector groups surveyed had major contributions from patrons in their initial 
startup phase.  Such major contributions, according to Walker‟s data, could come from 
government grants, foundations, corporations, or wealthy individuals.  Perhaps the most 
interesting pattern to come out of Walker‟s surveys performed in 1980 and 1985 is the explosive 
increase in citizen groups.  Citizen groups, assisted in a large part by patronage, have begun to 
level the playing field with profit sector groups (Walker, 1991).   
 Government stimulates the growth and mobilization of interest groups not only by direct 
subsidy and contracts, as Walker demonstrated, but also and on a much larger scale simply by 
expanding its activities within and across policy and economic sectors.  This includes federal 
spending, which groups see as an opportunity to secure government contracts or other similar 
financial benefits toward achieving the goals of the membership.  Campbell (2005), for example, 
showed that the Social Security significantly increased senior citizens‟ level of engagement in 
politics because of the profound effect the program has upon their income.  It is clear that federal 
spending has an effect on social mobilization, which is not surprising because frequently federal 
spending offers the opportunity to secure tangible benefits.  
Government effects on the demand for lobbying go far beyond federal spending only, 
however.  Regulatory activities of various kinds also foster a demand for lobbying activity 
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among organized interests.  Government regulation in economic or policy sectors in which an 
organization is active can offer opportunities to secure a desired new policy direction, or may 
lead to group mobilization among organizations which have an interest in protecting their turf.  
Regardless which motivation leads to increased mobilization among groups, it is expected that 
regulatory activity of various kinds should have an effect on the demand for lobbying activity. 
Increases in government activity across a broader range of policy or economic sectors over time 
have certainly played a major role in the explosion of interest group populations, as recent 
scholars have suggested (Lowery and Gray, 1996, 1998; Boehmke, 2005; Leech et al, 2005), 
which is discussed below. 
 Lowery and Gray (1996; 1998) borrow theoretically from population ecology to explain 
the growth and diversity of interest group populations in the American states.  Their analyses are 
based on a large sample of interest group populations across 50 states.  The model is represented 
by energy, stability, and area, or ESA.  Basically, the ESA model predicts that the size of the 
government in any given state is a major predictor of both the growth and diversity of interest 
group populations.  Boehmke (2005) echoes the findings of Lowery and Gray (1998) in studying 
the role of direct legislation.  Boehmke notes that states in which direct legislation is encouraged 
or increases, the lobbying populations tend to respond with a growth in the number of interest 
groups participating in the process. 
 The ability of government to foster lobby demand has not only been explored on the state 
level.  Baumgartner and Leech (2001) explore the interest group registrations required by the 
Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995 across 137 issue areas.  They find that the interest group 
populations across their issue areas are quite skewed, with a few areas having a great majority of 
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groups while others only have a few groups operating at any one time.  These results confirm the 
concerns of earlier scholars because business interests are still able to exercise their dominance 
in those policy areas where only a few groups have been mobilized.  Citizen groups tend to be 
concentrated in the issue areas where many groups are located, while the more powerful 
economic interests are able to find an issue niche where they can carve out an isolated spot for 
continued domination over their policy of interest. 
 The studies discussed thus far have had a predominant focus on the size of government, 
indicating an overwhelming exploration of tangible benefits.  Leech and her colleagues (2005) 
move beyond tangible benefits, exploring other activities that government can use to foster 
interest group mobilization.  They test specifically for the effects of increased governmental 
attention, as measured by the number of Congressional hearings, across fifty-six policy areas.  
They find that increased attention to a policy area, even absent increased legislative output, leads 
to a responsive increase in the number of lobbyists registered to participate in that issue area.  
Interest groups respond to the potential of new legislation or new benefits available at the 
agenda-stage.  The mobilization of organized interests at both the state and national levels, then, 
is a result not only of the social and economic “supply” factors, but also of demand factors such 
as increased government attention.  Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (2009, forthcoming) find 
evidence that policy attention on the federal level also has an effect on the state level, increasing 
the number of organized interests lobbying in a given policy area at the state level.   
 While scholars have been successful demonstrating that political attention has an effect 
on the growth of lobbying populations, each of the studies discussed above omits the possibility 
that presidential attention will influence the size of  lobbying populations.  Leech et al (2005) 
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and Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (forthcoming) focus only on Congressional attention and 
federal spending as a signal to interest groups of increased government attention to their policy 
area of interest.  What is troubling about these studies is the omission of the attention devoted to 
an issue by the president, who has a significant role in directing the policy attention of the federal 
government.   
Agenda-setting is an especially important component of presidential power in American 
politics.  Presidents have been able to use the important strategic power of agenda-setting to their 
advantage.  Kingdon (1984), in his study of the transportation and health subsystems, found that 
no other actor rivaled the ability of the president to bring attention to issues.  Similarly, 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that no other actor can so clearly focus attention or change 
the motivations of other political actors as well as the president.  Bond and Fleisher (1990) argue 
that setting the agenda of Congress is one of the president‟s greatest sources of influence.  
Edwards (1989) identifies the president‟s ability to set the political agenda as one of his greatest 
strategic powers.  Charles O. Jones (1994), who has been critical of the president becoming the 
focus of the public‟s aspirations for policy change, still recognizes the president‟s ability to 
manage the agenda as an important force in American politics (Jones, 1994). 
Influencing the Congressional agenda is not an especially difficult task for presidents, 
especially when compared with influencing Congressional actions at later stages in the policy 
process, such as actual voting on the floor.  The president has been invited by Congress to take 
the lead on the budget, the economy, national security, the environment, and other areas of 
public policy (Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  Presidents are forced into bargaining games in order 
122 
 
to exert influence in the political system, and simply achieving a spot on the agenda is one of the 
few areas where the costs of bargaining are low. 
Richard Neustadt (1991) argues that Congress welcomes a high-status agenda from 
outside to which they can react, and the agenda of the president fits these criteria quite well.  
Members of Congress also have an electoral incentive to invite the president to initiate 
legislation to which members can react.  Political realities have revealed that Congress acts upon 
this incentive.  Congress has invited the president to take greater roles in initiating legislation and 
policy priorities in the areas of the economy, foreign policy, the environment, and others 
(Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  Perhaps in no area is this clearer than in Congress inviting the 
president to submit a budget for their approval on an annual basis. 
Due to the influence that the president has on the political agenda, it should be expected 
that the President will have an effect on the demand for lobbying activity as well.  One measure 
of the policy priorities of the president is the content of his annual State of the Union message.  
In the State of the Union, the president has an uninterrupted opportunity to provide Congress 
with his legislative priorities that he would like to see the legislative branch act upon in the 
coming year.  Rudalevige (2002) makes the argument that the address should not be seen as an 
exhaustive list of the policy priorities of the president; however, the address still is generally 
viewed as a good indicator of the president‟s priorities (Light, 1999).   
The ability of the president to use the State of the Union message as a tool to set the 
political agenda has been thoroughly investigated.  Jeffrey Cohen (1995), for example, studies 
the linkage between the policy agendas of the mass public and the content of the president‟s 
State of the Union message, testing only for causality flowing from the presidential level.  He 
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finds that presidential attention to foreign policy, civil rights, and economic policy in the State of 
the Union Address affects the salience assigned to those issues by the mass public, as measured 
by Gallup‟s most important problem series.   
Kim Quaile Hill (1998) tests for the relationship between public salience and policy 
events on the president‟s agenda, with causality examined in both directions.  His research 
examines, similarly to Cohen (1995), the areas of foreign, economic, and civil rights policy.  
Again the president‟s agenda is measured by the number of sentences devoted to each policy 
area in the State of the Union Address, and public salience is measured by Gallup‟s most 
important problem series.  He finds a reciprocal pattern of influence between the agendas of the 
president and the mass public on the issues of foreign and economic policy, and the president 
having unidirectional influence on the mass public‟s salience assigned to civil rights.  Together, 
these studies demonstrate that the president is able to influence the domestic agenda in the short 
term through his State of the Union message, and the foreign policy agenda in the long term 
(Cohen, 1995; Hill, 1998). 
Further, the content of the State of the Union message as an indicator of presidential 
priorities has been tied to interest group activity.  Presidents invite interest groups to serve on 
advisory committees which help presidents to gain information regarding their policy proposals 
and provide increased legitimacy for a president‟s policy positions (Chin and Lundquist, 2004).  
Presidents also ask for help from organized interests in advancing policy priorities, especially 
calling upon groups to lobby Congress on the behalf of the administration (Peterson, 1992).  
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Data, Methods, and Hypotheses 
Congressional attention, as measured by the number of hearings, is shown to have a 
significant effect on social mobilization, both to lobby at the federal and state government levels.  
Hearings represent an overall indicator of Congressional interest in a given policy area, whether 
the hearing relates to the creation of new legislative programs, oversight, or general fact-finding 
ventures in Congressional committees.  Whether the intention of a Congressional hearing is to 
debate new legislative programs, propose changes in the direction of the implementation of some 
policy on the federal level, or simply to hear from citizens, interest groups, or experts regarding 
some policy matter the number of hearings held by Congress still is an accurate reflection of the 
overall Congressional interest in a policy area (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  It should be 
expected then that the number of hearings held in a given policy area reflecting Congressional 
interest should foster a demand for social mobilization within that issue area, an expectation 
confirmed by Leech et al (2005). 
The State of the Union message, discussed thoroughly above, is not the only indicator of 
a president‟s policy priorities.  Additionally, recent research has suggested that executive orders 
have evolved over time from a tool presidents employ primarily to effect the administration of a 
policy, to a method which allows presidents to take control of a policy debate by striking first, 
before Congress is either willing or able to mobilize to address an issue (Mayer, 2001).  The 
fragmentation of Congress leaves the legislative branch slower to mobilize, and over time 
presidents have taken advantage of this fragmentation to engage in more direct action through 
the use of executive orders (Howell, 2003).  Over time, the president has relied more on the 
executive order to exert political influence.  As such, it is important to include executive orders 
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as an indicator of presidential priorities.  In this paper, a presidential index variable is created 
combining the levels of presidential involvement in each issue area through policy statements in 
the State of the Union Address and the number of executive orders
4
.  Both of these measures 
have been recent additions to the Policy Agendas Project database. 
One caveat to the analysis of presidential activities is that the greatest emphasis in the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act is on Congressional activities.  Virtually all Congressional lobbying 
activity must be reported, whereas the definition of “covered officials” within the executive 
branch includes only more senior members.  As a result, much of the routine contact between 
lobbyists and staff members in executive agencies need not be reported in the LDA reports.  
Nonetheless, executive orders requiring agency action would virtually always include actions by 
agency officials in top policymaking positions.  Interest-group activities and their lobbying 
reports should reflect that tendency. 
 Table 5-1 provides annual averages of Congressional and presidential attention across the 
fifty-six issue areas examined in this paper from 1996-2004.  Notice that in the table, there is a 
distinction between “presidential domains”, and domains in which the president is not frequently 
active.  A presidential domain is considered to be any domain in which the indicator of 
presidential activity has an index score of greater than 1.0, with any domain area scoring less 
                                                          
4
 The index was created using Stata‟s factor command with unrotated principal components; each 
variable loaded on the principal factor with a value of .8156.  The index then had a mean of zero 
and a minimum value of -.4981271.  For ease of interpretation, I added this number to all values 
so that the index of presidential activity would have a minimum value of zero corresponding to 
no presidential activities.  The index equals .5507736 x executive orders + .0473831 x statements 
in the State of the Union. 
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than 1.0 in the presidential activity index designated as a non-presidential domain.  The 
distinction is made between presidential and non-presidential domains because of the expectation 
that there will be a much stronger relationship between presidential attention and lobby 
registrations in presidential domains.  Presidential activity tends to be focused on just a few 
areas:  defense, health care, foreign affairs, as well as civil rights, welfare, and the other issues 
listed at the top of the table.  Presidential activity is expected to have the greatest affect in those 
areas where the president is typically active.  Therefore, the analysis that follows tests for the 
effects of the presidential activity index on lobbying populations both in presidential and non-
presidential issue domains.  Congressional actions are widely dispersed throughout the 56 areas, 
as one would expect because of the committee structure.  However, there is considerably more 
attention in Congress to many of those areas also of concern to the president.  Of course, both 
presidential and Congressional actions vary not only by issue-area, but also over time. 
 Tables 5-2 and 5-3 below provide the annual average numbers of groups (table 5-2) and 
lobbyists (table 5-3) across each of the fifty-six policy areas under examination in this chapter.  
One of the most notable characteristics of the lobbying populations is the extent to which the 
sizes of the communities vary by issue area.  For example, whereas in the area of taxation and 
IRS code there is an annual average of over 600 organizations lobbying on their own behalf and 
over 1,100 hired lobbying firms, only an average of 8 groups lobbying on their own behalf and 
14 hired lobbyists are active in the area of District of Columbia Affairs. One should expect to see 
significant variation across issue areas simply because each of the issue areas has an effect on a 
different subset of the population.  Several of the issue areas affect a large subset of the 
population, while an area such as District of Columbia affairs has an effect on a rather small  
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Table 5-1.  Congressional and Presidential Activities by Issue-Area 
Issue Area  Hearings  Executive Orders  State of the Union Presidential Activity Index  
Part A:  Presidential Domains 
Foreign Relations 81.2 2.9 61.6 4.5 
Government Issues 86.9 4.0 8.4 2.6 
Defense 44.5 2.6 19.0 2.3 
Health Care 49.1 1.3 27.4 2.0 
Labor Issues 30.8 0.9 16.9 1.3 
Law Enforcement 39.4 0.8 18.5 1.3 
Welfare 14.9 0.6 19.4 1.3 
Civil 
Rights/Liberties 
11.6 1.1 10.4 1.1 
Education 22.8 0.5 33.2 1.8 
Environment 28.9 1.1 7.7 1.0 
Part B: Non-Presidential Domains 
Trade 12.6 0.9 8.1 0.9 
Natural Resources 36.6 1.1 4.4 0.8 
Taxation/IRS Code 8.6 0.6 11.1 0.6 
Transportation 29.8 1.1 0.4 0.6 
Medical Research 10.4 0.6 3.4 0.5 
Science/Technolog
y 
11.9 0.4 4.1 0.4 
Computer Industry 10.5 0.5 2.8 0.4 
Veterans 14.7 0.2 5.9 0.4 
Energy/Nuclear 22.8 0.4 2.6 0.3 
Indian Affairs 16.6 0.5 0.1 0.3 
Alcohol 11.3 0.3 3.5 0.3 
Family Issues 3.9 0.1 6.3 0.3 
Medicare/ Medicaid 9.9 0.0 3.9 0.2 
Housing 8.7 0.2 1.6 0.2 
Immigration 8.2 0.2 3.1 0.2 
Urban 
Development 
6.1 0.2 2.7 0.2 
Retirement 5.7 0.0 3.4 0.2 
Small Business 15.3 0.2 1.2 0.2 
Agriculture 19.4 0.1 1.8 0.1 
Aviation 11.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Clean Air/ Water 7.7 0.0 2.5 0.1 
Communications 4.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Waste 4.4 0.1 1.4 0.1 
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Tobacco 0.9 0.1 0.6 0.1 
Gaming/ Gambling 1.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 
Pharmacy 2.6 0.0 1.8 0.1 
Railroads 3.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Aerospace 5.9 0.1 1.1 0.1 
Disaster 
Management 
3.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Trucking/Shipping 6.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 
District of 
Columbia 
6.9 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Unemployment 2.3 0.0 1.5 0.1 
Telecommunication
s 
5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finance/ 
Investments 
11.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 
Banking 8.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Copyright/ Patent 4.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Insurance 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Consumer Issues 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Food Industry 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.0 
Fuel/Gas/Oil 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Roads/ Highways 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bankruptcy 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Postal 2.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Travel/ Tourism 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Minting/Money 4.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Commodities 4.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 
 
subset of the population, and should not be expected to produce a large social mobilization.  
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 also include the standard deviation over time for each of the issue areas, as 
well as the coefficient of variation, which is basically the mean divided by the standard 
deviation.  These statistics are included in the tables to demonstrate both the opportunity and the 
challenge presented by the dependent variables.  There is significant variation across issue areas 
in terms of the number of groups or lobbyists registered, which represents the differences among  
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Table 5-2: The Distribution of Registered Interest Groups in Each Issue-Area 
Issue Area Mean Group 
Registration 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Minimum Maximum 
Taxation/IRS Code 
 
603.6 54 11.18                            
11.18  
512 687 
Health Care 475.5 60.3 7.89 339 541 
Trade 356.8 27.5 12.97 319 407 
Environment 291.8 36.7 7.95 223 377 
Labor Issues 283.4 33.2 8.54 240 381 
Medicare/Medicaid 255.3 48.8 5.23 181 347 
Energy/Nuclear 234.1 73.1 3.20 146 333 
Transportation 225.4 39.2 5.75 168 311 
Education 214.8 46.1 4.66 147 278 
Defense 192.3 30.9 6.22 150 254 
Government Issues 175.3 19.6 8.94 135 223 
Agriculture 158.2 23 6.88 120 197 
Clean Air/Water 148.7 19.7 7.55 125 199 
Telecommunications 145.1 15.2 9.55 117 178 
Finance/Investments 135.4 15.8 8.57 107 161 
Copyright/Patent 133.5 13.4 9.56 117 160 
Immigration 131.9 31.2 4.23 69 177 
Science/Technology 124.6 18.2 6.85 88 153 
Banking 121.5 8 15.19 107 135 
Insurance 121.4 24.2 5.02 86 171 
Foreign Relations 109.3 14.3 7.64 92 132 
Retirement 107.1 34.4 3.11 53 164 
Consumer Issues 100.9 8.9 11.34 84 119 
Natural Resources 92.9 11.2 8.29 70 121 
Law Enforcement 91.6 15.1 6.07 67 114 
Medical Research 84.4 12.6 6.70 62 104 
Bankruptcy 79.8 24 3.33 17 110 
Communications 74.1 12.3 6.02 53 97 
Food Industry 74 9.4 7.87 53 89 
Aviation 73.1 10.1 7.24 59 101 
Housing 66.4 3.2 20.75 62 71 
Waste 61.9 24.6 2.52 31 126 
Civil Rights/Liberties 61.6 8.3 7.42 47 77 
Computer Industry 60.6 10.8 5.61 40 81 
Small Business 58.8 10 5.88 45 79 
Fuel/Gas/Oil 50.7 6.1 8.31 40 62 
Welfare 50.6 18.6 2.72 30 95 
Railroads 48.9 8.2 5.96 32 58 
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Pharmacy 48 11.1 4.32 31 68 
Veterans 47 12.3 3.82 32 73 
Family Issues 45.1 4.3 10.49 37 52 
Tobacco 39.4 16.5 2.39 24 85 
Postal 38.1 10.2 3.74 23 62 
Aerospace 32.6 7.8 4.18 20 45 
Disaster Management 32.3 10.3 3.14 17 57 
Trucking/Shipping 31.9 4.1 7.78 23 39 
Roads/Highways 30.9 6.6 4.68 20 41 
Alcohol 24.9 4 6.23 17 32 
Indian Affairs 23.3 5.5 4.24 15 31 
Gaming/Gambling 14.8 5.1 2.90 4 22 
Travel/Tourism 9.9 2.4 4.13 6 15 
Unemployment 9.3 3.8 2.45 3 17 
Urban Development 8.3 1.6 5.19 6 12 
District of Columbia 7.9 1.9 4.16 5 11 
Commodities 7.4 1.9 3.89 4 11 
Minting/Money 3.6 1.7 2.12 2 7 
Total 113 117.4 6.48 2 687 
 
issue areas in the social mobilization that surrounds policy activity, basically a correlation with 
issue salience.  While the differences across issue areas are of substantive interest, the challenge 
is that the social mobilization that occurs as a result of issue areas being salient is unlikely to 
change much over time.  Because the models explain the variation across issue areas and over 
time, the specification of the time component of the models will require careful attention.  This is 
something especially demonstrated by tables 5-2 and 5-3.  The coefficients of variation 
demonstrate that there is a substantially greater degree of variation across issue areas than there 
will be in any one issue area over time.  The correct model specification will therefore require 
that the lagged value of the organization and lobbyist population be included as an independent 
variable. The level of inertia over time is remarkable.  In fact, in results not reported below, a  
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Table 5-3: The Distribution of Registered Lobbying Firms Across Issue-Areas 
Issue Area 
Abbreviation 
Mean Lobbyist 
Registration 
Standard 
Deviation  
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Taxation/IRS Code 
 
1114.6 173.8 6.41 844 1551 
Defense 1036.3 383.5 2.70 563 1611 
Health Care 937.4 297.2 3.15 540 1593 
Transportation 811.2 291.3 2.78 469 1277 
Environment 630.3 214.6 2.94 520 923 
Trade 616.8 199.6 3.09 441 1093 
Energy/Nuclear 526.8 197.5 2.67 296 904 
Medicare/Medicaid 521.9 168.5 3.10 270 842 
Education 505.5 241.8 2.09 238 1007 
Telecommunications 442.4 139.8 3.16 255 874 
Government Issues 344.9 153.2 2.25 209 801 
Agriculture 331.1 91.2 3.63 212 578 
Natural Resources 311.1 79.5 3.91 214 515 
Aviation 280.9 139.3 2.02 154 747 
Finance/Investments 269.4 115.9 2.32 139 580 
Banking 257.8 46.9 5.50 208 410 
Indian Affairs 245.1 89 2.75 148 467 
Labor Issues 224 63.3 3.54 164 421 
Clean Air/Water 218.8 43.7 5.01 166 324 
Housing 204.4 69.6 2.94 123 405 
Science/Technology 195.9 78.4 2.50 106 405 
Copyright/Patent 191.9 50.6 3.79 161 362 
Law Enforcement 187.4 84.7 2.21 102 450 
Communications 169.3 43.5 3.89 112 243 
Medical Research 166.9 56 2.98 106 330 
Foreign Relations 158.9 67.2 2.36 96 371 
Insurance 152.9 71 2.15 86 329 
Computer Industry 133.1 58.2 2.29 52 288 
Consumer Issues 121.8 30.9 3.94 90 221 
Food Industry 117.7 41 2.87 78 249 
Urban Development 114.6 41.5 2.76 61 213 
Fuel/Gas/Oil 108.9 44.2 2.46 56 235 
Immigration 105.2 27.7 3.80 69 172 
Waste 96.7 26.4 3.66 67 159 
Tobacco 93.7 36.8 2.55 51 192 
Roads/Highways 93.3 45 2.07 49 226 
Gaming/Gambling 92.2 38.8 2.38 49 208 
Pharmacy 89.3 32.6 2.74 58 186 
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Railroads 88.8 32.7 2.72 64 185 
Retirement 85.3 41.8 2.04 32 196 
Bankruptcy 84.9 32.6 2.60 17 129 
Aerospace 81.4 41.2 1.98 45 194 
Disaster Management 81 47 1.72 38 226 
Postal 67.4 36 1.87 35 193 
Small Business 64.7 18 3.59 42 109 
Welfare 61.1 22 2.78 39 112 
Alcohol 43.1 12.4 3.48 27 78 
Travel/Tourism 43 18.5 2.32 26 106 
Veterans 38.5 16.8 2.29 12 70 
Trucking/Shipping 34.6 17.2 2.01 22 95 
Civil Rights/Liberties 27.6 10.3 2.68 14 50 
Minting/Money 22.6 14.2 1.59 12 66 
Family Issues 15.7 6.2 2.53 8 30 
District of Columbia 14 11.8 1.19 6 54 
Commodities 6.7 3.1 2.16 2 13 
Unemployment 2.8 2 1.40 0 8 
Total 233.6 279.6 2.83 0 1611 
 
simple regression of the number of organizations lobbying on their own behalf on the number of 
organizations lobbying on their own behalf in the previous time period produces an R-squared 
value of 0.98.  In the case of hired lobbying firms, the lagged value for each issue area alone 
produces an R-squared value of 0.84.  The challenge, then, will be to find significant effects of 
government attention that are independent of the inertial nature of the data.  The data fall on a 
nearly straight line, with very small amounts of variation around the mean.  There is, of course, 
more explanatory room afforded in the hired lobbyist models, as the tables above demonstrate.  
The average issue area in table 5-2, the organizations lobbying on their own behalf, has 113 
groups lobbying over time, with a standard deviation of only 13.  Table 5-3 shows, however, that 
hired lobbyist populations have an average annual value across the issue areas of 234 and a 
standard deviation of 80.  The differences between the two types of lobbying entities are likely 
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because organizations lobbying on their own behalf are much more likely to get in and stay 
involved in issue areas, whereas the hiring of lobbying firms is much more of a temporary 
strategy.  The inertial nature of each series, especially those of organizations lobbying on their 
own behalf, leave little room for the achievement of statistically significant coefficients, making 
significant results all the more impressive. 
 This chapter replicates and extends the work of Leech et al (2005), who found that 
Congressional attention to an issue area had a significant influence on the lobbying populations 
registered to lobby in the corresponding issue area.  Leech et al used pooled-cross sectional time 
series methods, which account for auto-correlation over time as well as panel correlated standard 
errors across the issue areas from 1996-2000.  This paper extends the time period under study 
from 1996-2003, which because of the inclusion of lagged values actually extends the time-
periods analyzed from four to fourteen, across the same fifty-six issue areas.  The methods 
employed here are the same, appropriately controlling for autocorrelation across both time and 
space.  Further, this chapter will include variables for the effects of federal spending associated 
with each issue area and the lagged value of each organizational or hired lobbyist population.  
Finally, this chapter also adds a variable measuring presidential activity to the model, testing for 
the inter-branch dynamics that exist in explaining the demand for changes in lobbying 
populations.    
 One caveat that should be mentioned is that the inclusion of the federal spending variable 
for each issue area does drop the number of observations from fifty-six issue areas to only 
twenty-six, because only twenty-six of the issue areas could be linked to the budget codes used 
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in the Policy Agendas Project.  Testing the models in these ways, I expect to find the following 
relationships. 
Hypothesis 1: Congressional hearings will have a significant positive effect on both 
organizational and lobbying populations.  The substantive strength of the relationship will be 
improved by the inclusion of more time periods. 
Hypothesis one is related to the work of Leech et al (2005), but I expect that the increased 
number of time periods included in this chapter will demonstrably improve the relationship 
between Congressional attention and lobbying populations, regardless of their specification. 
Hypothesis 2: Federal spending in each issue area will also mobilize both organizations and hired 
lobbyists in a significant and positive way, but the substantive affect of federal spending will be 
much smaller than that of Congressional or presidential attention. 
Hypothesis two states the expectation that the relationship between federal spending and 
lobbying populations will remain significant, as should be expected following the work of Leech 
et al.  Consistent with the findings of Leech et al, however, it is expected that the affect of federal 
spending will be quite small compared to institutional activity in each policy area.   
Hypothesis 3: Presidential attention will have a significant positive effect on both the number of 
organizations registering to lobby on their own behalf as well as the number of hired lobbyists in 
presidential domains. 
Hypothesis 4: Presidential attention will have substantially higher affects in those areas deemed 
as presidential domains, areas in which presidential attention is the norm rather than the 
exception.   
Hypothesis three and four pertain to the theoretical extension of the Leech et al (2005), 
adding a variable for presidential activity.  It is expected that presidential attention will have a 
significant positive effect, increasing the number of lobbyists registered on their own behalf or as 
hired firms.  The positive effect is expected to be especially pronounced in presidential domains, 
those policy areas in which presidential attention is the rule rather than the exception.   
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Hypothesis 5: Congressional attention will have a larger substantive affect in domains not 
deemed to be “presidential”, but will have significant positive results regardless of the level of 
presidential activity. 
Finally, the last hypothesis states that while presidential attention‟s addition to the model 
will contribute significantly to scholarly understandings of lobby demand, the addition of 
presidential attention will not change the substantive and significant effect observed by previous 
studies that Congress has on lobbying populations.   Congressional hearings have a profound 
effect on lobbying populations, a finding consistent with previous studies and expected to be 
reinforced in this paper.  It is expected that the affect of Congressional hearings will be higher in 
non-presidential domains, but still significant regardless of the role of the president in each 
policy domain. 
Analysis 
 The first step in analyzing the relationship between institutional attention and lobbying 
communities is to confirm and extend the models presented by Leech and her colleagues.  Tables 
4 and 5 perform this task.  Part A of each table confirms the findings of Leech and her 
colleagues.  These models are included in this work in order to demonstrate how the inclusion of 
more time periods affects the findings.  Table 5-4a shows these results for lobbying 
organizations (e.g., organizations lobbying on their own behalf in Washington), and Table 5-5a 
shows the results for lobbying firms (e.g., hired lobbyists working on behalf of clients).  Models 
1 through 4 in each table replicate the original findings nearly exactly.
5
  Model 5 then drops the 
variable for firms from the original model.  The number of firms active in the same area of the 
                                                          
5
 The Policy Agendas Project released updated budgetary figures since the original Leech et al. 
article was published.  Using the new Agendas Project budget data, figures are reported in 2003 
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Table 5-4: The Effects of Congressional Activity on Lobbying Activity by Organizations 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Hearings 
 
1.67*** 
(0.43) 
 
1.652*** 
(0.58) 
 
 
2.64** 
(1.07) 
 
0.25* 
(0.15) 
 
0.29* 
(0.17) 
Federal Spending (in Billions)  0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
Firms   3.32e
-04
*** 
(5.03e
-05) 
3.33e
-05
 
(2.84e
-05) 
 
Organizations, t-1    0.98*** 
(0.05) 
1.00*** 
(0.04) 
Intercept 83.41*** 
(5.10) 
98.951*** 
(8.58) 
49.19*** 
(13.55) 
-1.70 
(1.16) 
-1.28 
(1.26) 
R-square 0.07 0.07 0.42 0.98 0.98 
N, T N=56,T=4 N=26, T=4 N=21, T=2 N=21, T=2 N=26, T=3 
Observations 224 104 42 42 78 
Notes: Coefficients computed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses.  ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10, 
two-tailed tests 
 
Part B: Extending the Original Model, 1996-2004 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Hearings 
 
1.88*** 
(0.21) 
 
2.00*** 
(0.04) 
 
 
0.18*** 
(0.062) 
Federal Spending (in Billions)  0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.004) 
Organizations, t-1   0.98*** 
(0.015) 
Intercept 86.80*** 
(3.02) 
96.82*** 
(4.87) 
-0.21 
(1.103) 
R-square 0.10 0.14 0.98 
N, T N=56,T=16 N=26, T=16 N=26, T=14 
Observations 896 416 364 
Notes: Coefficients computed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses.  ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10, 
two-tailed test. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dollars rather than 2000 dollars as in the original.  In addition, a small number of budgetary 
categories were adjusted in the new dataset.  None of this affects the replication of the original 
results in any significant manner.  Just one coefficient shifts by even one tenth of one decimal 
place: In model 3 of Table 3a, the coefficient for hearings is 2.64; it was 2.63 in the original. 
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Table 5-5: The Effects of Congressional Activity on Lobbying Activity by Firms 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Hearings 
 
2.90*** 
(0.59) 
 
3.25*** 
(0.66) 
 
 
6.80*** 
(2.07) 
 
1.96** 
(0.80) 
 
3.59*** 
(1.04) 
Federal Spending (in Billions)  0.21*** 
(0.02) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Firms   4.15e
-04
*** 
(8.66e
-05
) 
-2.54e
-05
 
(2.40e
-05
) 
 
Organizations, t-1    0.92*** 
(0.06) 
1.33*** 
(0.09) 
Intercept 132.34** 
(6.38) 
147.67*** 
(11.00) 
57.34** 
(25.55) 
-15.15*** 
(5.72) 
-11.32 
(7.80) 
R-square 0.07 0.10 0.43 0.98 0.69 
N, T N=56,T=4 N=26, T=4 N=21, T=2 N=21, T=2 N=26, T=3 
Observations 224 104 42 42 78 
Notes: Coefficients computed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses.  ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10, 
two-tailed tests 
 
Part B: Extending the Original Model, 1996-2004 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Hearings 
 
5.27*** 
(0.67) 
 
5.79*** 
(0.78) 
 
 
2.05*** 
(0.67) 
Federal Spending (in Billions)  0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
Organizations, t-1   0.91*** 
(0.07) 
Intercept 160.26*** 
(12.90) 
171.73*** 
(19.61) 
-6.40 
(12.22) 
R-square 0.14 0.19 0.86 
N, T N=56,T=16 N=26, T=16 N=26, T=14 
Observations 896 416 364 
Notes: Coefficients computed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses.  ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10, 
two-tailed tests 
 
economy was included in the original analysis as a measure of social or economic supply, since 
sectors with greater economic activity might generate more lobbying activity.  The original 
analysis showed that this variable was insignificant in its affect when previous lobbying activity 
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was included, as Model 4 indicates in both tables.   As inclusion of the firms variable caused a 
significant loss of data because the data were not available for all 56 issue areas and cannot be 
collected for each of the 14 six-month time periods included in the extended analysis, this 
variable is omitted in the extension of the original work.  As Model 5 shows, there is no 
substantively important difference in the results between Model 4 and Model 5, so I proceed 
without the firms variable. 
 Part B of Table 5-4 presents the full analysis of the extended time-series now available.  
The first model shows that 20 additional hearings in any issue area (that is, about one standard 
deviation) can be expected to result in about 36 more groups registering to lobby in that area.  
Controlling for the level of federal spending in the issue area causes the number of observations 
to drop substantially (because I do not have spending data for each of the 56 issue areas where I 
have hearings and lobby registration information), but the substantive affect remains virtually the 
same: 40 more groups for every 20 hearings, and a small effect for spending.  For each one 
hundred billion dollars in spending, one could expect to see an increase of about five registered 
interest groups.  This effect is statistically significant now that it is based on many more 
observations than in the earlier published analysis.  However, overall federal spending across the 
entire budget was less than $2.5 trillion in 2003, so this effect within any given issue area would 
substantively be related to at most only a few more group registrations. Finally, Model 3 is the 
most appropriate and accurate model, controlling as it does for the number of groups registered 
to lobby in the previous time period.  Here there are significant coefficients both for hearings and 
for spending.  Comparing the results from Parts A and B of Table 5-4 shows that the extended 
time coverage confirms the earlier analysis.  Some of the coefficients change in size but all the 
effects are now significant and the analysis is based on a much larger empirical base.  
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Considering the discussion above about the high levels of inertia in the lobbying patterns, the 
significant effects in Model 3 are very strong.  Controlling for how many lobbyists were active in 
the previous period, there is a significant effect for increased or decreased numbers of hearings 
on the number of lobbyists registered in that time period. 
Table 5-5 shows an identical series of results for hired contract lobbyists rather than for 
organizations lobbying on their own behalf, as in Table 5-4.  These results are stronger than 
those for the groups analyzed in Table 5-4 because there are greater numbers of contract 
lobbyists, with more variation from area to area and from time period to time period.  In any 
case, the results largely reconfirm the original analysis but put these findings on a much more 
substantial empirical footing.
6
 
Tables 5-6 and 5-7 extend the models by adding variables for presidential attention to test 
for their affect on the number of organizations lobbying on their own behalf, as well as the 
number of hired lobbyists operating in each policy area.  Table 5-6 presents the effects of 
presidential attention on the number of organizations lobbying on their own behalf.  Model 1 
provides the relationship between hearings and organized interests in the fully specified model, 
                                                          
6 I do not replicate the analyses presented in Table 4 in the original publication.  These used the 
number of hearings in the previous ten years rather than only in the contemporaneous six-month 
period.  Replication of these results showed that the models were largely confirmed.  However, 
with 14 time points rather than only 4 as in the earlier paper, the results were not significant in 
the model with a lagged dependent variable.  This is because the number of hearings in the 
previous ten years is almost the same for each successive six-month period.  (If one thinks of a 
ten-year period consisting of 20 six-month windows, moving forward in time, the data are 
identical for 18 of the 20 windows, changing only by replacing one old window with one new 
one in each period.  These differences are never very substantial.)  The redundancy of including 
both this variable as well as the lagged dependent variable makes little sense.  Findings were 
highly significant, as in the original, without the lagged dependent variable. 
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Table 5-6: The Effect of Executive Activity on Lobbying by Organizations 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Presidential Attention 
  
-1.27 
(2.46) 
 
               
-2.70** 
(1.33) 
Hearings 0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.38*** 
(0.13) 
0.25** 
(0.10) 
Federal Spending (in Billions) 0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Organizations, t-1 0.98*** 
(0.02) 
0.97*** 
(0.02) 
0.99*** 
(0.02) 
Intercept -0.21 
(1.10) 
-0.57 
(0.93) 
-0.98 
(3.65) 
R-square 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Observations 364 266 98 
Notes: Coefficients computed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors, which appear in parentheses.  ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10, 
two-tailed tests 
 
Table 5-7: The Effect of Executive Activity on Lobbying by Firms 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Presidential Attention 
  
-3.27 
(20.06) 
 
 
-23.25** 
(11.89) 
Hearings 2.05*** 
(0.67) 
4.14*** 
(1.27) 
3.01*** 
(0.90) 
Federal Spending (in Billions) 0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.54*** 
(0.15) 
Organizations, t-1 0.91*** 
(0.07) 
0.84*** 
(0.07) 
0.83*** 
(0.08) 
Intercept -6.40 
(12.22) 
-3.57 
(10.77) 
-54.01** 
(26.30) 
R-square .86 .85 .89 
Observations 364 266 98 
 
without the presidential attention variable, in order for the reader to be able to observe the 
changes in the hearings variable when presidential attention is added.  Model 1 of table six is, 
therefore, identical to the findings presented in model 3 of table 5-4b above.   
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Model 2 adds the presidential index to the model, examining the effects of presidential 
attention in non-presidential domains.  The model demonstrates, consistent with expectations, 
that presidential attention does not significantly affect the number of registrations among 
organized interests in non-presidential domains.  Interestingly, the explanatory strength of both 
the Congressional hearings and federal spending variables are increased when presidential 
attention is added to the model, indicating that the inclusion of the presidential attention variable 
is the more appropriate specification.  This is likely to be the case because the omission of 
presidential attention left the Congressional hearings and federal spending variables responsible 
to pick up a small portion of the depressive effect of presidential attention, a frequent result of 
omitted variable bias.   
Model 3 of table 5-6 demonstrates that presidential attention, consistent with 
expectations, has a significant effect on the number of organized interests registering to lobby 
Congress in domains where the president is typically active.  However, contrary to expectations, 
the effect of presidential attention is depressive in presidential domains, decreasing the number 
of interest groups registering to lobby Congress.  Both the Congressional hearings and federal 
spending variables again perform better with presidential attention included in the model.  Model 
three also demonstrates that the effects of Congressional hearings are especially pronounced in 
those areas where the president is not typically involved, as demonstrated by the larger 
coefficient in model 2 than in model 3. 
Table 5-7 presents similar models for the number of hired professional lobbyists.  Model 
1 again is copied from table 5-5, model 3, to allow the reader to trace changes in the 
Congressional hearings variable across the different model specifications as presidential attention 
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is added to complete the models.  Model 2 of table seven again demonstrates that presidential 
attention does not have a significant effect on the number of registered lobbyists in non-
presidential domains.  Similar to the models presented in table 5-6, the performance of 
Congressional hearings is improved when presidential attention is added to the model, 
suggesting again that Congress is especially dominant in fostering lobby demand in non-
presidential domains.   
Finally, in presidential domains, presidential attention is again has a significant effect on 
the number of registered lobbyists.  Once again, however, the relationship is negative.  This 
suggests that presidential attention in presidential domains actually draws lobbyists away from 
Congress.  Model 3 also demonstrates that Congressional hearings are again significant across all 
policy domains, but the effect is greater in model 2 than model 3, demonstrating that 
Congressional hearings are more important in areas where Congress is the dominant actor 
consistent with the findings in table 5-6. 
The significant negative findings for the presidential attention index in presidential 
domains are quite surprising, and are in fact the opposite of what should be expected based on a 
litany of previous literature.  Many previous studies discussed above suggest that the president 
has a great deal of power over the political agenda of Congress, the media, and the mass public.  
Despite this, the findings in this chapter suggest that presidential attention actually produces a 
counter mobilization in those areas where presidents are typically active, and has no effect in 
issue areas where the president is not usually involved.   
One possible explanation for this which was discussed above is that the lobby disclosure 
reports are a Congress-dominant measure of lobbying activity.  The Lobby Disclosure Act of 
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1995 (LDA) requires those spending over ten thousand dollars on lobbying activity to report 
their activities, but the key factor here is where the activities are occurring.  The LDA requires 
reporting of those lobbying Congress and only a small percentage of executive branch officials.  
The findings in this paper suggest it is more likely that the lobby disclosure data cannot account 
for much of the lobbying activity that is occurring in the executive branch.  If this is true, then 
the relationship observed in this paper could be a result of lobbyists leaving Congress when the 
executive branch begins attending to an issue, focusing their efforts on the executive branch 
instead.  Two aspects of the model make this especially likely.  First, the LDA only covers a few 
executive branch officials and is more focused on Congressional lobbying.  Secondly, the 
presidential index was partially constructed by the number of executive orders issued in a policy 
area.  The nature of executive orders, which carry the full force of the law without Congressional 
activity, make it especially likely that interested lobbyists would focus greater attention on the 
executive branch responsible for implementing the changes resulting from an executive order.  
Ultimately the debate over these findings require further investigation, including increased 
scholarly attention to executive branch lobbying. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Leech et al. (2005) argued that group mobilization is often in response to, rather than the 
cause of, government activities.  While social and economic mobilization affect the development 
of the interest-group universe, so too does government activity itself.  Recent work has 
confirmed and extended these findings.  Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (2006) found that 
Congressional hearings stimulated subsequent interest group mobilization in the state capitals.  
That is, even controlling for state legislative activities, actions in Congress caused groups to 
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mobilize in those same issue areas in the 50 states.  Clearly, federal government activities send 
strong cues to interested constituencies.  In response to increased levels of federal activities, 
affected interests mobilize to fight off the new federal incursions, move to encourage the activity, 
or attempt to modify the proposals before they are completed.  In any case, I see that state action 
affects group mobilization, not only the reverse. 
This chapter confirms and extends the original findings by Leech et al. in three ways.  
One is simply by adding additional time points and more observations, showing more robust and 
stronger findings than in the original.  With a substantial number of additional observations now 
available, the results demonstrate that the first findings are clearly robust.  Second, this chapter 
clarifies the earlier model by dropping the long-term hearings variable where a lagged dependent 
variable was also used.  Third, this paper explored the affect of presidential involvement.  The 
treatment here is certainly not the last word on this topic.  The measure of lobbying activity is 
more accurate for Congressional lobbying activities than it is for presidential or executive branch 
lobbying.  I have not presented a full model of presidential–legislative relations.  But there are 
some intriguing results suggesting that presidential activities affect interest-group mobilization 
only to the extent to which they are filtered through the affect of the president on Congress.  
Interest groups clearly respond differently to Congressional and presidential actions depending 
on the policy domain.  Presidential actions such as attention in the State of the Union address on 
a policy domain where Congress has clear and widely understood autonomy have no effect on 
lobbying actions.  Presidential actions in those domains traditionally reserved for greater 
executive branch authority, on the other hand, depress Congressional lobbying because they 
divert lobbying energy away from Congress and toward the executive.  Congressional actions in 
areas within traditional Congressional control stimulate substantially more lobbying mobilization 
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by both groups and hired lobbyists than Leech and colleagues had previously estimated.  By 
including an additional measure of presidential actions, I improve the model of Congressional 
lobbying.  The substantive affect of the model including presidential actions in the model on 
Congressional mobilization of lobbying is that Congressional actions have an even stronger 
affect on mobilizing lobbyists than I had previously estimated, but only in those areas where 
Congress dominates.  Where the president is an important player, his actions actually decrease 
Congressional lobbying. 
Almost 70 years ago Ernest Griffith (1939) noted the importance of communities of 
professionals in and around government dealing with the many details of public policy.  His idea 
of “policy whirlpools” became part of the standard understanding of the policymaking process, 
and remains relevant today.  Over 50 years ago, David Truman‟s (1951) view of the mobilization 
of interests through social disruptions generated a new view of the dynamics of social 
mobilization and interest-group activity in America.  Since this time scholars from Olson (1965) 
to Salisbury (1984 and Heinz et al. 1993), to Walker (1983, 1991) have made this story more 
complete.  More recently a number of scholars have addressed the affect of large new 
government programs on the development of citizen mobilization surrounding those issues.  
These studies have focused on war-related pensions (Skocpol, 1992), the social security program 
(Campbell, 2005), and the GI Bill (Mettler, 2005).  This chapter, like those that have preceded it 
(Leech et al. 2005 and Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery 2006), adds to this growing perspective.  
Group mobilization affects government growth, to be sure.  Government activities affect groups 
as well.  Further, presidential and Congressional actions have diverse effects, depending on the 
policy domain.   
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The fact that presidential actions have a substantial depressive effect on Congressional 
lobbying also suggests that the goals of government transparency so commonly addressed in 
public speeches by public officials would be greatly enhanced by a revision of the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995 to expand greatly the number of “covered officials” in the executive 
branch.  The evidence strongly suggests that much is happening there which is uncovered by the 
limited public disclosure of executive branch contacts now required by the law. 
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This project has provided a lot of information regarding the president‟s agenda.  As with 
most projects that have any value, the results have posed as many or more questions for future 
projects as they have answered.  The project has emerged from a literature which suggests that 
the president‟s power to influence the political agenda is unparalleled (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993; Kingdon, 1995), and that the influence that the president has over the political agenda in 
the United States is one of the most critical sources of presidential influence (Bond and Fleisher, 
1990; Edwards, 1990; Edwards and Wood, 1999; Edwards and Barrett, 2000).  Because agenda-
setting is such a critical part of presidential power and success, this dissertation has examined 
three important questions regarding presidential agenda-setting. 
 First, chapter three focused on the actual construction of the presidential agenda.  
Presidents are expected by the public and encouraged by Congress to construct a legislative 
program and work to advance those policy proposals deemed most important by the president.  
Chapter three modeled two aspects of the president‟s agenda choice: the size of the legislative 
agenda advanced by the president and the extent to which the president‟s agenda advances new 
programs.  Paul Light (1999) provides scholars with several explanatory variables that influence 
the size and content of the president‟s agenda.  Chapter three introduced an effort to understand 
which of these factors so eloquently put forth by Light ten years ago had the greatest influence 
on the president‟s agenda, and pair actual numbers with theory to understand the magnitude of 
political capital‟s impact.   
The results suggest that presidents are much more attentive to the party in control of the 
legislature, whether government is unified or divided, than any other factor.  Unified 
government‟s influence on both the size and innovation offered in the president‟s legislative 
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agenda is unrivaled by other factors.  Electoral results also influence the size of the president‟s 
agenda, with larger margins of victory leading the president to request more bill introductions to 
Congress.  A variable was also included modeling midterm loss with the expectation that greater 
loss at the midterm in Congress would decrease the size of the president‟s agenda.  Surprisingly, 
the results demonstrate that greater midterm losses actually increase the size of the president‟s 
agenda, suggesting perhaps that presidents want to be assertive with a new Congress despite the 
losses suffered in order to show resolve in the face of political adversity.  Public approval also 
has a significant influence on the size of the president‟s agenda, but approval levels influence the 
size of the agenda far less than unified government and do not significantly influence the number 
of new programs offered in the president‟s program.  These findings are consistent with the work 
of previous scholars, who suggest that the influence of public approval on a president‟s prospects 
for success in Congress is limited to the margins (Edwards, 1990).  The results of the quantitative 
models in chapter three demonstrate that in order for public approval to exert as much influence 
on the size of the president‟s legislative agenda, a president would have to see increased public 
approval numbers of greater than 53 points, which would be a remarkable leap.  This would 
require a president who has a public approval rating of 37%, for example, to jump to 90%.  
Although such an increase is theoretically possible, the likelihood of such an unpopular president 
suddenly becoming so popular is unlikely, even in those flag-rallying moments that have become 
part of our political universe (Edwards and Swenson, 1997). 
The findings demonstrate that although public approval will lead presidents to increase 
the size of their agenda, other considerations are much more important.  The cycle of decreasing 
influence in presidential capital that Light (1999) hypothesizes will progress throughout a 
president‟s term may be overestimated then, for two reasons.  First, factors aside from the 
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president‟s declining approval throughout his term play a more critical role in determining 
agenda size.  Secondly, approval in and of itself does not follow a straight, linear, downward 
progression.  Rather, presidents receive several opportunities to act with public approval 
increases throughout their terms, despite the fact that these opportunities are far less predictable 
than the downward progression of approval (Edwards and Gallup, 1990).   
Finally, the results demonstrate that even when controlling for factors occurring within 
the political environment that are largely beyond a president‟s control, a significant portion of 
the variation in agenda size and the number of new programs a president advances is explained 
simply by the different individuals occupying the office.  The agendas of Presidents Carter and 
Reagan were much larger than that of either President Bush or President Clinton, and Presidents 
Bush and Reagan introduced many more new programs than Presidents Carter or Clinton when 
controlling for other factors.   
These results bring into question some of the long held assumptions about these four 
presidencies, especially the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter.  President Carter 
has long been assumed to have had an especially large, in fact many would argue too large, 
legislative agenda.  President Reagan, on the other hand, has been criticized for not being 
especially interested in getting bogged down in the mundane details of legislation (Light, 1999).  
Chapter three suggests, however, that many of the differences between these two individual 
presidents were not in their personality or approach to the job of being president.  Rather, many 
of the differences in their legislative agendas are explained by the different political 
circumstances faced by each of them during their administrations.  Jimmy Carter was benefitted 
by serving during a time of unified government, which led to a vast increase in the size of his 
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legislative agenda.  Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, never had a Republican House and had a 
Republican Senate for only a short time.  Reagan also took office with very low approval 
because he was such a polarizing figure.  In short, these factors contribute much more to the 
differing agenda sizes than any personality traits.  An important step forward in scholarship 
regarding presidential agendas would be to construct a similar model that better investigates the 
possible influence of presidential personality or approach to the job of being president.  It is 
critical for scholars to compare the importance of personality vs. environment in order to better 
understand several important governing activities.  Chapter three certainly suggests that the 
construction of agenda is among them. 
Chapter four examines the extent to which the president‟s agenda influences that of 
Congress and the media.  One of the primary goals of any modern president is to advance an 
agenda for policy change in Congress.  At the same time, the media provides a critical bridge to 
the broader political environment, especially to the public.  Presidential ability to influence either 
of these agendas is therefore a critical component of presidential success.  However, as chapter 
three suggests, presidents do not construct an agenda in a bubble.  Rather, it is likely that the 
president will not be a leader, but rather will act as a follower in distributing the scarce resource 
of attention to any one political issue.  As such, chapter four uses vector auto-regression to 
determine causality among the attention series of the president, Congress, and the media in 
nineteen public policy issue areas.  The purpose of this chapter is two-fold; first to determine 
who leads whom among three series that are difficult to theoretically separate for structured 
equations, and secondly to gain a better understanding of what issue areas each actor leads or 
follows in attending to political issues. 
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The results in chapter four suggest that the president is much more entrepreneurial in 
constructing a political agenda than Congress, and also has a tendency to lead the media‟s 
attention more than following the media as a proxy of public issue priorities.  The findings 
confirm assertions made by several previous scholars who suggest that the president‟s ability to 
bring about attention to political issues is unrivaled by other actors (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993; Kingdon, 1995).  The findings also provide some confirmatory evidence that the media 
does behave similarly to what should be expected as a bridge to the political environment, 
exerting much greater influence over the agenda of an electoral minded Congress (Mayhew, 
1974).  At the same time the actions of the president are almost all news worthy in modern times, 
and the media is much more likely to follow the president than Congress in selecting which 
public policy issues will receive attention.   
Several interesting questions arise from the findings in chapter four, two of which will be 
briefly discussed here.  First, future studies should build upon the information provided in 
chapter four at the policy area level to determine what factors unique to each policy area make an 
issue more or less likely for any of the actors examined in the chapter to lead or follow.  Such a 
study would be a valuable addition to the presidency, Congress, agenda setting, and public policy 
literatures and has been largely unexamined in previous works.  Secondly, once the patterns of 
influence unique to a policy area are uncovered, which is accomplished in chapter four, the next 
step is to construct quantitative models with parameter restrictions that arise out of these findings 
in order to determine the extent of influence that any actor has over the others in each specific 
policy area.  Chapter four simply discovered the patterns of influence for each individual policy 
area.  It is up to future studies to examine the extent of those influence patterns in a quantitative 
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model.  To some extent, chapter four represents an important first step towards the investigation 
of a far broader research question.   
Finally, chapter five investigates the influence of presidential and Congressional issue 
attention on the interest group populations active in each issue area.  Previous studies 
demonstrate that Congressional attention to issues has a positive impact on the size of lobbying 
communities, suggesting that the long posited relationship between groups and government 
flows in both directions.  Because the president has an unrivaled ability to increase the attention 
devoted to a public policy issue in the political environment, it is expected that presidential 
attention should have a similar positive impact that should presumably exceed that of Congress.  
The findings in chapter five suggest otherwise, however, as an increase in the attention the 
president devotes to an issue area actually depresses the size of the interest group population 
registered to lobby Congress.  While these findings appear to be counterintuitive, there is a 
plausible explanation behind this seemingly strange finding. 
The findings should not be taken as evidence that the president depresses the lobbying 
energy surrounding a policy area.  Rather, because the data are pulled from the Lobby Disclosure 
Database, a Congress-dominated measure of lobby populations, it is likely that the result is 
picking up a tendency on the part of interest groups to devote lobbying efforts to the executive 
branch instead of Congress when the executive begins attending to the issue.  Either way, 
presidential attention does significantly influence the size of lobbying populations, just not in the 
expected direction.  It is because of these confounding results that important questions remain 
open to investigation. 
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Two future areas of study would represent a promising follow-up to the evidence 
presented in chapter five.  First, scholars should devote a much greater amount of care to 
examining the relationship between the president and interest groups.  It is clear that presidential 
attention should evoke an interest group response, but we cannot gain a full understanding of that 
relationship without a much larger research project that is focused specifically on lobbying in the 
executive branch.  Second, an investigation of presidential attention‟s influence on the size of 
state lobbying communities may provide the evidence of the hypothesized relationship that was 
not found in chapter five, contrary to expectations.  The president devoting attention to issues 
should send a signal to the broader political environment that the policy train is leaving the 
station, and the groups would best serve themselves by getting on board.  Previous studies have 
linked political attention on the national level to the lobbying population active in a given policy 
area on the state level, but again the national government‟s attention was only examined using 
Congressional measures (Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery, 2009).  If the president shifting 
attention sends shockwaves throughout the political system, especially if the response is 
expected to be greater for presidential rather than Congressional attention, then there should be a 
response in state level lobbying communities.  If this hypothesis is tested and the evidence 
supports it, there will be further evidence pointing to the need to examine executive branch 
lobbying much more carefully. 
Broadly speaking, this dissertation has followed in a long line of studies that have 
examined presidential agendas using a variety of measures.  In chapter three, the president‟s 
agenda was modeled by specifically focusing on the president‟s legislative agenda, as measured 
by the number of bills introduced by request in Congress from 1977-2000.  In chapter four, the 
president‟s agenda was measured using the number of policy messages in any given policy area 
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that the president transmitted to Congress through letters, speeches, or any other form of 
communication.  Finally, in chapter five, presidential priorities were measured using an index 
variable which combined the number of policy mentions in the State of the Union Address and 
the number of executive orders issued in a given policy area.  Three different measures are 
employed in three different empirical chapters, which makes me guilty of the same problem for 
which I am about to criticize the presidency subfield.  Scholars of the presidency have to gain a 
fuller understanding of how to best measure presidential priorities, or at least gain a better 
understanding of which measures are appropriate for some specific purposes.  Largely the 
literature has progressed with different measures of presidential priorities with no one taking 
time out to ask why.  Is the president‟s agenda such a complicated concept that several measures 
are required to serve as a proxy?  Or do we simply have a litany of less than ideal measures we 
continue to recycle because we do not have a good option?  It seems that the latter is much more 
likely.  This is a very critical question that scholars of the American presidency have to confront 
moving forward if we are to better understand the president‟s power to set the agenda or its 
influence in the political system more broadly.  
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